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In this thesis, we cover various topics in lattice-based cryptography. This means
that the scope of this thesis is wider than it is deep, with contributions in the areas
of cryptanalysis, hardness assumptions and cryptographic constructions. For the
cryptanalytic contribution, we present techniques that allow an attacker to recover
a secret key when given a leakage profile practically achievable by means of a cold
boot attack. In particular, we focus on the case where a number theoretic transform
(NTT) is used for key storage. This is a common choice made in efficient imple-
mentations of lattice-based cryptography. In addition to describing the attack in
detail, we run experiments attesting to the practicality and efficiency of our methods
using realistic parameters. Our techniques rely heavily on the divide and conquer
structure of the NTT and lattice basis reduction.
The second main contribution considers reductions between variants of the standard
learning with errors (LWE) problem. The variants of interest are Ring-LWE (RLWE)
and Module-LWE (MLWE). The content presented in this thesis improves on our
original paper published at Asiacrypt 2017 by way of an improved analysis of the
reduction. In particular, a main result in our original paper states that for power-of-
two cyclotomic rings of dimension n, there is a reduction from the MLWE problem
in module rank d, modulus q and error rate α to the RLWE problem in modulus qd
and error rate α′ = n2
√
d ·α. However, this thesis shows that a smaller error rate of
α′ = n1/2+c
√
d ·α is possible for any constant c > 0. In addition, the original RLWE
to RLWE dimensions that halve the ring dimension while squaring the modulus are
improved upon by way of shrinking the growth factor in error rate.
Our final contribution is to construct a verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function
(VOPRF) protocol whose security is based on lattice assumptions. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first construction of a post-quantum secure VOPRF. A VOPRF
allows a client to obtain a pseudorandom function evaluation on a point of its choice
using a server’s secret key. Importantly, the server does not learn anything about
the client’s input and the client does not learn anything about the server’s key. Our
protocol manages to achieve security against adversaries that may deviate arbitrar-
ily from the protocol and consists of a single round of interaction. Our protocol
should be interpreted as showing the feasibility of round-optimal VOPRFs from




1.1 LWE and its Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Preliminaries 24
2.1 General Mathematical Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.1 Statistical Distance and Rényi Divergence . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Lattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.1 Lattice Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Gaussian Distributions (Over Lattices) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Lattice Basis Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Fields, Modules, Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.1 Coefficient Embedding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.2 Canonical Embedding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Number Theoretic Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7 Learning With Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8 Ring Learning With Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.9 Module Learning With Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.9.1 *Practical* R/MLWE Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.10 The 1D-SIS Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.11 Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3 Cold Boot/Leakage Attacks 48
3.1 Chapter Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Chapter Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.1 Minimal Binary Signed Digit Representation . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2.2 Standard Methods for Solving BDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2.3 Cold Boot Attack Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Cold Boot Resilience for Kyber’s Parameters (non-NTT) . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Cold Boot NTT Decoding Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 The Main Cold Boot Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5.1 Divide and Conquer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5.2 Extending Solutions to Sub-Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.3 Lattice Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.4 A Guessing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5.5 Putting It All Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.6 Low Hamming Weight Secret Block Leakage Attack . . . . . . . . . 85
6
CONTENTS
3.6.1 Linear Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.6.2 Full Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6.3 Cold Boot Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6.4 Future Directions for Linear Complexity Attacks . . . . . . . 93
3.7 Periodic Leakage Attack [45] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.7.1 Indexing in Z∗2n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.7.2 Deriving the Noiseless Systems of Equations . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.7.3 Solving for the Most Likely Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.7.4 Experimental Evaluation and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4 Reductions between MLWE and RLWE 98
4.1 Chapter Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2 Chapter Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3 Reductions Between MLWE Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.1 Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.2 The Main Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.3 Normal Form Secret Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.3.4 Instantiation: Power-of-Two Cyclotomic Rings . . . . . . . . 109
4.3.5 Strictly Spherical Error Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3.6 Modulus Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.4 Reducing RLWE in (n, q) to (n/2, q2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.1 Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.2 Proof of Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5 Related/Subsequent Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.5.1 An Improved RLWE to RLWE Reduction Result . . . . . . . 120
5 A Lattice-Based VOPRF 123
5.1 Chapter Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.2 Chapter Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.2.1 RLWE with Two (Invertible) Samples is Well-Defined . . . . . 127
5.2.2 The BP14 PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2.3 Verifiable Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3 A VOPRF Construction From Lattices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.3.1 Sampling s, t, u, v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.3.2 Zero Knowledge Argument of Knowledge Statements . . . . . 137
5.3.3 Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.4 VOPRF Security Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.4.1 Malicious Client Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.4.2 Malicious Server Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.4.3 Setting the parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.5 Post-Quantum Zero Knowledge Instantiations (High level) . . . . . . 149
5.6 Abstract Stern Protocol for Proof System 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.6.1 (Randomised) PRF Evaluation and the ZK Relation. . . . . . 154
5.6.2 Evaluation of F ′ as a System of Linear Equations. . . . . . . 155
5.6.3 Three Problems with the Linear System. . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.6.4 The Final Linear System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.6.5 The Building Block Extensions and Permutations. . . . . . . 159
7
CONTENTS




3.1 Recursive folding/dimension reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Histogram of observed squared norms of vectors of length n = 256
mod q = 7681, folded three times to dimension 32, written in base 27,
for θ = 3 and κ = 19. Note that in this example E[∥(∆(ℓ), θs)∥2] <
κ 4
ℓ−1
3 ℓ + n (θσ)
2 because log2 q < 14. Thus, half of our entries are
bounded by 26 instead of 27 This is taken into account when we
compute the expectation in this figure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Length of Gram-Schmidt vectors in q-ary lattice derived from nega-
cyclic inverse NTT at dimension 32 using parameters ℓ = 7, θ = 1. . 74
3.4 Projected lengths for 256 samples of (∆(ℓ), θs) and the norms of the
Gram-Schmidt vectors for our reduced basis B′ for θ = 3 with κ = 19,
folded down three times to n = 32 and shaved with parameters α, β =
4, 2. The dotted line indicates d− bs, i.e. where we start enumerating. 75
3.5 A minimal length LFSR generating the finite sequence (3, 2, 3, 1, 3, 2, 4)
over Z7. Note that the coefficients of the connection polynomial are
the negation of the multiplicands in this diagram. This LFSR has
length 4, yet the minimal degree connection polynomial has degree 3. 87
3.6 Linear complexity profiles for a random sequence (left) and for the
NTT of a low Hamming weight vector (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1 The Ideal Functionality FVOPRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.2 VOPRF construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.3 Abstract Stern Protocol [86] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
9
List of Tables
1.1 Estimated costs of cold boot attacks on Kyber KEM keys stored in
the non-NTT/NTT domain with ρ0, ρ1 cold boot bit-flip rates. The
non-NTT success rate is always expected to be close to 100%. For
more details, see the caption of Table 3.10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2 Estimated costs of cold boot attacks on New Hope KEM keys stored
in the non-NTT/NTT domain with ρ0, ρ1 cold boot bit-flip rates. The
non-NTT success rate is always expected to be close to 100%. For
more details, see the caption of Table 3.15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 The preservation rate of the Hamming weight of∆ on folding multiple
times for κ = 19 cold boot flips on Kyber parameters. . . . . . . . . 66
3.2 A breakdown of the statistics on the 128 to 64 dimensional fold on
1000 Kyber cold boot instances (κ = 19) when carrying out the three
guessing phases. The “Solvable” row indicates how many of the in-
stances in each category are solvable by the three guessing phases. . 66
3.3 The analogous statistics to those in Table 3.2 for κ = 25. For details
on the table entries, see the caption for Table 3.2. . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 The maximum possible κ handled by each guessing band size β for
Kyber parameters and the cost of guessing the significant band. . . . 71
3.5 Experimental results for Kyber parameters and number of bit-flips
κ = 5 (ρ0 = 0.2%, ρ1 = 0.1%); θ is the scaling factor of our lattice, α
the number of bits we guess in a band of size β. In the “even” case we
target the least significant bits of the components of ∆ first. The col-
umn “guess” holds the number of guesses before lattice enumeration
which includes the cost of guessing ∆0, the column “enum” holds the
number of nodes in the pruned lattice-point enumeration tree. The
column “total” is the product of the two. All costs are give as log2(·).
The column “rate” is the success rate over 200 experiments. Only
parameters with success rate ≥ 60% are shown. The minimal total
cost is highlighted in bold and used in Table 3.10. . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 10 (ρ0 = 0.5%,
ρ1 = 0.1%). For details see Table 3.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7 Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 19 (ρ0 = 1.0%,
ρ1 = 0.1%). For details see Table 3.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.8 Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 25 (ρ0 = 1.4%, ρ1 =
0.1%). For details see Table 3.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.9 Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 30 (ρ0 = 1.7%, ρ1 =
0.1%). For details see Table 3.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
10
LIST OF TABLES
3.10 Cold boot attacks on Kyber KEM keys stored in the NTT domain
with ρ0, ρ1 the cold boot bit-flip rates. The column “cost” gives the
cost of recovering 256 components of the secret in terms of the num-
ber of lattice points visited during enumeration (≈ 100 CPU cycles
each). The attack can be repeated to recover all 768 components.
The column “rate” shows the overall success rate 1 − (1− p0)2 for
recovering 256 components of the secret, cf. Section 3.5.4.1. We also
give the costs of a cold boot attack when the secret key is stored in
the time domain in the column “non-NTT”, cf. Section 3.4. In that
case, the success rate is always expected to be close to 100%. . . . . 81
3.11 Experimental results for New Hope parameters and number of bit-
flips κ = 10; θ is the scaling factor of our lattice, α the number of
bits we guess in a band of size β. In the “even” case we target the
least significant bits of the components of∆ first. The column “guess”
holds the number of guesses before lattice enumeration which includes
the cost of guessing∆0, the column “enum” holds the number of nodes
in the pruned lattice-point enumeration tree. The column “total” is
the product of the two. All costs are give as log2(·). The column
“rate” is the success rate over 100 experiments. Only parameters with
success rate ≥ 50% are shown. The minimal total cost is highlighted
in bold and used in Table 3.15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.12 Experimental results for New Hope parameters and number of bit-
flips κ = 19; for details see Table 3.11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.13 Experimental results for New Hope parameters and κ = 25. For
details see Table 3.11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.14 Experimental results for New Hope parameters and κ = 30. For
details see Table 3.11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.15 Cold boot attacks on New Hope KEM. The column “cost” gives
the cost of recovering all 1024 components of the secret in terms
of the number of lattice points visited during enumeration (≈ 100
CPU cycles each). The column “rate” shows the overall success rate
1 − (1− p0)2 for recovering 1024 components of the secret, cf. Sec-
tion 3.5.4.1. For the columns labelled “non-NTT”, see caption of
Table 3.10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84





1.1 LWE and its Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
As the development of large-scale quantum computation progresses, new solutions
to cryptographic problems are being developed. In particular, these new solutions
are intended to resist attacks carried out on a quantum computer. Unfortunately, all
cryptographic constructions that are secure assuming the hardness of the RSA [120]
or discrete logarithm problems are insecure when considering an adversary that can
execute Shor’s quantum algorithm [129]. Since these problems are central in the de-
sign of a large proportion of cryptography, the cryptographic community has been
investigating alternative constructions/hardness assumptions that remain secure
/valid with respect to quantum adversaries. In addition to Shor’s algorithm, quan-
tum algorithms such as Grover’s algorithm [63], Simon’s algorithm [130], and the
HHL algorithm [92] have all been considered for quantum cryptanalysis [80, 28, 39].
Cryptography that remains secure against quantum adversaries is often called post-
quantum cryptography. The importance of designing post-quantum cryptography is
highlighted by the efforts of NIST to standardise post-quantum public-key encryp-
tion, key encapsulation mechanisms and signature schemes [104].
Research areas in post-quantum cryptography are numerous. Amongst these areas
are lattice-based cryptography, multi-variate cryptography, code-based cryptogra-
phy, hash-based cryptography and isogeny-based cryptography. In this thesis, we
will focus solely on lattice-based cryptography, which appears to be amongst the
most popular research areas in post-quantum cryptography. In fact, this thesis is
fairly broad in its content and covers different topics within lattice-based cryptog-
raphy. Therefore, this introduction will contain brief overviews of:
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• popular hardness assumptions,
• cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes,
• and advanced cryptographic constructions.
1.1 LWE and its Variants
The learning with errors problem (LWE) [118] is perhaps the most fundamental
assumption in lattice-based cryptography. Informally, the (decisional) LWE problem
asks an adversary to distinguish between (ai, bi := ai · s + ei) ∈ Znq × Zq and
(ai, ui) ∈ Znq × Zq for i = 1, . . . ,m where ai is uniform over Znq ; ui is uniform over
Zq; the “noise” terms ei ∈ Z are integers small in absolute value; and s ∈ Znq is a
secret drawn from a uniform distribution. Typically, the noise terms are sampled
from a discretised Gaussian distribution with standard deviation α · q. We refer to
the parameter α as the error rate. It is believed that the LWE problem cannot be
solved efficiently by a quantum algorithm. This belief is partially backed up by the
result of Regev stating that the existence of an efficient quantum algorithm solving
LWE implies the existence of an efficient quantum algorithm solving certain lattice
problems in the worst-case. Therefore, according to the hypothesis that these worst-
case lattice problems are not efficiently solvable with respect to quantum algorithms,
LWE is not efficiently solvable; even for quantum adversaries. For formal statements,
see Section 2.
One can view the LWE problem as the task of distinguishing random noisy in-
ner products from uniform. From this informal interpretation, one can straight-
forwardly imagine replacing the finite set of vectors Znq with other finite spaces and
swapping the inner product/addition operations with alternative analogous opera-
tions to obtain variants of the LWE problem. One example would be to consider
the ring of integers R of some algebraic number field. We might then swap the
vectors in Znq with Rq := R/qR and replace inner-products and additions with mul-
tiplication and addition in Rq. More concretely, this description gives rise to the
Ring-LWE (RLWE) [97] and informally asks an adversary to distinguish between
(ai, bi := ai · s + ei) ∈ Rq × Rq and (ai, ui) ∈ Rq × Rq for i = 1, . . . ,m where ai
and ui are uniform over Rq; the “noise” terms ei ∈ R are polynomials with small
13
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coefficients; and s ∈ Rq is a secret drawn from a uniform distribution. The RLWE
problem can be interpreted as asking an adversary to distinguish random noisy ring
products from uniform. The advantage of using RLWE over LWE is that a RLWE
sample essentially contains n structured LWE samples (one in each coefficient) as-
suming R is of degree n. Roughly speaking, this results in RLWE public keys being
a factor of n smaller than LWE keys at the cost of introducing algebraic structure.
The above recipe for producing variants of the LWE problem has lead to a pro-
liferation of LWE-like problems. Amongst these are Module-LWE (MLWE) [81],
Polynomial-LWE (PLWE) [134], Order-LWE (OLWE) [17] and Middle-Product-LWE
(MPLWE) [121]. Similarly to RLWE, each of these variants have their pros and cons.
For example, MLWE asks an adversary to distinguish between (ai, bi := ai ·s+ei) ∈
Rdq × Rq and (ai, ui) ∈ Rdq × Rq for i = 1, . . . ,m where ai ∈ Rdq and ui ∈ Rq
are uniform; the “noise” terms ei ∈ R are polynomials with small coefficients; and
s ∈ Rdq is a secret drawn from a known distribution. Note that the multiplication
here is analogous to an inner product of vectors. The advantage of MLWE is that
one can very easily increase security in an implementation by changing the value of
d. Note that the ring R (or q) need not change as is the case for increasing security
for RLWE. Therefore, we can stick to a fixed ring (perhaps one that allows efficient
multiplication) once and for all, even if security levels need to be increased.
Often, whenever a new LWE variant is introduced it is accompanied by a reduction
from a presumed hard lattice problem over a particular class of lattices (e.g. ideal
lattices [97] or module lattices [81]). Additionally, direct reductions between the
variants also allow for a better understanding of the relative hardness of different
variants under certain parameter settings. For example, there are results showing
that MPLWE is at least as hard as PLWE [121], and that PLWE is at least as hard as
RLWE [122] in particular parameter settings. In addition, recent research simplifies
and improves on some reductions from RLWE to other variants by presenting a very
general algebraic framework [109]. For a more technical summary of reductions
between variants of LWE, see Section 4.5.
Contribution: Reductions between MLWE and RLWE One of the contri-
butions of this thesis (Chapter 4) relates to reductions from MLWE to RLWE. The
14
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results presented in this thesis are an improvement over our original publication that
appeared at Asiacrypt 2017 [6]. The improvements are a consequence of a better
analysis of the reduction. All of our reductions apply to MLWE/RLWE in normal
form where the secret is drawn according to the error distribution. Note that it
has been shown that this method of sampling the secret makes MLWE/RLWE no
easier [98, 81] than the case where secrets are chosen uniformly. Consider R to be
a cyclotomic ring of integers with a power-of-two dimension n. Put informally, our
main result states that the MLWE problem in rank d and modulus q over ring R is
at least as hard as the RLWE problem in modulus qd and ring R. It should be noted
that the RLWE error rate is a factor of n 12+c ·
√
d larger than the MLWE error rate for
any constant c > 0. This blow-up factor improves on the factor of n2 ·
√
d reported in
our original publication. The methodology of the reduction and analysis is heavily
influenced by that of [32]. Major emphasis in the analysis is put on ensuring that
the resulting error distributions remain statistically close to a Gaussian (which is
usually considered as the standard error distribution as it enables reductions from
lattice problems). Our reduction provides a clear account of the relative hardness of
MLWE and RLWE, stating that RLWE in modulus qd is at least as hard as MLWE
in rank d and modulus q keeping the ring fixed.
We can also combine our aforementioned reduction from MLWE to RLWE with the
recent results of Peikert and Pepin [109] to obtain a result relating the hardness
of RLWE in different dimensions. We emphasise now that the following discussion
holds for power-of-two cyclotomic rings. In particular, the work of Peikert and Pepin
shows the existence of a reduction from RLWE in dimension n to MLWE in module
rank 2 with underlying ring dimension n/2. Combining this reduction with our
MLWE to RLWE reduction implies a dimension reducing reduction from RLWE to
RLWE. A more precise account of the parameters involved follows. Let R′ be a
cyclotomic ring with power-of-two dimension n′ < n such that n′ > 1. Using this
notation, we combine our reduction with the aforementioned recent work to show
existence of a reduction from RLWE in ring R, modulus q to RLWE in ring R′,




+c for any constant c > 0. As an example, taking n′ = n/2 yields a
growth in modulus from q to q2 and a polynomial growth in error rate of roughly
n1/2+c (ignoring constants). For n′ = n/2, our original publication only managed to
show a growth factor n9/4 for search variants of RLWE. Therefore, the result in this
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thesis extends our original result by allowing for consideration of decisional RLWE
and providing a smaller growth in the error rate. Our RLWE to RLWE reduction
implies the hardness of RLWE for very small ring dimensions and polynomial error
rates provided that the modulus is chosen large enough.
1.2 Cryptanalysis
Above, we have mentioned reductions from lattice problems to LWE. These are
often cited as providing theoretical evidence for the hardness of LWE. Unfortunately,
these reductions cannot be used for concrete parameter selection as the complexity
of solving worst-case lattice problems is not well understood. A seemingly more
reasonable view is to consider LWE problems as hardness assumptions themselves,
rather than relying on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. The disadvantage
of doing this is that LWE is a relatively new problem, whereas lattice problems have
been around for many more years. Nonetheless, cryptanalysts are yet to contradict
the hardness of LWE. Interestingly, the best attacks for standard cryptographic
parameters on LWE correspond to the best RLWE and MLWE attacks with standard
parameters. Put differently, the best way to attack RLWE/MLWE with standard
parameters is to consider samples as multiple LWE samples (ignoring structure) and
run the best known attacks on LWE.
The most effective algorithms for solving LWE include the primal [88, 15, 10, 8] and
dual attacks [102, 4]. Essentially, both of these attacks formulate a reduction from
LWE to lattice problems and then attempt to solve the resulting lattice problem via
concrete methods. For example, one form of the primal attack transforms solving
LWE to finding the shortest vector in a particular lattice. According to current
knowledge, the best way to find this short vector is to run the BKZ [40] algorithm.
In turn, the BKZ algorithm runs by making multiple calls to an oracle that finds
short vectors in lattices of relatively small dimension (known as the block size). We
note that the block size is carefully chosen to be large enough to ensure a successful
attack on LWE, while bearing in mind that choosing larger block sizes leads to
longer running times. In order to estimate the running time of the BKZ algorithm,
we need to calculate both the number of oracle calls and the running time of each
oracle call at the chosen block size. Unfortunately, neither of these quantities are
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easily bounded and estimates vary between different cryptanalyses. For example,
the number of oracle calls is sometimes conservatively assumed to be one [10] and
in other cases assumed to be 8 times the dimension of the larger lattice [4]. In
addition, the cost of an oracle call depends on the methods used to instantiate the
oracle. The two main methods are sieving and enumeration. Once again, the costs
of sieving/enumeration are not easily predicted so heuristics/empirical data-fitting is
used to provide security estimates [40, 9, 103, 68]. All models predict a running time
exponential in the block size. In addition, there have been many works investigating
the quantum cost of the oracle call in BKZ [79, 80, 11, 78]. For a complete list of the
attack cost models used in the lattice-based submissions to NIST’s post-quantum
standardisation process, see [5].
The cryptanalysis described above is used to set concrete parameters, and usually
arises from a standard security notion (e.g. CPA, CCA, EUF-CMA security). How-
ever, one may consider a more general adversarial setting where partial leakage of
secret key material occurs by way of a side-channel. This alternative setting may
lead to unforeseen attacks not captured by standard security proofs. As we describe
next, cold boot attacks are one such class of side-channel attack based on a particular
leakage scenario.
Cold boot attacks were introduced and studied in the seminal work of Halderman
et al. [65]. Briefly, cold boot attacks rely on the fact that bits in RAM retain their
value for some time after power is cut. In order to preserve the value for longer,
memory can be cooled to extreme temperatures (−50◦C) in order to retain a ρ0 = 1%
bit-flip rate even after a time period of ten minutes. Halderman et al. also noted
that bit-flip rates as low as ρ0 = 0.17% are possible when liquid nitrogen is used for
cooling. Another key observation was that memory has a ground state that the bits
decay to over time, i.e. the noise introduced is very biased. However, it was also
noticed that there is a very small but non-zero probability of retrograde bit-flips
away from the ground state. It was estimated that these retrograde bit-flips occur
at a rate of ρ1 ∈ [0.05− 0.1%]. In a cold boot attack, then, the attacker is assumed
to have physical access to a machine shortly after a power down cycle. The attacker
proceeds by extracting from memory a noisy version of a scheme’s secret key, where
a small number of bits have been flipped. This can be achieved by performing a
cold boot and loading a malicious operating system or alternatively, plugging the
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victim’s RAM chip into an external device. The attacker then recovers the key
by applying bespoke error correction algorithms. To date, cold boot attacks have
received a significant amount of attention across a range of cryptographic primitives
including a variety of symmetric ciphers [65, 137, 75, 3], RSA [67, 66, 106], discrete
log [113] and, most recently, NTRU [107] systems. We note that NIST considers
resistance to side-channel attacks as a worthwhile, albeit secondary security feature
in their post-quantum standardisation process [104]: “schemes that can be made
resistant to side-channel attacks at minimal cost are more desirable than those whose
performance is severely hampered by any attempt to resist side-channel attacks”.
Contribution: Cold Boot Attacks on RLWE/MLWE Using the NTT The
full details of this contribution can be found in Chapter 3. This contribution is based
on our original publication in “IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems 2018” (CHES 2018) [7]. The accompanying proof of concept
code is publicly available 1. We consider the resistance of RLWE- and MLWE-based
schemes to cold boot attacks. Note that other classes of side-channel attacks have
been considered on lattice-based schemes [52, 117, 35, 29], but to our knowledge,
the aforementioned publication was the first to give a detailed consideration of cold
boot attacks on secret key stored using an NTT. In light of the leakage resilience of
(R)LWE [61, 44], we investigate how cold boot leakage of secrets stored as polynomial
coefficients affects the hardness of the LWE problem. We show that for moderate cold
boot error rates the resulting problem is considerably easier to solve than the side-
channel-free RLWE/MLWE instances from which it is derived; for this analysis, we
simply apply standard security estimates. However, we note that this analysis does
not apply to many schemes as specified and implemented in practice. In particular,
many schemes, e.g. [115, 131, 93, 142, 123, 128, 48, 127, 96, 38], make use of a power-
of-two cyclotomic ring Z[x]/(xn + 1). This ring is amenable to performing efficient
multiplications with complexity O(n log2 n) using a (negacyclic) number theoretic
transform (NTT). Adopting Fourier transform terminology, a polynomial that is the
result of an NTT is said to be in the frequency domain whereas polynomials that
have not been transformed are said to be in the time domain. In order to utilise
the efficiency gains of the NTT, it is beneficial to store intermediate values in the




Table 1.1: Estimated costs of cold boot attacks on Kyber KEM keys stored in the
non-NTT/NTT domain with ρ0, ρ1 cold boot bit-flip rates. The non-NTT success
rate is always expected to be close to 100%. For more details, see the caption of
Table 3.10.
bit-flip rates NTT non-NTT
ρ0 ρ1 cost rate cost
0.2% 0.1% 3 · 221.1 95% 238.7
0.5% 0.1% 3 · 233.1 87% 251.6
1.0% 0.1% 3 · 243.3 91% 270.3
1.4% 0.1% 3 · 253.6 91% 289.2
1.7% 0.1% 3 · 262.8 89% 2100.1
detail dramatically alters the landscape for cold boot attacks on RLWE/MLWE-based
schemes using an NTT. Therefore, our contribution is the design of a practical cold
boot attack for schemes storing secret polynomials in the frequency domain. The
attack is described in Section 3.5.
While our attack in principle applies to all RLWE/MLWE schemes using an NTT
to store secret keys, we focus on the example of the default Kyber parameters [127]
for concreteness. We next summarise our findings. We establish the decoding cost
for cold boot attacks when the NTT is not used for secret key storage, and obtain a
solving cost of 270 operations for ρ0 = 1%, ρ1 = 0.1% bit-flip rates. We then develop
a practical attack with a cost of roughly 243 operations when the key is stored in the
frequency domain for the aforementioned bit-flip rates. This attack relies heavily
on the structure of the NTT. We present our findings in Table 3.10. In addition to
the example of Kyber, we also analyse New Hope KEM [115] to give an idea of the
attack performance on a RLWE-based scheme. The results for New Hope are slightly
different to the Kyber results and are summarised in Table 3.15. In particular, for
the bit-flip rates considered, the attack complexities on New Hope when using the
NTT for key storage are comparable to the case where the NTT is not used.
For Kyber KEM, our results suggest that vulnerability to cold boot attacks can
be mitigated by storing the secret in the time domain instead of the frequency
domain. This counter measure would increase decryption time in a typical IND-
CCA setting by a factor of at most two as such a conversion from the time to
frequency domain must take place already due to the re-encryption step2. However,
2Note that the NTT is typically not the most expensive operation in RLWE/MLWE-based
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Table 1.2: Estimated costs of cold boot attacks on New Hope KEM keys stored
in the non-NTT/NTT domain with ρ0, ρ1 cold boot bit-flip rates. The non-NTT
success rate is always expected to be close to 100%. For more details, see the caption
of Table 3.15.
bit-flip rates NTT non-NTT
ρ0 ρ1 cost rate cost
0.17% 0.1% 248.7 84% 253.7
0.25% 0.1% 260.6 81% 260.0
0.32% 0.1% 270.2 81% 266.1
such a counter measure would not completely rule out cold boot attacks: for bit-flip
rates of ρ0 = 0.2% the resulting MLWE instance is still relatively easy to solve using
the standard methods/security estimates (see Section 3.3). This countermeasure
does not appear to be relevant in the case of New Hope according to Table 3.15
where the complexity of attacking a New Hope key remains comparable whether
the NTT is used for key storage or not. However, future work may propose better
algorithms for solving the cold boot NTT decoding problem.
A secondary contribution is an alternative cold boot attack on RLWE/MLWE se-
crets stored in the frequency domain based on the efficient Berlekamp-Massey al-
gorithm [99] and Blahut’s Theorem [26] (Section 3.6). Informally put, Blahut’s
theorem says that an infinite periodic sequence has linear complexity equal to the
Hamming weight of a single period whereas the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm en-
ables the efficient calculation of linear complexities. Unlike our main attack which
works for standard secret distributions, the success of this attack depends on the
use of low Hamming weight secrets i.e. secrets with a small number of non-zero co-
efficients. Note that low Hamming weight secret distributions have been considered
for practical constructions [41, 13]. As a starting point, we show that for secret
polynomials with a total of w non-zero coefficients, leakage of a consecutive block of
2w NTT entries leads to an extremely efficient key recovery attack. The intuition
behind this observation is that the structure of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
implies that a sequence with linear complexity w is fully defined by 2w consecutive
coordinates. This base aspect of the attack depends on the Berlekamp-Massey algo-
rithm and Blahut’s theorem. Unfortunately, the likelihood of a cold boot attacker
schemes, thus the factor of two is conservative. There is also a conversion from the frequency
to time domain during decryption. However, in an MLWE setting this operates on one ring element
as opposed to k ring elements, which is the dimension of the secret s.
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obtaining 2w consecutive error-less entries will typically be low for practical choices
of q. To remedy this, one can try to guess which bit flips to correct within a block
of 2w NTT coordinates and then run the base attack on each guess. This leads to
a more realistic cold boot attack. For example, taking the New Hope parameters
with low Hamming weight secrets i.e. w = 64, n = 1024, q = 12289, we obtain
the following complexity estimates (ignoring the trivial cost of the base Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm). For bit-flip rates of (ρ0, ρ1) = (1%, 0.1%), we estimate an attack
with complexity roughly 280, whereas for bit-flip rates of (ρ0, ρ1) = (0.17%, 0.1%)
the complexity is roughly 228. Additionally, the complexities associated to the same
parameters but with w = 128 are 2163 and 250 respectively.
1.3 Constructions
Next we briefly overview some interesting constructions that can be built from
LWE/RLWE/MLWE etc. The very first construction based on LWE was public key
encryption [118, 88]. Many signature schemes have also been constructed [58, 95,
1, 51] in addition to the constructions submitted to the NIST post-quantum stan-
dardisation process. One of the more fundamental primitives that can be built
from lattices are pseudorandom functions (PRFs). These were first instantiated
from lattice assumptions in [19] and later improved in [27, 18] to be approximately
key homomorphic. In addition to standard PRFs, there has been much successful
work on constructing PRFs with advanced properties. A selection of such PRFs
include constrained-key PRFs [33], constrained key, programmable PRFs [111] and
constraint-hiding constrained key PRFs [36]. Intuitively, constrained-key PRFs en-
able the production of constrained keys that provide PRF evaluations on points
satisfying some constraint whilst returning random values on other points. Other ad-
vanced cryptographic primitives such as identity-based encryption [2] and attribute-
based encryption [62, 34] have also been constructed from LWE. In addition to
the advanced constructions above, fully homomorphic encryption can be built from
LWE (and its variants) [53, 31, 59]. More recent advances in the area of FHE are
beginning to show the practicality of FHE based on LWE assumptions [42]. In addi-
tion, one of the long-standing open problems of instantiating zero-knowledge proofs
for all of NP from lattice-based assumptions was recently solved [112]. This small
subset of constructions shows the constructive power and flexibility of LWE assump-
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tions. Having said this, there are still some classically secure constructions without
post-quantum alternatives, one of which is presented below.
Contribution: A Post-Quantum VOPRF Construction Our final contribu-
tion is to construct a secure verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function (VOPRF)
protocol that is secure based on lattice assumptions. We stress that our construc-
tion is by no means practical but is (online) round-optimal. To our knowledge, our
construction is the first post-quantum construction of a VOPRF.
A VOPRF is an interactive protocol between two parties; a client and a server.
Intuitively, this protocol allows for a server with key k, to provide a client with
an evaluation of a PRF on an input x that the client chooses using k as the key.
Informally, the security of a VOPRF, from the server’s perspective, guarantees that
the client learns nothing more than the PRF evaluated at x using k as the key.
Security from the perspective of the client guarantees the two conditions below:
1. the server learns nothing about the input x;
2. the client output is indeed the evaluation on input x and key k.
VOPRFs have numerous applications including secure keyword search [57], pri-
vate set intersection [73], secure data de-duplication [77], password-protected secret
sharing [70, 71], password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [72] and privacy-
preserving lightweight authentication mechanisms [46]. A post-quantum VOPRF is
required to afford these applications security against quantum adversaries.
The underlying (post-quantum) PRF we use is the ring version of the PRF from [18]
(referred to as the BP14 PRF). Our basic VOPRF design and proof assumes certain
non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoKs). With the goal of
creating an example instantiation of the required NIZKPoKs, we adapt the usage
of Stern’s [136, 86] protocol to argue knowledge of the input and (small) key to
a BP14 PRF evaluation. We note that our analysis implies that we may also use
the comparatively efficient framework of Beullens [24], but we focus on Stern proof
formulations for simplicity. In addition, we use the Fiat-Shamir transform [54] to
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obtain non-interactivity, meaning that our zero knowledge instantiations are secure
in the quantum random oracle model by the results of [50, 91].
It should be said that we do not achieve a standard multi-party computation (MPC)
notion of a VOPRF where security holds for every pair of inputs/secret keys (see [87]
for standard MPC security definitions). Instead, our security definition for malicious
clients asks for average case security over the sampling of a key from the key distri-
bution dictated by the PRF. We argue that this is a reasonable concession since an
honest server will always be sampling its key from the aforementioned distribution as
it would want evaluations of the PRF that it provides to appear pseudorandom. On
the other hand, security against malicious servers follows the standard notions from
MPC and holds for any input/secret key pair. For more details of our definition,
see Section 5.2.3.
To summarise, we show the existence of a post-quantum secure VOPRF in the
quantum random oracle model whose security relies on the hardness of the RLWE
and 1D-SIS problems. Note that the 1D-SIS problem is fairly non-standard but does
have a reduction from a presumably hard lattice problem [33].
Road Map
We begin with a preliminary section (Chapter 2) where general lattice-based and
traditional cryptographic preliminaries are presented along with the general notation
that will be used. The three chapters following this are the main chapters listed next.
• Chapter 3: Cold boot attacks on RLWE/MLWE keys stored using an NTT.
• Chapter 4: Reductions between the MLWE and RLWE problems.
• Chapter 5: A post-quantum VOPRF construction.
The three main chapters each begin with a short synopsis highlighting the objectives,
high-level techniques, and conclusions of that chapter followed by chapter-specific
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2.1 General Mathematical Notation
We let R denote the reals, Q denote the rationals, Z denote the integers, and C
denote the complex numbers. For positive real y, we write ⌊y⌋ to denote the integer
part of y, ⌈y⌉ to denote the smallest positive integer larger than y and ⌊y⌉ to denote
the rounding of y to the nearest integer (rounding down in the case of a tie). Note
that vectors and polynomials are rounded component-wise. We denote the integers
modulo q as Zq. For x ∈ Zq, we define the rounding operation to Zp as ⌊x⌉p :=
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. For real numbers a and b where b > a, [a, b] ⊂ R denotes the closed interval
{x ∈ R : a ≤ x ≤ b}.
We denote vectors using bold font and use indices along with non-bold font to
reference the entries of a vector. For example, the ith entry of a vector b is denoted
bi. In general, p-norms of vectors will be denoted as ∥ · ∥p and ∥ · ∥ will be used
to denote a Euclidean norm of a vector. We sometimes count indices from 0 and
sometimes count from 1 depending on the context. We denote matrices analogously.
For example, the (i, j)th entry of a matrix B is denoted as Bi,j . In addition, BT
denotes the transpose of B and B−T represents the inverse of BT . The matrix I
denotes the identity matrix. In cases where there are two types of vectors, we use
an over-arrow to denote vectors, e.g. #»b . to allow for easy differentiation between
the classes of vector.
For a full-rank matrix B ∈ Rn×n, we denote by B̃ the result of running the Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure on its columns. Considering the columns of
a matrix B ∈ Rn×n as vectors, ∥B∥ will denote the Euclidean norm of the longest
column of B.
For a probability distribution D, we write s ← D to denote that s is an element
sampled from the distribution D. If s is a k-dimensional vector, then s ← (D)k
denotes that each entry in s is drawn independently from the distribution D. If
S is a finite set, s ← S denotes that s is an element sampled from the uniform
distribution over S. Alternatively, we write U(S) to denote the uniform distribution
over the set S.
We will denote the security parameter as λ. We use standard asymptotic notation
(O, ω,Ω etc.). We let poly(λ) denote the set of polynomial functions in λ. With
respect to the security parameter, a probabilistic algorithm A is said to be poly-
nomial time if its running time can be bounded (in the worst case) by a function
in poly(λ). Such an algorithm is said to be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithm. A function µ is said to be negligible if for every c > 0, ∃λ∗ such that
for all λ > λ∗, |µ(λ)| < 1/λc. The set of negligible functions is denoted by negl(λ).
By abuse of notation, we sometimes write f(λ) = negl(λ) to denote that f is a
negligible function. We also write a(λ) ≫ b(λ) to denote that a(λ) = λω(1) · b(λ).
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For an algorithm A outputting either 0 or 1, the advantage of A in distinguishing
between two distributions D0 and D1 is defined to be∣∣∣∣ Prx←D0[A(x) = 1]− Prx′←D1[A(x′) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ .
If the advantage of any PPT algorithm in distinguishing distributions D0 and D1 is
negligible (where the sizes of samples from Di are in poly(λ)), then we say that D0
and D1 are computationally indistinguishable.
2.1.1 Statistical Distance and Rényi Divergence
It is common to write security proofs/reductions that rely on the fact that certain
distributions are close to each other. There are multiple ways of doing this, the most
well-known being to rely on the notion of statistical distance.
Definition 1 (Statistical Distance). Let P and Q be distributions over some dis-
crete domain X. The statistical distance between P and Q is defined as ∆(P,Q) :=∑
i∈X |P (i) − Q(i)|/2. For continuous distributions, replace the sum by the appro-
priate integral.
Claim 1. If P and Q are two probability distributions such that P (i) ≥ (1− ϵ)Q(i)
for all i, then ∆(P,Q) ≤ ϵ.
Importantly, the statistical distance between two distributions gives an upper bound
on the distinguishing advantage of any distinguisher; even an unbounded one. The
following two properties of statistical distance are simple to verify, given the defini-
tion and previous observation.
• Triangle Inequality: For any distributions P,Q,R, we have ∆(P,R) ≤
∆(P,Q) + ∆(Q,R).
• Data Processing Inequality: Let f(X) denote the distribution induced by
sampling x← X and applying a probabilistic algorithm/function f . Then for
any distributions P,Q we have ∆(f(P ), f(Q)) ≥ ∆(P,Q).
We can also make use of the Rényi divergence as an alternative to the statistical
distance to measure the similarity between two distributions.
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Definition 2. (Rényi Divergence) For any distributions P and Q such that Supp(P ) ⊆














a−1 for a ∈ (1,∞),
maxx∈Supp(P ) P (x)Q(x) for a =∞.
For the case where P and Q are continuous distributions, we replace the sums
by integrals and let P (x) and Q(x) denote probability densities. We also give a
collection of well-known results on the Rényi divergence (cf. [82]), many of which
can be seen as multiplicative analogues of standard results for statistical distance.
The proof of this lemma is given in [138] and [82].
Lemma 1 (Useful facts on Rényi divergence). Let a ∈ [1,+∞]. Also let P and Q
be distributions such that Supp(P ) ⊆ Supp(Q). Then we have:
• Increasing Function of the Order: The function a 7→ Ra (P∥Q) is non-
decreasing, continuous and tends to R∞ (P∥Q) as a→∞.
• Log Positivity: Ra (P∥Q) ≥ Ra (P∥P ) = 1.




≤ Ra (P∥Q) for any function f
where P f and Qf denote the distributions induced by performing the function
f on a sample from P and Q respectively.
• Multiplicativity: Let P and Q be distributions on a pair of random variables
(Y1, Y2). Let P2|1(·|y1) and Q2|1(·|y1) denote the distributions of Y2 under P
and Q respectively given that Y1 = y1. Also, for i ∈ {1, 2} denote the marginal
distribution of Yi under P resp. Q as Pi resp. Qi. Then
– Ra (P∥Q) = Ra (P1∥Q1) ·Ra (P2∥Q2).





• Probability Preservation: Let E ⊆ Supp(Q) be an arbitrary event. If
a ∈ (1,∞), then Q(E) ≥ P (E)
a




• Weak Triangle Inequality: Let P1, P2 and P3 be three probability distribu-
tions such that Supp(P1) ⊆ Supp(P2) ⊆ Supp(P3). Then
Ra (P1∥P3) ≤
{
Ra (P1∥P2) ·R∞ (P2∥P3) ,
R∞ (P1∥P2)
a
a−1 ·Ra (P2∥P3) if a ∈ (1,+∞).
2.2 Lattices
An n-dimensional lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn. A rank d lattice
Λ can be written in terms of a set of linearly independent vectors {b0, . . . , bd−1}
(where bi ∈ Rn) as
Λ := {x ∈ Rn : x =
d−1∑
i=0
zibi, zi ∈ Z}. (2.1)
The set {b0, . . . , bd−1} is called a basis of the lattice. We can also represent this basis
as a matrix B ∈ Rn×d where the jth column of B is given by bj . The lattice generated
by a basis B as in Equation (2.1), will be denoted as L(B). The determinant of a
lattice with basis matrix B is defined to be
√
det(BTB). A lattice is full-rank if
n = d in which case, the determinant is given by det(B). Unless stated otherwise,
all lattices should be assumed to be full-rank. Note that L(B) = L(C) if and only if
B = CU for some unimodular matrix U ∈ Zd×dq . For any lattice Λ, the dual lattice
Λ∗ is defined to be
Λ∗ := {y ∈ Rn : y ∈ span(b0, . . . , bd−1), ⟨y,Λ⟩ ∈ Z}. (2.2)
It can be shown that if B ∈ Rn×d is a basis for Λ, then B · (BTB)−T is a basis for
Λ∗. For full rank lattices, the basis of the dual can simply be written as B−T . In
either case, det(Λ) · det(Λ∗) = 1.
We denote the length of the shortest non-zero vector of a lattice Λ as λ1(Λ). The kth
successive minima (where k = 1, . . . , d) for a lattice Λ is defined to be the smallest
positive real number r such that there exists at least k linearly independent lattice
vectors of Euclidean norm at most r. We use λk(Λ) to denote the kth successive
minima for lattice Λ. In addition, for any point t ∈ Rn, dist(Λ, t) denotes the
minimum value of ∥v − t∥ over all v ∈ Λ.
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2.2.1 Lattice Problems
Below, we present definitions for approximate lattice problems where the approx-
imation factor is denoted by γ. For the definitions of exact lattice problems, set
γ = 1. As written below, we consider lattices as inputs to the various problems.
In order to ensure that inputs can be expressed finitely, we may consider canonical
finite representations of lattices as the inputs e.g. bases in Hermite normal form.
For more information, see [100].
Definition 3 (γ-Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (SVPγ)). Given as input a
lattice Λ, output a non-zero vector v ∈ Λ such that ∥v∥ ≤ γ · λ1(Λ).
Definition 4 (γ-Approximate Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVPγ)).
Given as input a lattice Λ, output a set of linearly independent vectors v1, . . . ,vd ∈ Λ
such that maxi ∥vi∥ ≤ γ · λn(Λ).
Definition 5 (γ-Approximate Closest Vector Problem (CVPγ)). Given as input
a lattice Λ and a target point t ∈ Rn, output a lattice vector v ∈ Λ such that
∥v − t∥ ≤ γ · dist(Λ, t).
We can also consider a variant of CVP where it is guaranteed that the target point is
very close to the lattice (relative to the length of the shortest vector in the lattice).
Definition 6 (γ-Approximate Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (γ-BDD)).
Given as input a lattice Λ and a target point t ∈ Rn such that dist(Λ, t) ≤ γ · λ1(Λ),
output a lattice vector v ∈ Λ such that ∥v − t∥ ≤ γ · λ1(Λ).
2.3 Gaussian Distributions (Over Lattices)
Definition 7 (Continuous Gaussian function/distribution). The Gaussian function





and the Gaussian distribution Dr,c is the probability distribution whose probability
density function is given by 1rρr,c. Further, we define Dr to be the distribution Dr,0.
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Definition 8 (Multivariate continuous Gaussian function/distribution). Let Σ =
STS for some rank-n matrix S ∈ Rm×n. The multivariate Gaussian function with
(scaled) covariance matrix Σ centred on c ∈ Rn is defined as
ρS,c(x) = exp
(
−π(x− c)T (STS)−1(x− c)
)
and the corresponding multivariate Gaussian distribution denoted DS,c is defined by
the density function 1√
det(Σ)
ρS,c.
Remark 1. In the above definition, the scaled covariance matrix differs to the
standard covariance matrix by a factor of 2π. Throughout, we will ignore this factor
of 2π and simply refer to scaled covariance matrices as covariance matrices.
Remark 2. As notation, if S in the above definition is diagonal with the entries
of a vector s along the diagonal (i.e. S = diag(s)), we write Ds,c to represent the
multivariate continuous Gaussian distribution.
Definition 9 (Bounded width continuous Gaussian family). The bounded width
Gaussian error family with parameter α ≥ 0 is defined to be the set Ψ≤α := {Ds :
|si| ≤ α}.
Definition 10 (Discrete Gaussian sums/distribution). The discrete Gaussian distri-
bution over some n-dimensional lattice Λ and coset vector u ∈ Rn with parameter r,
denoted DΛ+u,r, is the distribution with probability mass function 1ρr(Λ+u)ρr, where
ρr(Λ + u) :=
∑
x∈Λ+u ρr(x) is a discrete Gaussian sum over Λ + u.
We use the following shorthand conventions for Gaussian functions (and similarly
for DΛ):
• ρ(x) = ρI,0(x) = exp(−π∥x∥2)
• ρS(x) = ρS,0(x)
• ρs(x) = ρsI,0(x)
• ρs(x) = ρdiag(s),0(x)
We use the convention that the Fourier transform of f : Rn → C is given by f̂(z) =∫
x∈Rn f(x) · e
−2πi⟨x,z⟩dx. The Poisson summation formula over lattices is a useful
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tool when proving results about discrete Gaussian distributions over lattices. It





y∈Λ∗ f̂(y). After noting that the Fourier transform of ρ is precisely ρ,
the Poisson summation formula states that for any lattice Λ, ρ(Λ) = det(Λ∗) ·
ρ(Λ∗). After noting that (Λ/r)∗ = r · Λ∗, the Poisson summation formula for ρr
is ρr(Λ) = rn det(Λ∗)ρ1/r(Λ∗). The Poisson summation formula can be straight-
forwardly applied to prove the following two facts for any lattice Λ:
1. For any s ≥ 1, ρs(Λ) = ρ(Λ/s) ≤ snρ(Λ).
2. For any coset Λ + u, ρ(Λ + u) ≤ ρ(Λ).1
These two facts are used to prove the following results, bounding the infinity and
Euclidean norm of discrete Gaussians (with standard deviation 1). For a full proof
of the below result (and of Lemma 5) see Daniele Micciancio’s lecture notes on the
Gaussian distribution. 2
Lemma 2 ( [16]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and α ≥ 1, if x← DΛ, then















To get a more general result, we can use the fact that DΛ,σ can be sampled by
sampling from DΛ/σ and then multiplying by σ.
Corollary 1. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, σ > 0, if x← DΛ,σ, then














for some universal constant c > 1.
1The following fact is useful: f(x) = g(x+ c) =⇒ f̂(z) = e2πi⟨z,c⟩ · ĝ(z)
2available at https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/classes/wi16/cse206A-a/LecGaussian.pdf
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In addition, there is a “drowning/smudging” lemma for discrete Gaussians over the
integers. This is proved following the same reasoning as in [49].
Lemma 3. Let σ > 0 and y ∈ Z. The statistical distance between DZ,σ and DZ,σ+y
is at most |y|/σ.
A useful quantity when analysing properties of discrete Gaussian distributions over
a lattice Λ is the smoothing parameter of Λ defined next. When discussing intuitive
properties of the smoothing parameter ηϵ, we will assume that the parameter ϵ is
small (e.g. ϵ = 2−λ for security parameter λ). The definition below says that the
smoothing parameter is the smallest scaling factor s such that ρ(sΛ∗) has almost
all its weight on 0. Following the definition is a result bounding the size of the
smoothing parameter.
Definition 11 (Smoothing parameter [101]). For a lattice Λ and any ϵ > 0, the
smoothing parameter ηϵ(Λ) is defined as the smallest s > 0 s.t. ρ1/s(Λ∗) = ρ(sΛ∗) ≤
1 + ϵ.




It is clear from the definition that ηϵ(cΛ) = cηϵ(Λ). Once again, the Poisson summa-
tion formula is a handy tool when used in conjunction with the smoothing parameter.
This is the case for the proof of the following lemma that says the continuous Gaus-
sian distribution with any width larger than the smoothing parameter assigns an
almost constant weight on any coset of Λ.
Lemma 5. For any lattice Λ and coset Λ + u, if ηϵ(Λ) ≤ 1, then
ρ(Λ + u) ∈ [1− ϵ, 1 + ϵ]det(Λ∗).
Alternatively, for any r ≥ ηϵ(Λ),
ρr(Λ + u) ∈ [1− ϵ, 1 + ϵ]det(rΛ∗).
As a corollary, combining the above lemma, and the fact that ρr(Λ + u) ≤ ρr(Λ),
we have the following.
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Lemma 6 (Claim 3.8 in [119], Sums of Gaussians over cosets). For any lattice Λ,
ϵ > 0, r ≥ ηϵ(Λ) and c ∈ Rn, we have







The following lemma states that we can efficiently sample from a Gaussian distri-
bution over a lattice provided that the deviation of the Gaussian distribution is
sufficiently large compared to the Gram-Schmidt length of a known basis.
Lemma 7 (Lemma 2.3 in [32], Sampling discrete Gaussians). There is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm that, given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ =
L(B), c ∈ Rn and parameter r ≥ ∥B̃∥ ·
√
ln(2n+ 4)/π outputs a sample distributed
according to DΛ+c,r.
2.4 Lattice Basis Reduction
Here we briefly recall some of the foundational results/techniques in solving lattice
problems. More techniques and details will be given in the relevant sections of this
thesis. For any basis {b0, . . . , bd−1}, we denote the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation
of this basis as {b∗0, . . . , b∗d−1}. Concretely, for i = 0, . . . , d− 1, we have that









Intuitively, b∗i is the projection of bi onto the space orthogonal to span({b∗0, . . . , b∗i−1}) =
span({b0, . . . , bi−1}). Alternatively, b∗i is the projection of bi onto span({b∗i , . . . , b∗d−1}).
Definition 12 (δ-LLL reduced basis). A basis {b0, . . . , bd−1} is δ-LLL reduced for
some value δ ∈ (1/4, 1) if
1. (Size reduced) for 0 ≤ j < i ≤ d− 1, |µi,j | ≤ 1/2,
2. (Lovász condition) for 0 ≤ i < d− 1, δ∥b∗i ∥2 ≤ ∥b∗i+1∥2 + µ2i+1,i∥b∗i ∥2.
Setting α := 1/(δ − 1/4), it can be shown that the following properties hold for
δ-LLL reduced bases:
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• ∥b1∥ ≤ α(n−1)/2 · λ1
• maxi ∥bi∥ ≤ α(n−1)/2 · λn
Given any basis of a lattice, the LLL algorithm [83] computes a δ-LLL reduced basis
in time polynomial in the number of bits required to represent a basis. Very infor-
mally, the LLL algorithm runs through a sequence of iterations, terminating only
when an iteration leads to an LLL reduced basis. Each iteration runs Babai’s near-
est plane algorithm [14] repeatedly to obtain a size reduced basis (see Algorithm 1)
before performing a swap if the Lovász condition is violated. To see that Babai’s
nearest plane allows for a size reduced basis, one can use a geometric interpreta-
tion of the algorithm: on input t and lattice L(b0, . . . , bd−1), Babai’s nearest plane











Algorithm 1: Size-reduction sub-routine in LLL
Input: Basis {b0, . . . , bd−1}, Babai’s nearest plane oracle NearestPlane
Output: Basis {b0, . . . , bd−1} that is size reduced
1 i← 1
2 while i ≤ d− 1 do
3 bi ← bi − NearestPlane (bi − b∗i ,L(b0, . . . , bi))
4 i← i+ 1
Using the properties stated above, the LLL algorithm therefore solves the SVPγ and
SIVPγ problems for approximation factors γ = α(n−1)/2 in polynomial time for any
α > 4/3. In other words, there is a polynomial time algorithm solving SVPγ and
SIVPγ for exponential approximation factors. In addition to this, it is a well-known
fact that applying the LLL algorithm to a basis and then using Babai’s nearest
plane algorithm leads to a polynomial time algorithm solving CVP for exponential
approximation factors [14]. Therefore, lattice problems with exponential approxi-
mation factors have been shown to be classically solvable in time polynomial in the
lattice dimension.
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2.5 Fields, Modules, Rings
We now present some relevant algebraic number theoretic preliminaries. The con-
cepts recalled here are fairly standard. As a detailed reference, see the book of
Neukirch [105]. For fields E and F , we denote that F is an extension field of E by
writing E/F . Let K be an algebraic number field i.e. K = K/Q. The degree of K
is equal to the dimension of K as a vector space over Q. The trace of a field element
x ∈ K is defined to be the trace of the linear map (acting on K when viewed as a
vector space over Q) corresponding to multiplication by x. An element x ∈ K is
said to be integral if it is the root of a monic polynomial with integer coefficients.
The set of all integral elements forms the ring of integers of K denoted by OK . An
order O of an algebraic number field K of degree n is a subring containing 1 that
is also a rank n Z-module. The simplest example is the ring of integers OK which
corresponds to the maximal order i.e. for any order of K, O, we have that O ⊆ OK .
Suppose that ζ ∈ C is an algebraic number (i.e. the root of some polynomial with
rational coefficients) and let f(X) denote the minimal polynomial of ζ with coef-
ficients in Q. The field extension Q(ζ) ⊃ Q is isomorphic to Q(X)/⟨f(X)⟩, so we
can view field elements in Q(ζ) as polynomials with degree at most deg(f)− 1, and
consider operations as polynomial multiplication/addition modulo the polynomial
f(X). An integral ideal of a ring R is an additive subgroup of R that is closed under
multiplication by all ring elements.
Cyclotomic Fields/Rings A common example of an algebraic number field used
in lattice based cryptography is the nth cyclotomic field. The nth cyclotomic field
is obtained by adjoining a primitive nth root of unity ζn = e2π
√
−1/n ∈ C to the
rationals. It turns out that the ring of integers of a cyclotomic field Q(ζn) is simply
Z(ζn) and we refer to this as a cyclotomic ring. The minimal polynomial of ζn
is called the nth cyclotomic polynomial. For power-of-two n, the (2n)th cyclotomic
polynomial has the formXn+1. Therefore, for power-of-two n, the (2n)th cyclotomic
field (resp.ring of integers) can be represented as Q(X)/⟨Xn+1⟩ (resp. Z(X)/⟨Xn+
1⟩). This is the representation commonly used in lattice-based cryptography. We
sometimes informally refer to the (2n)th cyclotomic field for power-of-two n as the
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cyclotomic field with power-of-two degree n 3.
2.5.1 Coefficient Embedding
We have seen that we can represent field elements in Q(ζ) using polynomials of
degree strictly less than d = deg(f) where f is the minimal polynomial of ζ. We
can naturally view these polynomials as d-dimensional vectors with rational entries




i ←→ (c0, . . . , cd−1)T .
Moreover, we can view polynomial multiplication modulo f(X) as a linear operation
taking degree d − 1 polynomials to degree d − 1 polynomials or coefficient embed-
dings to coefficient embeddings. In particular, suppose we represent α ∈ Q(ζ) as a
polynomial α(X). Then the matrix that acts on coefficient embeddings represent-
ing multiplication by α(X) is a d × d matrix whose ith column is the coefficient
embedding of α(X) ·Xi mod f(X).
Example 1. Take the (2n)th cyclotomic field for power-of-two n, K = Q(ζ2n) ≊




2n is given by
rot(s) =

s0 −sn−1 −sn−2 · · · · · · −s1
s1 s0 −sn−1
. . . . . . −s2
...
... . . . . . . . . .
...
...
... . . . . . . . . .
...
sn−1 sn−2 · · · · · · · · · s0
 . (2.4)
Note that it is often the case that we work with polynomials whose coefficients are
integers modulo some prime q ∈ N. For example, it is common to work with the ring
Zq(X)/⟨Xn+1⟩. In such cases, we define coefficient embeddings and multiplication
matrices for Zq(X)/⟨Xn + 1⟩ analogous to those for a field. In particular, c(X) =∑n−1
i=0 ciX
i ∈ Zq(X)/⟨Xn+1⟩ has (c0, . . . , cn−1) ∈ Znq as a coefficient embedding and
a multiplication matrix whose ith column corresponds to the coefficient embedding
of c(X) ·Xi mod Xn + 1 where all coefficients are reduced modulo q.
3Formally, this is ambiguous as there are many cyclotomic polynomials of degree n, but we
always mean the (2n)th cyclotomic polynomial of the form Xn + 1
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2.5.2 Canonical Embedding
We can also use canonical embeddings to endow field elements with a geometry. A
general number field K = Q(ζ) has r1+2r2 field homomorphisms σi : K → C fixing
each element of Q4. Let σ1, . . . , σr1 be the real embeddings and σr1+1, . . . , σr1+2r2 be
complex. The complex embeddings come in conjugate pairs, so we have σi = σi+r2
for i = r1 + 1, . . . , r1 + r2 using an appropriate ordering of the embeddings. Define
H := {x ∈ Rr1 × C2r2 : xi = xi+r2 , i = r1 + 1, . . . , r1 + r2} ⊂ Cr1+2r2
and let (êi)ni=1 be the standard (orthonormal) basis of Rr1 × C2r2 assumed in the




• ĥi = êi for i = 1, . . . , r1




2 (êi − êi+r2) for i = r1 + r2 + 1, . . . , r1 + 2r2
to see that H ≃ Rn as an inner product space. The canonical embedding is defined
as σC : K → Rr1 × C2r2 where
σC(x) := (σ1(x), . . . , σn(x)).
The image of any field element under the canonical embedding lies in the space H,
so we can always represent σC(x) via the real vector σH(x) ∈ Rn through the change
of basis described above. For any x ∈ K, σH(x) = U†H · σC(x) where the unitary










 ∈ Cn×n. (2.5)
Addition and multiplication of field elements is carried out component-wise in the
canonical embedding, i.e. for any x, y ∈ K, σC(xy)i = σC(x)i·σC(y)i and σC(x+y) =
4For the nth cyclotomic field for any n, r1 = 0 and r2 = ϕ(n)/2 where ϕ is the Euler totient
function
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σC(x)+σC(y). Multiplication is not component-wise for σH . Specifically, in the basis
(êi)
n
i=1, we have that multiplication by x ∈ K can be written as left multiplication
by the matrix Xij = σi(x)δij where δij is the Kronecker delta. Therefore, in the basis
(ĥi)
n
i=1, the corresponding matrix is XH = U
†
HXUH ∈ Rn×n which is not diagonal





Explicitly, (XH ·XTH)ij = |σi(x)|2δij i.e. XH · XTH is a diagonal matrix. Likewise
for XTH ·XH . Therefore, the singular values of XH are precisely given by |σi(x)| for
i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 3. We use σi(·) to denote both singular values and embeddings of field
elements. If the argument is a matrix, it should be assumed that we are referring to
singular values. Otherwise, σi(·) denotes a field embedding.
Fields and Lattices We view any finitely generated Z-submodule ofK as a lattice
in Rn using the canonical embedding along with the space H. The ring of integers
OK is an example of a finitely generated Z-submodule of K and so can interpreted
as a lattice. The same can be said for any ideal of OK .
2.6 Number Theoretic Transform
Let R be a power-of-two cyclotomic ring. Here, we define a transform that permits
efficient multiplication. We defer useful properties and further details to the relevant
sections of this thesis. Let q be a prime such that a (2n)th primitive root of unity
γ ∈ Zq exists, and set ω = γ2 mod q. The negacyclic number theoretic transform





We often refer to NTTn(a) as being a vector in the NTT domain or frequency domain.
This transform has been shown to allow for fast polynomial multiplication in rings
of the form Zq[X]/⟨Xn + 1⟩ where n is a power of two [126, 140]. In particular,
polynomial multiplication corresponds to component-wise multiplication in the NTT
domain. The notation â will be used as shorthand for the NTT of a and we often
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drop the subscript n when its value is clear from the context. The inverse negacyclic
NTT is given by













× · · · × Zq[X]
⟨X − γ2n−1⟩
(2.6)
that appears when applying the chinese remainder theorem to the ring Zq[X] and
ideal ⟨Xn + 1⟩.
2.7 Learning With Errors
One of the most common assumptions made in lattice-based cryptography is that
the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is hard to solve — even for a quantum
adversary. More precisely, suppose we set λ to be the security parameter. Then the
assumption is that there are choices of LWE parameters leading to polynomial sized
instances that no polynomial time quantum adversary can solve with non-negligible
success probability in the average case. In order to define the decisional and search
versions of LWE, we first define the LWE distribution. Let T = {x : 0 ≤ x < 1}.
Definition 13 (LWE distribution). For s ∈ Zn and error distribution ψ over T,
we sample the ring learning with errors (LWE) distribution An,q,s,ψ over Zq × T by
outputting (a, 1q (a · s) + e mod 1), where a← U(Znq ) and e← ψ.
Definition 14 (Decision/search LWE problem [118]). The decision learning with
errors problem LWEm,n,q,Ψ(D) entails distinguishing m samples of U(Zq × T) from
An,q,s,ψ where s ← D and ψ is an arbitrary distribution in Ψ. The search variant
S-LWEm,n,q,Ψ(D) entails obtaining the secret s← D given m samples of An,q,s,ψ. If
m is omitted, it is assumed that the problem grants a poly(λ) number of samples to
the solver. If D is omitted, it is assumed that s← Znq .
One of the initial reasons for believing LWE is a hard problem is the following result
due to Regev [118] saying that there is a reduction from SIVP to LWE. In order
for the reduction to go through, we must use the error distribution ψα which is the
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Theorem 1 (Reduction from SIVP to LWE [118]). Let α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) be some
real and q = q(n) be some integer such that αq > 2
√
n. If there exists a quantum
algorithm solving LWEn,q,ψα or S-LWEn,q,ψα in polynomial time, then there is a
quantum algorithm solving SIVPγ for approximation factors γ = Õ(n/α).
Informally, the above states that solving LWE on average is at least as hard as
solving SIVP in the worst case. Unfortunately, the reduction implicit in the theorem
statement is not tight. Chatterjee et al. [37] show that if there is an algorithm W1
solving LWEm=nc,n,q,ψα with advantage greater than 1/nd1 for a proportion 1/nd2
of s ∈ Znq , then the algorithm for SIVP implicit in the theorem runs W1 a total
of O(n11+c+2d1+d2) times. Therefore, it has been questioned whether the above
theorem is a good indicator of the hardness of LWE for concrete parameters, since the
non-tightness in the reduction to SIVP only implies an algorithm with much longer
running time which we cannot confidently rule out. However, from a theoretical
standpoint, the above theorem suggests that LWE is hard asymptotically.
To remedy the problems inherent in the reduction from LWE to SIVP, whenever
concrete parameters are required, the best known attacks on LWE are considered.
In order to account for future improvements, the runtimes of known attacks are
under-estimated with respect to the state of the art [10].
2.8 Ring Learning With Errors
A common variant of the LWE problem is the so-called Ring Learning With Er-
rors (RLWE) problem. Let R be the ring of integers of an algebraic number field
K/Q and define the ring dual to R as R∨ := {x ∈ K : Tr(xR) ⊆ Z}. Also let
KR = K ⊗Q R and define TR∨ := KR/R∨. Note that distributions over KR are
sampled by choosing an element of the space H (as defined in Section 2.5) accord-
ing to the distribution and mapping back to KR via the vector-space isomorphism
H ≃ KR. For example, sampling the Gaussian distribution Dα over KR is done by
sampling Dα over H ≃ Rn and then mapping back to KR. In all definitions below,
let Ψ be a family of distributions over KR, let Γ be a distribution over a family of
distributions over KR, and let D be a distribution over R∨q where R∨q := R∨/(qR∨)
and Rq := R/(qR).
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Definition 15 (RLWE distribution). For s ∈ R∨q and error distribution ψ over KR,
we sample the ring learning with errors (RLWE) distribution A(R)q,s,ψ over Rq × TR∨
by outputting (a, 1q (a · s) + e mod R∨), where a← U(Rq) and e← ψ.
Definition 16 (Decision/search RLWE problem [97]). The decision ring learning
with errors problem RLWE(R)m,q,Γ(D) entails distinguishing m samples of U(Rq×TR∨)
from A(R)q,s,ψ where s← D and ψ ← Γ. The search variant S-RLWE
(R)
m,q,Ψ(D) entails
obtaining the secret s from m samples of A(R)q,s,ψ where s ∈ R∨q and ψ ∈ Ψ are arbitrary.
If m is omitted, it is assumed that a poly(λ) number of samples is provided. If D is
omitted, it is assumed that s← R∨q .
RLWE can be seen as a structured variant of LWE. In fact, there is an analogous
result to the reduction from SIVP to LWE in the context of RLWE. For a field K,
we can view integral ideals of OK as lattices using the canonical embedding. Such
lattices are called ideal lattices over K and we refer to the SIVPγ problem over ideal
lattices as Ideal SIVP. It has been shown that for both cyclotomic rings [97] and
general rings [110] that there is a reduction from Ideal SIVPγ to RLWE. In the
theorem below Γα is a family of distributions. For a number field K, let r1 be the
number of real embeddings and r2 be the number of pairs of complex embeddings.
Fixing an arbitrary f(n) = ω(
√
logn), a sample from Γα is an ellipsoidal Gaussian
Dc, where:
• for i = 1, . . . , r1, sample xi ← D1 and set c2i = α2(x2i + f(n)2)/2,





In addition, we define the family Ψ≤α := {Dc : 0 < ci ≤ α} .
Theorem 2 (Reduction from Ideal SIVP to RLWE [97, 110]). Let K be an arbitrary
number field of degree n and R = OK . Let α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and q = q(n) > 2 be
an integer such that αq > ω(1). There is a polynomial time quantum reduction from
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Once again, the reduction above suffers from a lack of tightness. Similar to the case
of plain LWE, under-estimated running times of the best-known attacks are used for
concrete parameter selection. Interestingly, the best known attacks for RLWE and
LWE are the same after interpreting the ring multiplication a · s as a matrix-vector
multiplication. In other words, it is not known how to take practical advantage
of the additional ring structure of the RLWE problem. Beyond the parameter sets
used in cryptography, it has been shown that there is a polynomial time quantum
algorithm solving Ideal SIVPγ [43] for γ = exp(Õ(
√
n)). On the other hand, it is not
known whether there exists a quantum polynomial time algorithm solving general
SIVP with the same approximation factor. It is still believed that SIVPγ is not
solvable in quantum polynomial time for γ = O(nc) in the case that c < 1/2.
2.9 Module Learning With Errors
Yet another variant of the LWE problem is Module Learning With Errors (MLWE).
To get from the RLWE problem to the MLWE problem, we change ring elements a ∈
Rq, s ∈ R∨q to module elements a = (a1, . . . , ad) ∈ (Rq)d, s = (s1, . . . , sd) ∈ (R∨q )d.
In addition to this change, we replace the ring multiplication a · s with an inner
product




Similarly to RLWE, we let Ψ be a family of distributions over KR, let Γ be a distri-
bution over a family of distributions over KR, D be a distribution over R∨q where
R∨q := R
∨/(qR∨) and Rq := R/(qR). Before presenting the formal definition, we
remind the reader that R denotes the ring of integers of an algebraic number field
K.
Definition 17 (MLWE distribution). Let M := Rd. For s ∈ (R∨q )d and an error




d ×TR∨ by outputting (a, 1qa · s+ e mod R∨) where a← U((Rq)
d)
and e← ψ.
Definition 18 (Decision/search MLWE problem [81]). Let M = Rd. The decision
module learning with errors problem MLWE(M)m,q,Γ(D) entails distinguishing m samples
of U((Rq)d × TR∨) from A(M)q,s,ψ where s ← Dd and ψ ← Γ. The search variant S-
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MLWE(M)m,q,Ψ(D) entails obtaining the secret element s ← Dd from m samples of
A
(M)
q,s,ψ where s ∈ (R∨q )d and ψ ∈ Ψ are arbitrary. If m is omitted, it is assumed
that a poly(λ) number of samples is provided. If D is omitted, it is assumed that
s← (R∨q )d.
Once again, a reduction from approximate SIVP (on the set of so-called module
lattices) to MLWE has been shown to exist. In order to present the result, we first
discuss module lattices. Taking a number field K of degree n, and any OK-module5
M ⊆ Kd, we can embed M into (Rn)d by applying σH to each component of M
individually to obtain a lattice. Such lattices are called rank-d module lattices over K
and we refer to the SIVPγ problem over module lattices as Module SIVP. This result
uses the same distributions Ψ≤α and Γα as the analogous RLWE result presented
above.
Theorem 3 (Reduction from Module SIVP to MLWE [81]). Let K be a degree
n number field, R = OK and M = Rd for some integer d ≥ 1. Further, let
α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and integer q ≥ 2 be such that αq > 2
√
d · ω(logn). There is a
polynomial time quantum reduction from SIVPγ over rank d module lattices in K to
S-MLWE(M)q,Ψ≤α and also MLWE
(M)
q,Γα
with approximation factor γ = Õ(d
√
n/α).
2.9.1 *Practical* R/MLWE Definitions
We will also be considering the definition of RLWE discussed in [98] since it best
represents practical use. The reason for this is that the original RLWE definition
given in Section 2.8 (and the definition of MLWE in Section 2.9) uses a continuous
error distribution which is inconvenient in practice. As we will see, the definition
below uses discrete error distributions rather than continuous ones. These definitions
will be used in Chapters 3 and 5, whereas the more formal definitions above are used
in Chapter 4.
Definition 19 (Practical RLWE distribution). For a “secret” s ∈ Rq and an error
distribution χ over R, a sample from the ring-LWE distribution As,χ over Rq×Rq is
generated by choosing a← Rq uniformly, e← χ and outputting (a, a ·s+e mod qR).
5where OK represents the ring of integers of K
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Definition 20 (Practical RLWE problems). The practical S-RLWE problem with
secret distribution D over R entails recovering s from arbitrarily many samples of
As,χ where s← D. The practical decisional RLWE problem with secret distribution
D entails distinguishing As,χ from uniform given arbitrarily many samples where
s← D.
We note that in practice, we usually have a restriction on the number of samples
available to an attacker.
Definition 21 (Practical MLWE distribution). For a “secret” s ∈ (Rq)d and error
distribution χ over R, a sample from the practical MLWE distribution Ad,s,χ over
(Rq)
d ×Rq is generated by choosing a← (Rq)d uniformly, e← (χ)d and outputting
(a,a · s+ e mod qR).
Definition 22 (Search module-LWE problem). The practical S-MLWE problem with
secret distribution D over R entails recovering s from arbitrarily many samples of
Ad,s,χ where s ← Dd. The practical decisional MLWE problem with secret distri-
bution D entails distinguishing Ad,s,χ from uniform given arbitrarily many samples
where s← Dd.
2.10 The 1D-SIS Problem
The next computational problem/assumption is slightly less common. It is the short
integer solution problem in dimension 1 (1D-SIS). The following formulation of the
problem was used in [33] in conjunction with a lemma attesting to its hardness.
Definition 23. (1D-SIS, [33, Definition 3.4])‘ The one-dimensional SIS problem,
denoted 1D-SISq,m,t, is the following: Given a uniform v ← Zmq , find z ∈ Zm such
that ∥z∥∞ ≤ t and ⟨v,z⟩ ∈ [−t, t] + qZ.
In addition there is a useful variant of the 1D-SIS problem that is easier to use when
writing certain proofs.
Definition 24. ( [33, Definition 3.6]) Let q = p ·
∏
i∈[n] pi where p1 < · · · < pn and p
are all co-prime. Further, let m ∈ N. The 1D-SIS-Rq,p,m,t problem is the following:
Given v ← Zmq , find z ∈ Zm with ∥z∥∞ ≤ t such that ⟨v, z⟩ ∈ [−t, t] + (q/p)Z.
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Evidence that both of these problems are hard is given via reductions from the SIVP
problem as stated in the following lemmas.
Lemma 8. ( [33, Corollary 3.5]) Let n ∈ N and q =
∏
i∈[n] pi where all p1 < . . . , < pn
are co-prime. Let m ≥ cn log q (for some universal constant c). Assuming that
p1 ≥ t · ω(
√
mn logn), 1D-SISq,m,t is at least as hard as SIVPt·Õ(√mn).
Lemma 9. ( [33], Corollary 3.7) Let q, p, t,m be as in Definition 24. Then the
1D-SIS-Rq,p,m,t problem is at least as hard as 1D-SISq/p,m,t. Further, if p1 ≥ t ·
ω(
√
mn logn), then 1D-SIS-Rq,p,m,t is at least as hard as SIVPt·Õ(√mn).
2.11 Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
Let L be a language defined by a relation RL. That is,
L := {x : ∃w ∈ {0, 1}∗,RL(x,w) = 1}.
At a high level, a zero knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) for relation RL is an
interactive protocol where a prover P wishes to convince a verifier V that it knows
a w∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that RL(x,w∗) = 1 for some common instance x. It is assumed
that V is polynomial time. For the sake of V, the protocol should only result in V
accepting if P can indeed exhibit knowledge of such a w∗ (knowledge soundness).
For the sake of P, if it indeed does know of a w∗, it should be able to make V accept
(completeness). In addition, even when interacting with a malicious polynomial
time verifier V∗, it is desired that P does not leak any information beyond what V∗
could have computed on its own (zero-knowledge).
In the definition below, P(·, ·) and V(·) are interactive probabilistic algorithms,
i.e. two algorithms that participate in some prescribed protocol together. We let
⟨P(·, ·),V∗(·)⟩ denote a random variable representing the output of V∗ when inter-
acting with P over the random coins of both P and V∗. In addition, we denote that
an algorithm A has oracle access to B using the notation AB where the cost of an
oracle call to B is counted as one. As a technical note, we keep any auxiliary inputs
implicit throughout the definition for simplicity. For more details, see [60].
Definition 25 (ZKPoK). A ZKPoK (with knowledge soundness error κ) for a
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language L with relation RL is a pair of algorithms P(·, ·) and V(·) satisfying the
following properties:
• (Completeness) For any x ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) and w ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that RL(x,w) =
1, Pr[⟨P(x,w),V(x)⟩ = 1] ≥ 1− negl(λ).
• (Knowledge soundness with error κ) There is a probabilistic algorithm K
whose expected running time is poly(λ) such that for every P∗ satisfying
Pr[⟨P∗(x),V(x)⟩ = 1] = ϵ(x) > κ(|x|), KP∗(·)(x) outputs a w such that
RL(x,w) = 1 with probability at least ϵ(x)− κ(|x|).
• (Zero knowledge) For every PPT V∗, ∃ a PPT algorithm M∗ such that ∀x ∈
{0, 1}poly(λ) and w such that RL(x,w) = 1, the distributions of M∗(x) and
⟨P(x,w),V∗(x)⟩ are computationally indistinguishable.
Note that a zero knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) is defined similarly to
a ZKPoK apart from the fact that the knowledge soundness property only considers
PPT adversaries P∗.
The Fiat-Shamir Transform Briefly, the random oracle model introduces a
random function that all parties are given oracle access to in a cryptographic scheme.
Assuming existence of such an oracle is a powerful tool when writing cryptographic
proofs because oracle answers can be simulated/programmed advantageously. We
call a protocol public coin if the verifier’s messages consist of uniform random values
in some range. In addition, a protocol is honest-verifier zero knowledge (HVZK) if
the zero knowledge property holds against the prescribed verifier from the protocol
description. Finally, a proof of knowledge is a protocol where the completeness and
knowledge soundness properties from Definition 25 hold for some negligible κ. Fiat
and Shamir proposed a way to transform a public coin, HVZK, constant-round proof
of knowledge protocol into a non-interactive ZKPoK (NIZKPoK) in the random
oracle model [54]. At an intuitive level, the Fiat-Shamir transform simply replaces
the verifier’s messages with calls to a random oracle. The formal proof of validity
of the Fiat-Shamir transform was subsequently proven formally by Pointcheval and
Stern [114]. More recently, the quantum random oracle model has been considered
where parties have access to a quantum instantiation of the random function. The
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motivation for this is that post-quantum security considers a world where quantum
computation is feasible, so it makes sense that implementations of the random oracle
function should be quantum as well. This introduces a significant change in the way
that the random function is queried, so we cannot take the security of the Fiat-
Shamir transform for granted. Nonetheless, recent work shows that the Fiat-Shamir
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In this chapter, we present attacks that allow for the computation of a RLWE/MLWE
secret key given a “noisy” version of the secret key. The nature of the “noise” leads
to different attack techniques. Our main attack (Section 3.5) fits into the cold
boot setting [64] where an attacker is given the secret key (as stored in memory)
apart from the fact that some of the bits are flipped. Our attack considers the case
where an NTT is used to store the key which is fairly common amongst practical
RLWE/MLWE based schemes [127, 96, 115]. Importantly, the positions of the bit
flips are not known to the attacker.
Our main attack follows a relatively simple structure. We first use the divide and
conquer strategy for computing an NTT to derive an incomplete binary tree of sub-
instances of our original cold boot problem. The root of the tree represents the
original instance in dimension n, say, and a node at level i represents a sub-instance
of dimension n/2i. Although the dimensions of sub-instances decrease further away
from the root node, the instances do not necessarily become easier. In particular,
sub-instances of very small dimension turn out to be ill-defined in the sense that
there are many candidate solutions, but no efficient way of verifying which candidate
solution is correct. Therefore, we only produce a tree of sub-instances to a carefully
chosen level. The remainder of the attack involves solving the relatively low dimen-
sional sub-instances at the bottom of our tree using practical lattice techniques and
working a solution to a sub-instance back up the tree to the root node.
We show that our attack is feasible on practical RLWE/MLWE parameter sets and for
practical cold boot bit flip rates. Throughout, we use the parameters from the Kyber
KEM [127] as a concrete example, eventually estimating attack with a complexity
of roughly 243 using the bit flip rates of ρ0 = 1%, ρ1 = 0.1% (see Section 3.2.3
for an explanation and justification of these values). If the NTT is not used for
key storage, we estimate that a cold boot attack takes roughly 270 operations at
the same bit flip rates using standard lattice-based security estimates. Therefore, it
appears that storing a key in the NTT domain makes practical cold boot attacks on
MLWE schemes significantly easier. In cases where cold boot attacks are a concern,
Kyber may be implemented by storing secret keys in terms of coefficients rather
than the NTT. On the other hand, our experiments show that storing a key in the
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NTT does not affect the difficulty of running a cold boot attack for the RLWE-
based scheme New Hope [115]. For the very low but still very feasible bit flip
rates ρ = 0.17%, ρ1 = 0.1%, the NTT-based attack costs roughly 249 operations
whereas an attack without an NTT costs around 254 operations. Tables 3.10 and
3.15 summarise our estimates for the cost of our attack. These findings are the
result of running an implementation of the most expensive lattice-based aspect of
our attack. The code used to generate these results is publicly available 1.
Following the main attack is an attack using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm (Sec-
tion 3.6) showing that it is very easy to recover RLWE secrets of Hamming weight
w when given access to 2w consecutive entries of a secret vector in the NTT do-
main. For w considerably smaller than n/2 this attack solves a seemingly non-
trivial problem. However, obtaining the leakage of 2w consecutive coefficients does
not immediately fit nicely into the cold boot setting. Nonetheless, we do consider
combining a naive guessing strategy with our Berlekamp-Massey attack to obtain
a cold boot attack on RLWE secrets with low Hamming weight. The resulting at-
tack on New Hope parameters with Hamming weight w secrets, for bit flip rates of
ρ0 = 0.17%, ρ1 = 0.1%, performs as follows. For w = 64, the attack has a com-
plexity of roughly 228 whereas for w = 128, the attack costs roughly 250 operations.
Unfortunately, low Hamming weight schemes that use an NTT for key storage are
not common, so this attack is theoretical rather than practical in nature.
Finally, in Section 3.7 we overview another recent work [45] that aims to solve a
similar problem to our work. Informally, their result states that there is an attack
recovering a RLWE secret key s given periodic entries of a secret vector in the NTT
domain. Although this does not model a realistic attack setting, this attack is based
much more explicitly on algebraic structure and does not require any heavy lattice
reduction.
Road map We begin with chapter preliminaries in Section 3.2 that include a fairly
detailed account of the general cold boot attack setting. We next discuss how to
estimate the complexity of a cold boot attack on a M/RLWE-based scheme where




problem and describe our main attack in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. After the
main attack, we describe our Berlekamp-Massey based attack in Section 3.6 followed
by an account of related literature in Section 3.7.
3.2 Chapter Preliminaries
We switch between polynomials and coefficient vectors throughout for convenience.
For example, for a polynomial s ∈ Rq, we assume that s ∈ Znq is the coefficient vector
of a single ring element s and represent an NTT using the most convenient out of
NTT(s) or NTT(s). In addition, we denote MLWE keys using #»s = (s0, . . . , sd−1) ∈
(Rq)
d and write #»s = (s0, . . . , sd−1) ∈ Zndq to denote the concatenation of coefficient
vectors of the polynomials in #»s .
We will use the following result, whose proof is an easy exercise:
Proposition 1. Let X ← {±20,±21,±22, . . . ,±2ℓ−1}. We have




Furthermore, let Y = (X0, . . . , Xn−1) where each Xi ← {±20,±21,±22, . . . ,±2ℓ−1}.
Then the expected squared norm of Y is






3.2.1 Minimal Binary Signed Digit Representation
We will often consider integers in binary signed digit representation (BSDR). This
representation is reminiscent of a binary representation for positive integers, apart
from the fact that each individual bit in a BSDR has its own sign. For example,
(1, 0,−1) is a BSDR of −3 because −3 = 1 · 20 + 0 · 21 − 1 · 22. We also have
that −3 can be written as (−1,−1) in BSDR. It is clear that integers can have
many BSDRs. In order to reduce the number of possibilities, we often consider the
minimal BSDRs corresponding to the BSDRs with the minimum possible Hamming
weight. For example, the minimal BSDR of 31 is (−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1). Note that this
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has a lower Hamming weight than the binary representation of 31 i.e. (1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
Even when considering minimal BSDRs, the issue of non-uniqueness can arise. The
integer −3 is a simple example of this. One can also consider integers in q-ary signed
digit representation (q-SDR). For example, if q = 3, a possible q-SDR of the integer
8 would be (−1, 0, 1). Once again these representations are not unique. We extend
these definitions to vectors in the obvious way, i.e. by considering vectors component-
wise. For example, using 3 digits per symbol (or vector entry), the vector (2,−4)
has a minimal BSDR of (0, 1, 0, 0, 0,−1).
3.2.2 Standard Methods for Solving BDD
One possible strategy for solving BDD is to first obtain a “high quality” basis for
the lattice and then to run Babai’s nearest plane algorithm to obtain a solution.
Informally, the most desirable bases for running Babai are short and orthogonal.
Obviously, for certain lattice geometries, short orthogonal bases do not necessarily
exist. Due to this fact, definitions of “reduced” bases aim to mimic the notion of
a short and orthogonal basis. LLL reduced bases are reduced in a relatively weak
sense. Such bases can be computed in polynomial time in the lattice dimension
using the LLL algorithm and lead to solutions of lattice problems with exponential
approximation factors. Alternatively, the well-known BKZ algorithm [124, 40] out-
puts a so-called BKZ-reduced basis. This algorithm is parametrised by a block size
β which is at most the lattice dimension d. The BKZ algorithm makes many calls to
an oracle solving SVP in dimension β. High level pseudocode for the BKZ algorithm
is given in Algorithm 2. Intuitively, both the running time and output basis quality
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of BKZ increase with β.
Algorithm 2: High level pseudocode for BKZ
Input: Basis {b0, . . . , bd−1}, SVP oracle
Output: Basis {b0, . . . , bd−1} that is BKZ reduced
1 z ← 0, j ← 0, LLL(b0, . . . , bd−1) // LLL reduce the whole basis
2 while z < d− 1 do
/* πj = projection onto space orthogonal to span(b0, . . . , bd−1) */
3 k ← min{j + β − 1, d− 1} // define block
4 L[j,k] ← L(πj(bj), . . . , πj(bd−1))




6 if v ̸= (1, 0, . . . , 0) then
7 LLL(b0, . . . , bj−1,
∑k
i=j vibi, bj , . . . , bmin(k+1,n))
8 z ← 0
9 else
10 LLL(b0, . . . , bmin(k+1,n))
11 z ← z + 1
12 j ← (j + 1) mod (d− 1)
We now give the formal definition of a BKZ-reduced basis.
Definition 26 (BKZ-reduced basis). A lattice basis {b0, . . . , bd−1} is a δ-BKZ-β-
reduced basis if
• it is δ-LLL reduced, and
• for j = 0, . . . , d− 1, ∥b∗j∥ = λ1(L[j,k]) where L[j,k] is the lattice with basis given
by the components of bj , bj+1, . . . , bk orthogonal to the span of b1, . . . , bj−1 and
k = min{j + β − 1, d− 1}.
After performing BKZ-β reduction, the first vector in the transformed lattice basis
is assumed to have norm δn0 ·det(Λ)
1/n where det(Λ) is the determinant of the lattice
under consideration and the root-Hermite factor δ0 is a constant based on β. More
generally, the quality of a reduced basis B is related to the flatness of the slope
of the logs of the lengths of the vectors b⋆i in the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation




Definition 27 (Geometric Series Assumption [125]). For a random lattice, the
norms of the Gram-Schmidt vectors after lattice reduction satisfy
∥b∗i ∥ = αi−1 · ∥b1∥ for some 0 < α < 1.
Combining the GSA with the root-Hermite factor and the fact that det(Λ) =∏n




0 . Increasing the block-size parameter β
of BKZ-β leads to a smaller δ0 but also leads to an increase in run-time. In this
thesis, we consider the “enumeration regime” where lattice point enumeration is
used to realise the exact SVP oracle in dimension β. In this case the running time
grows as βΘ(β) [76, 103]. The precise details of lattice enumeration are not essential.
However, as intuition, enumeration in the context of BDD is an exhaustive search
over lattice vectors of some maximal distance to the target point. A lattice vector
candidate v = v1b1 + · · ·+ vdbd is found one coefficient at a time, starting from vd
and ending at v1. To obtain vd, project the target point and lattice onto the space
orthogonal to all but the last basis vector. A close vector to the projected target in
this projected lattice is by definition an integer multiple of ∥b∗d∥ and we set vd to
be such an integer multiple. We then project the lattice, target point and partial
candidate vdbd onto the space orthogonal to all but the final two basis vectors. The
coefficient vd−1 is set to be an integer multiple of b∗d−1 that is added to shorten the
offset between the target point and partial candidate vdbd in this projected space.
The rest of the coefficients are obtained similarly. Note that as soon as the off-
set length reaches some threshold, the partial candidate is thrown away and the
process restarts using different choices of coefficients. From this description, one
can view enumeration as a depth first search of a “pruned” enumeration tree. As
a note, Babai’s nearest plane algorithm has been generalised to consider multiple
planes [88]. This, can also be considered as a form of pruned BDD enumeration [90].
We will follow the enumeration approach to solving BDD, i.e. we first compute
a high quality basis and then run pruned enumeration to recover the (hopefully)
closest vector to our target vector. As is standard, we run enumeration in some
sub-dimension and then extend the solution in the projected sub-lattice to a full
solution by running the standard Babai’s nearest plane algorithm. This is equivalent
to picking very small pruning coefficients for the smallest indices. We will make use
of BKZ and enumeration as implemented in [55, 56] for our experiments. This
54
3.2 Chapter Preliminaries
implementation also features a Pruning module, which computes parameters for
pruned enumeration.
3.2.3 Cold Boot Attack Scenario
Cold boot attacks were introduced and studied in the seminal work of Halderman et
al. [65]. Briefly, cold boot attacks rely on the fact that bits in RAM retain their value
for some time after power is cut. Therefore, a cold boot attacker would typically
either
1. Remove the RAM chip from the victim’s device and plug into an external
device to read the information on the RAM chip or
2. Power down the machine and then immediately turn it back on while loading
a malicious operating system allowing for the bits in RAM to be read.
In order to preserve the information stored in RAM for longer, memory can be
cooled to extreme temperatures. However, an attacker always ends up with a noisy
version of memory where some of the bits have been flipped. It turns out that RAM
chips have regions that eventually decay to a “ground state” of either a 0 value or
a 1 value. With this in mind, the experiments of Halderman et al. [65] showed that
there were two different classes of bit flips:
1. those flipping towards the ground state,
2. those flipping away from the ground state (i.e.retrograde flips).
In addition, there are two different bit flip rates associated to the two classes of
bit flips: ρ0 being the rate towards the ground state and ρ1 being the rate in the
retrograde (i.e. opposite) direction. Realistic values for ρ0 and ρ1 are as follows.
Cooling RAM chips to (−50◦C) before cutting the power allows for a ρ0 = 1% bit-
flip rate even after a time period of ten minutes. Halderman et al. also noted that
bit-flip rates as low as ρ0 = 0.17% are possible when liquid nitrogen is used for
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cooling. As for the retrograde flips, it was estimated that these occur at a rate of
ρ1 ∈ [0.05− 0.1%].
In a cold boot attack, then, the attacker gets access to a noisy version of memory.
As is typically done, we will ignore the problem of identifying the location of secret
key material in memory and assume the attacker gets access noisy version of a
scheme’s secret key, where a small number of bits have been flipped. The attacker
then recovers the key by applying bespoke error correction algorithms. Our main
attack (Section 3.5) is an example of such a bespoke error correction algorithm in the
context of RLWE/MLWE. Since it is typical for secret keys to be stored in memory
using an NTT, the main attack considers the case where the attacker is given access
to a noisy NTT of the secret key.
3.3 Cold Boot Resilience for Kyber’s Parameters (non-NTT)
For comparison, we now include security estimates for the case where we try to
solve RLWE/MLWE given a noisy cold boot reading of the coefficients of the secret
(rather than leakage in the NTT domain). As a concrete example, we use the
default parameter set of the Kyber KEM [127], henceforth referred to simply as
“Kyber”, as the running example. However, we stress that our analysis applies
generally to RLWE/MLWE keys as we will see later when the New Hope KEM [115]
is considered. Kyber relies on the MLWE problem using module rank 3 over the ring
Rq = Z7681[x]/(x256 + 1). Let Bin(n′, p′) denote the standard binomial distribution
using n′ trials with parameter p′ ∈ [0, 1]. Kyber uses an error distribution denoted by
Bη that corresponds to the shifted standard binomial distribution Bin(2η, 1/2)− η.
More specifically, the coefficients of the error polynomials follow the distribution Bη





Kyber, the coefficients of the secret also follow Bη.
Now, consider the Kyber public key ( #»a , b := #»a · #»s + e) where #»a , #»s ∈ (R7681)3, e ∈ R
with si, e← Bη and assume that, due to some leakage, we are given a noisy version
of s ∈ (R7681)3 denoted by
#»
s̃ := #»s +∆. Here, the addition is over R7681 and ∆ is
an element of (R7681)3 representing bit-flips. This means that each coefficient of ∆
should have low Hamming weight when written in minimal BSDR. For illustrative
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purposes, we will focus on cold boot bit-flip rates of ρ0 = 1.0% towards the ground
state and a retrograde bit-flip rate of ρ1 = 0.1%, cf. [65]. We consider
#»a · #»s̃ − b = #»a · #»s̃ − #»a · #»s − e = #»a · ( #»s̃ − #»s ) + e = #»a ·∆+ e (3.1)
which is an MLWE instance for the secret ∆. We note that the conversion works
both ways, i.e. an attacker who can find ∆ can then solve the above MLWE instance,
and thus the two problems are equivalent.
By definition of Bη we have that coefficients of #»s have absolute value bounded
by η = 4. Thus, the secret coefficients fit into four bits (including one sign bit)
and we may assume that ∆ is both relatively sparse (at least when considered
in minimal BSDR) and has coefficients that are bounded by η = 4 in absolute
value. This means that we only need to consider 768 · 4 bits altogether. We assume
that half of these bits are in the ground state of memory and the other half are
not. That is, for ρ0 = 1.0%, ρ1 = 0.1%, we obtain a ∆ with an expected number
of 17 = ⌈(1.0 + 0.1)/100 · 768 · 4/2⌉ non-zero coefficients, each bounded by four in
absolute value. According to the LWE estimator from [9] the MLWE instance (3.1)
for these parameter sets take ≈ 270.3 operations to solve assuming enumeration is
used to realise the SVP oracle [40].2 This attack might be improved somewhat
by taking into account the a priori distribution of #»s . More values are given in
Table 3.10 and estimates for the New Hope KEM are given in Table 3.15.
3.4 Cold Boot NTT Decoding Problem
The discussion in the previous section assumes that the MLWE secret #»s is stored
in RAM as a coefficient vector with small entries, allowing a cold boot attacker to
obtain a noisy image of s. Yet, to maximise efficiency, Kyber stores #̂»s = NTTn( #»s )
where by abuse of notation, we write NTTn( #»s ) := (NTTn(s0), NTTn(s1), NTTn(s2)).
Thus, a cold boot attacker does not encounter a noisy version of #»s but a noisy
version of NTTn( #»s ). In other words, the costs derived in Section 3.3 are immaterial
2The following call to the code available at https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator was
used to establish this cost:
sage: f = partial(drop_and_solve, primal_usvp, n=3*256, q=7681, al-
pha=sqrt(2)*sqrt(2*pi)/7681,
reduction_cost_model=BKZ.CheNgu12, decision=False, postprocess=False)
sage: f(secret_distribution=((-4, 4), ceil((1.0 + 0.1)/100 * 4 * 768/2)))
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for a real-world attack on Kyber. In particular, the decoding problem encountered
during a cold boot attack on M/RLWE-based schemes utilising an NTT, is as follows:
Definition 28 (Cold boot NTT decoding problem). Let NTT be a (negacyclic) NTT
of dimension n modulo q, let ξ be some known constant mod q, let s ∈ Znq be the
coefficient vector of a single polynomial with some known distribution χ and let
∆ ∈ Znq be a coefficient vector with known distribution ψ. Then the Cold Boot NTT
Decoding Problem is to recover s given
˜̂s := ξ NTT(s) + ∆.
In the definition above, we slightly generalise the cold boot problem encountered
by permitting a scaling factor ξ, cf. Section 3.5.1. Note that all quantities in the
problem statement are interpreted as coefficient vectors rather than polynomials.
In addition, the coefficient vectors are associated to single polynomials rather than
non-trivial rank module elements. In other words, recovering an MLWE key involves
solving multiple instances of the described cold boot NTT decoding problem.
As before, in our setting ∆ corresponds to bit-flips which means that each com-
ponent of ∆ should have low Hamming weight when written in minimal BSDR.
However, contrary to the discussion in Section 3.3, the norm of the “noise term” ∆
is not necessarily small. By analogy with LWE, it will be convenient to consider the
problem with the roles of s and ∆ reversed, i.e. to consider the inverse NTT of the
above instance. In particular, we will be considering the problem of recovering s or
∆ given
s̃ := W ·∆+ s (3.2)
where W is the inverse (of a possibly scaled by some constant) negacyclic NTT
matrix for dimension n, s̃ is known, s is small and ∆ is sparse in minimal BSDR.
We sometimes write Wn to explicitly indicate the dimension of the NTT.
In a standard LWE setting, an adversary is essentially given a noisy product of
a matrix A with a secret vector where A has entries uniformly chosen modulo
q. Indeed, to prevent precomputation attacks, Kyber specifies that a fresh A is
computed for each new secret. In contrast, each instance of our decoding problem has
the same W which is the matrix representation of a scaled inverse negacyclic NTT.
Thus, precomputation attacks become feasible. More importantly, though, this
58
3.5 The Main Cold Boot Attack
matrix is highly structured and, indeed, the q-ary lattices derived from this matrix
do not behave like random lattices. We consider this in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.4.1.
We note that while we are only given n LWE-like samples in our decoding problem,
the problem is still well defined, despite ∆ not being small. This is because ∆ is
sparse when its components are written in BSDR form. On the other hand, the
distribution of ∆ implies that standard techniques for solving LWE-like problems
need to be adapted. We consider this in Section 3.5.3.
We parametrise the cold boot NTT decoding problem by a parameter κ representing
the number of expected bit-flips; explicitly:
κ := ⌈(ρ0 + ρ1) · n · ⌈log2 q⌉/2⌉.
Finally, we note that, for Kyber, the dimension of the problem is immediately re-
duced from n·d = 768 to n = 256 since a single Kyber key gives rise to d independent
cold boot problems. It should be noted that this reduction in dimension does not
occur when considering RLWE keys since RLWE is effectively MLWE with d = 1.
For bit-flip rates of 0.17% and 1% in the ground state direction (and 0.1% in the
retrograde direction), we expect a total of less than ⌈(0.17 + 0.1) · 256 · 13/200⌉ = 5
and ⌈(1 + 0.1) · 256 · 13/200⌉ = 19 bits to be flipped respectively. Therefore, un-
der these cold boot assumptions, we expect either 5 or 19 unknown bit-flips. Note
that in both cases, the number of retrograde bit-flips is approximately 2. The case











operations. For the case, ρ0 = 1.0%, the naive strategy of simply guessing the posi-











This latter value of ρ0 will be used as our running example.
3.5 The Main Cold Boot Attack
In this section, we describe our main cold boot attack on RLWE/MLWE where secret
keys are stored in the NTT domain. The attack can be separated into three distinct
parts:
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1. (Section 3.5.1) Deriving low-dimensional cold boot NTT decoding sub-instances.
2. (Section 3.5.2) Extending the solution of a sub-instance to a solution of the
original cold boot attack instance.
3. (Section 3.5.3) Solving the low dimensional sub-instances.
3.5.1 Divide and Conquer
It is well known that a 2n-dimensional Fourier transform can be written in terms of
two 2n−1-dimensional Fourier transforms. The same holds for a negacyclic NTT. To
simplify the presentation of the appropriate formulae, define g(e) := (g0, g2, . . . , gn−2)
and g(o) := (g1, g3, . . . , gn−1) for any g ∈ Znq . The negacyclic NTT can be shown to
satisfy the following relations:
2NTTn/2(g(e))i = NTTn(g)i + NTTn(g)i+n/2 (3.3)
2γωiNTTn/2(g(o))i = NTTn(g)i − NTTn(g)i+n/2 (3.4)
for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n/2− 1}.
Example 2. Consider n = 8, given a 2n-th root of unity γ, we can write the forward
negacyclic NTT in matrix form as
Vn =

1 γ γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7
1 γ3 γ6 −γ −γ4 −γ7 γ2 γ5
1 γ5 −γ2 −γ7 γ4 −γ −γ6 γ3
1 γ7 −γ6 γ5 −γ4 γ3 −γ2 γ
1 −γ γ2 −γ3 γ4 −γ5 γ6 −γ7
1 −γ3 γ6 γ −γ4 γ7 γ2 −γ5
1 −γ5 −γ2 γ7 γ4 γ −γ6 −γ3
1 −γ7 −γ6 −γ5 −γ4 −γ3 −γ2 −γ

Adding the rows i and i+4 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, we obtain W (+)n as shown below which
corresponds to the NTT matrix for n = 4 scaled by ξ = 2:
V(+)n =

2 0 2γ2 0 2γ4 0 2γ6 0
2 0 2γ6 0 −2γ4 0 2γ2 0
2 0 −2γ2 0 2γ4 0 −2γ6 0
2 0 −2γ6 0 −2γ4 0 −2γ2 0
 , 2Vn/2 =

2 2γ2 2γ4 2γ6
2 2γ6 −2γ4 2γ2
2 −2γ2 2γ4 −2γ6
2 −2γ6 −2γ4 −2γ2
 .
Using this halving property, we can split our cold boot NTT decoding problem into
two smaller cold boot NTT decoding problems. Recall that our cold boot instance
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is described by the equation s̃ = NTT−1n (∆) + s (see Equation (3.2)). To show how
we utilise Equations (3.3) and (3.4), we perform the following steps:
1. Take a forward NTT to obtain the instance NTTn(s̃) = NTTn(s) + ∆.
2. Perform the two folding steps:
(a) (Positive Fold) Compute the vector described by
NTTn(s̃)i + NTTn(s̃)i+n/2 = 2NTTn/2(s
(e))i + (∆i +∆i+n/2).










3. Define ∆(l) := (∆0, . . . ,∆n/2−1), ∆(r) := (∆n/2, . . . ,∆n−1) and do the follow-
ing:
(a) (Positive Fold): Multiply by 2−1 mod q and take an inverse NTT. The
resulting instance is
s̃(e) = 2−1 NTT−1n/2(∆(l) +∆(r)) + s
(e).
(b) (Negative Fold) Define the matrix Ω such that Ωi,j = (γωi)−1δi,j where
δi,j is the Kronecker delta function. Take an inverse NTT to obtain the
instance
s̃(o) = 2−1 NTT−1n/2
(
Ω · (∆(l) −∆(r))
)
+ s(o).
To summarise, in matrix notation, we can halve the dimension of the instance s̃ =
Wn ·∆+ s by performing the folding step and deriving the following two instances
of half the dimension:
s̃(e) = 2−1Wn/2 · (∆(l) +∆(r)) + s(e), (3.5)
s̃(o) = 2−1(Wn/2 Ω) · (∆(l) −∆(r)) + s(o). (3.6)
Looking at the form of the sub-instance given by the “positive fold” (Equation (3.5)),
it is clear that we can run a further divide and conquer step to reduce the dimension
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Figure 3.1: Recursive folding/dimension reduction.
further. In fact, we can repeatedly divide and conquer the positive fold to reach any
dimension we wish as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Considering, the “negative fold”, the additional scaling matrix Ω prevents us from
folding down further. However, we note that on the lowest level, the attacker may
still solve the negative branch.
Remark 5. Note that we can also attempt to divide and conquer on the inverse NTT
directly in the hope of obtaining sub-instances with error terms of the form s(l)±s(r)
and secrets ∆(e) or ∆(o). Yet, when attempting to do this for the negacyclic NTT,
we actually obtain sub-instances with errors of the form s(l) + ω±n/4s(r) which are
not guaranteed to be small. However, these instances are still susceptible to lattice
attacks for limited folding levels.
A drawback of reducing to an extremely small dimension is that the “secret term”
(i.e. the analogue of ∆) becomes less sparse at each level, eventually to the point
that its distribution approaches the uniform distribution. Nonetheless, performing
only a limited number of folding steps can preserve sparsity. This is because if
∆ := (∆(l),∆(r)) is very sparse, then ∆(l)±∆(r) is still expected to be sparse (albeit
not as sparse as ∆) and of the same Hamming weight as ∆ when written in minimal
BSDR. We will see later that a sparse minimal BSDR is the key to our lattice-
based attack for solving sub-instances, so reducing to trivial dimension would be
detrimental to our cold boot attack.
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3.5.2 Extending Solutions to Sub-Instances
We now show how to derive a solution to an n-dimensional instance given an oracle
that solves just one of its child instances in dimension n/2. We instantiate such an
oracle in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4.1.
We first note that given the solution to one of the sub-instances, we can derive a
solution to its neighbour instance (c.f. Figure 3.1). First assume that the minimal
BSDR (or possibly elements of a minimal BSDR list) of ∆(l) + ∆(r) has Hamming
weight equal to that of ∆. In other words, assume that there was no decrease in
minimal BSDR Hamming weight when performing the positive fold. Then each bit
set in the minimal BSDR of ∆(l) +∆(r) (or the single correct element of the BSDR
list) originate from either ∆(l) or ∆(r). Therefore, in order to guess ∆(l) − ∆(r),
we simply flip some bits in the minimal BSDR of ∆(l) + ∆(r). We then check
the correctness of the guess by substituting the value of ∆(l) − ∆(r) back into the
neighbour instance. Note that the list of minimal BSDRs is expected to be relatively
short. For example, of the integers {1, . . . , 7680}, less than 4.92% have a BSDR list
length of 4 or more when considering 13-bit representations. The maximum BSDR
list length observed for these integers is 21 and occurs just 4 times. Since we will
typically be encountering integers with low Hamming weight minimal BSDR, the
length of the minimal BSDR lists ought to be shorter than suggested by these figures
over {1, . . . , 7680}.
If the Hamming weight of the minimal BSDR of ∆(l) + ∆(r) is different to that of
∆, it has decreased with very high probability.3 For example, assume that each
Zq-component of ∆(l) is the result of at most a single bit-flip. Assume the same
for ∆(r). Performing a fold in such a case would mean that each Zq-component of
∆(l) + ∆(r) is the result of at most two bit-flips. Therefore the minimal BSDR of
each component should have Hamming weight at most 2. In what follows, a sum
“a + b” for a, b ∈ Zq is intended to represent a single entry of a folding ∆(l) +∆(r)
where a is from ∆(l) and b is from ∆(r). Under this assumption, there are two cases
where the Hamming weight decreases by 1:
3Modular reduction by q may increase the Hamming weight, but this case occurs so infrequently
that we ignore it here.
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(a) Two bits with the same sign and position collide after folding e.g., (1 + 1) =
2, (−1− 1) = −2
(b) Two bits with opposite signs appear in consecutive positions after folding e.g.,
(−1 + 2) = 1, (2− 1) = 1, (1− 2) = −1, (−2 + 1) = −1.
The Hamming weight can also decrease by 2 if two bits with opposite signs collide
e.g., (1− 1) = 0, (−1 + 1) = 0.
In light of these observations, we can still use a combinatorial approach to derive
∆(l) − ∆(r) from ∆(l) + ∆(r) even when folding caused the Hamming weight to
decrease. For now, assume that the Hamming weight κ of ∆ is known,4 let κ′
denote the Hamming weight of ∆(r) +∆(l) and ignore the small factors arising from
the non-uniqueness of the minimal BSDR. We perform one of the following three
guessing strategies depending on κ− κ′:
0: Flip signs of ∆(l) +∆(r) to guess ∆(l) −∆(r); 2κ
′ guesses required.
1: Assume the Hamming weight decreased by 1 when folding due to either case
(a) or (b) above; 3κ′ · 2κ′−1 guesses required.
2: Assume the Hamming weight decreased by 2 due to a single collision in bits
with opposing signs; at most (n/2 · ⌈log(q)⌉ − κ) · 2 · 2κ guesses required
Note that the 3κ′ factor arises because we must choose one out of the κ′ bits that
directly resulted from the Hamming weight decrease, and there are at most three
ways that this spurious bit occurred. For example, suppose the spurious bit repre-
sented the integer 2. Then it could be that this value arose from the (1 + 1), (4− 2)
or (−2+ 4). The (n/2 · ⌈log(q)⌉− κ) factor arises in the third case because we must
choose a 0 bit that arose from a collision and there are at most (n/2 · ⌈log(q)⌉ − κ)
zeros that are set to 0. There is a chance that this guessing approach fails. In
order to increase the probability of success, we would have to perform additional
guessing phases where we try to correct multiple spurious bits assuming various
configurations. However, our experimental results below show that performing the
three guessing phases above already yields a good probability of success. We also
4While this does not hold in a real cold boot attack, we will discuss below how to handle this.
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note that in a cold boot attack the exact value of κ is not known. In this case, the
attacker starts by assuming κ = κ′, followed by κ = κ′ + 1 and κ = κ′ + 2. This is
sufficient to achieve a high rate of success.
An attacker may also directly solve the problem of the neighbour branch ∆(l)−∆(r).
Indeed, given ∆(l) + ∆(r), we can eliminate either ∆(l) or ∆(r) from the neighbour
instance to obtain a problem in either ∆(l) or ∆(r). This new problem will have
associated Hamming weight roughly κ/2. Furthermore, since κ < n there is a very
high probability that a known value (∆(l))i + (∆(r))i = 0 is indeed the result of
adding (∆(l))i = 0 and (∆(r))i = 0. Thus, the dimension of the neighbour instance
can be further reduced by eliminating those components, producing a relatively easy
instance.
Combining the solutions from the two neighbour instances yields a solution for the
parent instance. Thus, a solution in dimension n, implies a solution in dimension
2n which can then be extended to solutions in 4n, 8n, . . . using the simple guessing
approach above. The overall divide and conquer strategy can be summarised as
follows:
1. Repeatedly divide and conquer the positive fold until a desired target dimen-
sion n′ has been reached.
2. Solve the bottom (positive fold) instance, cf. Section 3.5.4.1.
3. (a) Given a solution to the positive fold, guess the solution to the negative
fold and work the solution upwards. This costs in the order of5
max
(
2κ, 3(κ− 1)2κ−2, (n′/2 · ⌈log(q)⌉ − (κ− 2)) · 2 · 2κ−2
)
operations multiplied by the number of folds.
(b) If guessing fails, solve the negative instance directly, using partial infor-
mation about ∆(l) or ∆(r).
4. Repeat the previous step until the full solution is recovered.
Table 3.1 uses Kyber parameters with κ = 19 bits flipped to give an overview of
how the Hamming weight of ∆ evolves as we fold multiple times. Assuming two
5Once again, we ignore the small factor arising from the non-uniqueness of the minimal BSDR.
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folds, this shows a rough success rate of 74% when only considering the trivial
(κ−κ′ = 0) phase of guessing to work a 64-dimensional solution upwards. However,
when all three phases of guessing are used, we empirically estimate that the success
probability is around 97% when working a solution up from dimension 64. The
corresponding success probability with κ = 25 is 94%. These values were obtained
by sampling 1,000 random vectors∆ with minimal BSDR of Hamming weight κ = 19
and 25 and then analysing the cause of a decrease in Hamming weight whenever this
occurred. A breakdown of the statistics of 1000 trials at the 128 to 64-dimensional
fold are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In particular, we include how many times the
Hamming weight decreases by 0,1 and 2 as well as how many of these are solvable
in the three simple guessing phases described above. We also report success rates
of 98% and 96% for solving this particular fold for κ = 19 and κ = 25 respectively.
We reiterate that even when the simple guess-and-verify algorithm presented here
fails, we expect to be able to solve the neighbour branch by making use of partial
information about ∆l or ∆r. Thus, from now on, we will assume that the aspect of
our attack introduced in this section always succeeds.
Table 3.1: The preservation rate of the Hamming weight of ∆ on folding multiple
times for κ = 19 cold boot flips on Kyber parameters.





Table 3.2: A breakdown of the statistics on the 128 to 64 dimensional fold on 1000
Kyber cold boot instances (κ = 19) when carrying out the three guessing phases.
The “Solvable” row indicates how many of the instances in each category are solvable
by the three guessing phases.
No decrease Decrease by 1 Decrease by 2
Frequency 824 119 45
Solvable 824 119 39
Success rate 100% 100% 87%
Overall success rate for fold: 98.2%
What remains to be established is how to solve one or both of the bottom level
instances; this is the subject of the following sections.
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Table 3.3: The analogous statistics to those in Table 3.2 for κ = 25. For details on
the table entries, see the caption for Table 3.2.
No decrease Decrease by 1 Decrease by 2
Frequency 714 174 94
Solvable 714 173 70
Success rate 100% 99% 74%
Overall success rate for fold: 95.7%
3.5.3 Lattice Formulation
Our algorithm for solving the bottom level instance after applying repeated folding
is inspired by the normal form of the primal attack on LWE . At a high level, the
aim of this attack is to construct a lattice Λ which contains a vector v closest to
(0, s̃), such that the offset between v and (0, s̃) is (∆, s). Then, finding this unique
closest vector v to (0, s̃) allows to recover (∆, s). The success of this attack depends
on v being the unique closest vector. Heuristically, we can expect the attack to
work if (∆, s) is shorter than the shortest vector in Λ.6 Looking at our instance in
Equation (3.2), our “secret term” (interpreting the instance as LWE) is the vector
∆, which is not guaranteed to have small norm, but is guaranteed to be sparse. Note
that we abuse notation slightly here and let Equation (3.2) refer to the bottom level
instance after folding, i.e. ξ > 1 and ∆ is a vector obtained by repeated folding. Note
that this setting is somewhat similar to that considered in [25, 47]. Now, since we
know that the component-wise minimal BSDR of ∆ will be small in norm, the idea
is to construct a lattice resembling the primal attack lattice with an offset vector
containing the minimal BSDR of ∆ in its components.
In fact, we will generalise this idea to construct a lattice with the 2ℓ-ary signed digit
representation of ∆ as an offset. Let b = ⌈log2ℓ q⌉ and ∆(ℓ) ∈ Znb be the vector
where all components of ∆ are expanded in the 2ℓ-ary signed digit representation
of minimal norm, i.e. we consider 2ℓ-SDR. Concretely, for Kyber the reader may
assume ℓ = 7 and thus b = 2. Now, let W(ℓ) = W⊗ (1, 2ℓ, . . . , 2(b−1)ℓ) ∈ Zn×nb and
θ ∈ Q be some rational scaling factor. We take as our lattice




· x ≡ 0 mod q}. (3.7)
6The attack might still succeed even if Λ contains shorter vectors if these vectors are fairly
orthogonal to the offset vector (∆, s).
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)
where (·)T denotes a transpose. Our aim is that v := (0, θs̃) − (∆(ℓ), θs) ∈ Λ is
the closest lattice vector to (0, θs̃). To estimate whether this is the case, we need
to estimate the norm of the offset vector ∥(∆(ℓ), θs)∥ and the length of the shortest
vector in Λ denoted by λ1(Λ).
For primal attacks analysis on LWE, λ1(Λ) is estimated using the Gaussian heuristic.
This is well justified for the LWE case where A is a uniformly random matrix mod q.
However, the tensor product in W(ℓ) means that there are two classes of unusually
short vectors in Λ. The first class contains vectors of the form
(0, . . . , 0, 2ℓ,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
where the last n components are 0 and the 2ℓ and 1 belong to the same chunk of b
entries. This vector essentially “undoes” the tensor product, producing zero in the
part corresponding to W(ℓ). This vector has norm ≈ 2ℓ, e.g. 128 in our Kyber-based
running example.
The second class of fairly short vectors is given in terms of the 2ℓ-ary signed digit
representation of q that has minimum norm, which we denote as q(ℓ) ∈ Zb. Explicitly,
the second class of vectors are of the form
(0, . . . , 0, q(ℓ), 0, . . . , 0)
where b divides the number of leading zeros and the last n components are 0. For
example, for ℓ = 7, we can write q = 7681 as 60·2128+1 implying our lattice contains
vectors of the form (0, . . . , 0, 60, 1, 0, . . . , 0) of norm ≈ 60.
In addition to these short vectors, we must consider the expected length of the
shortest vector in Λ ignoring such unusually short vectors. We will denote this
length as λ′1(Λ). As mentioned above, if W were uniformly random, we could follow
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However, as we will discuss in Section 3.5.4.1 the Gaussian Heuristic does not hold
in our case, even when ignoring the vectors discussed above. Thus, we will establish
λ′1(Λ) empirically using strong lattice reduction.
Now, we expect that the unique vector v ∈ Λ closest to (0, θ s̃) satisfies v +




22ℓ + 1 ≈ 2ℓ
∥q(ℓ)∥
λ′1(Λ).
We note that the above conditions by themselves do not imply that it is efficient to
recover the appropriate closest vector.
In order to use the above inequalities, we need to estimate the expected length of
the vector (∆(ℓ), θs). Assuming κ ≪ n bit-flips and (ρ0 + ρ1) · log2 q ≪ 1 (so that
each non-zero component of ∆ is with high probability the result of a single bit-flip),








+ n θ2 σ2 (3.8)
where σ is the standard deviation of the secret distribution.
Example 3. To carry out the analysis for Kyber, we pick ℓ = 7 which means
∥q(ℓ)∥2 = 3601 and ⌈log2ℓ(q)⌉ = 2. Thus, we heuristically require our offset vector
to have squared norm < min(16385, 3601). Even picking a very small θ and ignoring
the third condition above, this implies that we can only satisfy our constraints for
κ ≤ 15.
3.5.4 A Guessing Strategy
To shorten the distance between the lattice and our target vector (i.e. ∥(∆(ℓ), θs)∥)
we can simply guess the bits of ∆ that contribute most significantly to the norm of
∆(ℓ).7 To formalise this approach, we define a “band size” β that describes which bits
we consider as contributing significantly to ∆(ℓ). For example, suppose we choose
7Of course, other guessing strategies are possible. For example, for sufficiently small κ we may
have ∆ sparse even mod q. An attacker might thus attempt to guess which columns of ∆ can be
ignored in an attack.
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some ℓ ≥ 2 and a band size of β < ℓ. Then we consider the top β bits of each entry
in ∆(ℓ) (written in minimum Hamming weight BSDR) as being significant.
We can decompose ∆(ℓ) ∈ Znb into two parts: ∆(ℓ,↑) (the vector arising from the
bits in the significant band) and ∆(ℓ,↓) (the vector arising from the non-significant
band). In doing so, we can write ∆(ℓ) = ∆(ℓ,↑) +∆(ℓ,↓).
Our “guessing approach” is simply to guess ∆(ℓ,↑) and use the basic primal attack
to find the short vector ∆(ℓ,↓). Note that assuming sparsity, the norm of ∆(ℓ,↓) is
smaller than that of ∆(ℓ) so it is more likely that the primal attack will succeed.
More concretely, once we have guessed ∆(ℓ,↑), we define s̃(↓) := s̃ −W (ℓ)∆(ℓ,↑) and
target offset vector (∆(ℓ,↓), θs).
Now to investigate when (∆(ℓ,↓), θs) is likely to be the offset to the unique closest
vector to (0, s̃(↓)) in Λ, we begin by assuming some fixed ℓ and β < ℓ and calculating
the expected length of ∆(ℓ,↓). For every individual entry of ∆(ℓ), there are ℓ−β bits
in the non-significant band and β bits in the significant band. Therefore, assuming κ
bit-flips in total, we would expect roughly ℓ−βℓ κ bit-flips8 in ∆(ℓ,↓). Assuming κ≪ n










3 (ℓ− β − 1)
+ n θ2 σ2. (3.9)
At this point, we can reuse the three success conditions detailed above, as the
characteristic properties of Λ remain unchanged. We refer to the process of removing
the top-most bits of a vector as “shaving”. This process is parametrised by a band
size β and a maximum number of bits to correct, α. Setting α to be less than the
expected number of bits set in the top band has the advantage of yielding a smaller
number of potential guesses available, but there is also the disadvantage that there
may still be a few non-zero bits left in the top band. If there are some bits still set in
the top band, then the candidate vector ∆(ℓ,↓) may still be too long for a successful










8The number of expected bit-flips is actually less than this for some parameters (see Example 4
below).
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Table 3.4: The maximum possible κ handled by each guessing band size β for Kyber
parameters and the cost of guessing the significant band.
guessing cost for κ = 19
β max κ n = 16 n = 32
0 15
1 52 29.0 211.0
2 169 225.8 230.9
where the factor 2i takes care of the fact that each set bit-flip takes values in {−1, 1}
when multiple folding steps have been performed. If we have not folded, the factor
of 2i may be omitted since the sign of the bit-flips are known.
Example 4. Returning to our example of Kyber, we analyse the case ℓ = 7 again.
Firstly, there are 256 · 2β bits in the significant band. Note the factor of 2 due
to the fact that each element of Z7681 requires two integers when written in base
27. However, since 7681 < 213, the top most bit of each element of Z7681 must
be 0. This leaves 256 · (2β − 1) unknown bit positions where we must correct bit-
flips. There is an average of 2β−113 · κ bit-flips in the unknown part of the significant
band. The maximum κ such that (3.9) < 3601 = ∥q(ℓ)∥ with θ arbitrarily small,
i.e. we are ignoring the second summand in (3.9), is given in Table 3.4. We use
Equation (3.10) with α set to the expected number of bit-flips to estimate the number
of guesses required for κ = 19 bit-flips in total.
Even strategy. As illustrated in Example 4, the existence of vectors q(ℓ) is a
main limiting factor for ensuring that our offset vector is sufficiently short. To
remove this class of vectors from our lattice, we focus on resolving bit-flips in the
least significant bits of the components of ∆. Assume for the moment that this has
been achieved, and ∆i mod 2 ≡ 0 for all 0 ≤ i < n. Then, instead of considering
W⊗ (1, 2ℓ, . . . , 2(b−1)ℓ) ∈ Zn×nb we may consider
W⊗ (2, 2ℓ, . . . , 2(b−1)ℓ) ∈ Zn×nb,
i.e. scale rows 0, b, 2b, . . . , nb of B by a factor of two. Since q mod 2 ≡ 1 we cannot
write q as a linear combination of 2, 2ℓ, . . . , 2(b−1)ℓ. This removes the annoying
vectors q(ℓ) from our lattice. To ensure ∆i mod 2 ≡ 0, as assumed here, we may
apply a similar guessing strategy as discussed above. However, we note that this
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comes with some additional cost for guessing and correcting the least significant bits
of the components of ∆.
Finally, we stress that our analysis so far uses expected values throughout. In Fig-
ure 3.2, we plot an example histogram of the ∥(∆(ℓ), θs)∥2 against our expectation
for κ = 19 and θ = 3. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the actual observed distribu-
tion has a large variance. Thus, to estimate the cost of our attack, we will derive
parameters from empirical evidence.
Figure 3.2: Histogram of observed squared norms of vectors of length n = 256
mod q = 7681, folded three times to dimension 32, written in base 27, for θ = 3
and κ = 19. Note that in this example E[∥(∆(ℓ), θs)∥2] < κ 4ℓ−13 ℓ + n (θσ)
2 because
log2 q < 14. Thus, half of our entries are bounded by 26 instead of 27 This is taken
into account when we compute the expectation in this figure.


















3.5.4.1 BDD on NTT lattices
So far, we have only analysed the existence of a unique closest vector to our target.
The last ingredient of our attack is to find this vector, i.e. a vector in




· x ≡ 0 mod q}
that is close to (0, θs̃). Concretely, for Kyber we set ℓ = 7 and n = 32, where n > 16
is chosen to preserve sparsity of BSDRs for ρ0 = 1.0%, ρ1 = 0.1%, where we expect
κ = 19 bit-flips. To consider the geometry of the lattice spanned by our instances,
consider the smaller case n = 4, θ = 1 (since it fits on this page). We obtain the
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1 1 −ω3 −ω2 −ω
1 27 −27ω3 −27ω2 −27ω
1 1 −ω ω2 −ω3
1 27 −27ω 27ω2 −27ω3
1 1 ω3 −ω2 ω
1 27 27ω3 −27ω2 27ω
1 1 ω ω2 ω3







where all of the omitted entries are zero. Note that the lattice spanned by B
contains the unusually short vector
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0). (3.11)
This vector is not an artefact of the tensor product but an artefact of B being derived
from an NTT matrix: it corresponds to folding all the way down to dimension n = 1.
More generally, the geometry of the q-ary lattices Λ considered in this work is far
from what we would expect from a random q-ary lattice. In Figure 3.3, we plot
the lengths of the Gram-Schmidt vectors of a BKZ-90 reduced basis for a lattice Λ
corresponding to folding our 256-dimensional instance down to dimension n = 32.
This lattice has dimension 96 = ⌈log27 q⌉ · n + n. For comparison, we also plot the
expected lengths of the Gram-Schmidt vectors according to the Geometric Series
Assumption which approximates the behaviour of random q-ary lattices reasonably
well.
Due to this unusual geometry, we cannot readily apply standard estimates for lat-
tice reduction. As a case in point, computing a BKZ-90 reduced basis of the 96-
dimensional lattice in Figure 3.3 took less than an hour with FPLLL [55], i.e. re-
ducing this basis is considerably faster than expected for random q-ary lattices.
Thus, to find the vector v ∈ Λ closest to (0, θs̃), we proceed as follows. First, we
remove the unusually short vector given in Equation (3.11). This is accomplished
by guessing the value of ∆0 and considering the sublattice spanned by the rows of
Λ except for the first ⌈log2ℓ q⌉ rows. Pessimistically, we expect that this increases
our guessing cost by a factor of ⌈log2 q⌉. We refer to this smaller basis as B′ and
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Figure 3.3: Length of Gram-Schmidt vectors in q-ary lattice derived from negacyclic
inverse NTT at dimension 32 using parameters ℓ = 7, θ = 1.
call d the dimension of the lattice spanned by B′. Then, we compute a high-quality
basis for the lattice spanned by B′. In particular, for n = 32 we compute a BKZ-90
reduced basis. Then, for each guess as in Section 3.5.4, we perform one pruned
BDD enumeration in dimension bs = min(60, d), i.e. the bs-dimensional sub-lattice
orthogonal to the first d − bs vectors in B′. We heuristically expect that BDD
enumeration in block size bs will find the closest vector iff the projection of the
offset vector orthogonal to the first d − bs vectors in B′ is shorter than b⋆d−bs, the
Gram-Schmidt vector at index d − bs in B′ [10, 8]. As in [10, 8], we assume that







where E[∥(∆(ℓ), θs)∥] is experimentally established by sampling 1024 vectors.9 As





· E[∥(∆(ℓ), θs)∥], ∥b⋆d−bs∥
)
. (3.12)
The right-hand argument in (3.12) takes care of the fact that there is little point in
enumerating beyond the length of the shortest vector in the projected sub-lattice if








indeed appears reasonably accurate.
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we are targeting a unique closest vector. We illustrate the expected behaviour in
Figure 3.4, where we plot the projected norms for 256 samples of (∆(ℓ), θs) against
the norms of the Gram-Schmidt vectors for our reduced basis B′ for θ = 3. Note
that in contrast to Figure 3.3, the basis in Figure 3.4 is B′ and not B. We ex-
pect enumeration to succeed for every grey line that stays below the Gram-Schmidt
vectors for all indices < d− bs. Figure 3.4 illustrates that we can improve our prob-
ability of success by increasing the enumeration dimension at the cost of increasing
the running time. Note that the algorithm may still succeed when the heuristic suc-
cess condition discussed above is not satisfied due to the orientation of the vectors
involved. Therefore, we use the empirical evidence (cf. Tables 3.5-3.9) to establish
the success rate.
Figure 3.4: Projected lengths for 256 samples of (∆(ℓ), θs) and the norms of the
Gram-Schmidt vectors for our reduced basis B′ for θ = 3 with κ = 19, folded down
three times to n = 32 and shaved with parameters α, β = 4, 2. The dotted line
indicates d− bs, i.e. where we start enumerating.










The experiments we performed are as follows.10 We sample random sparse binary
vectors ∆ in dimension n for various κ and construct a corresponding cold boot NTT
decoding problem using secrets sampled from the Kyber secret distribution. We then
folded this instance down to dimension n = 32 and simulated the guessing part of
the algorithm for some parameters α, β. Since the cost of the guessing part of the
attack is easy to predict, we simulated it by always picking the best “shaving” under
10Code available at https://bitbucket.org/Amit_Deo/coldboot-ntt/
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the constraints imposed by α, β. This is implemented as the shave function. We
then ran lattice point enumeration to recover the offset vector, this is implemented
in the function offset_vector. We report success when the returned vector matches
the norm of our target exactly and failure otherwise. In summary, we implemented
the full attack on the n = 32 sub-problem except for the guessing part. We note
that we also implemented and verified extending the solution upwards as described
in Section 3.5.2.
We summarise the observed behaviour of our algorithm for solving the bottom-level
n = 32 instance in Tables 3.5-3.9. These tables illustrate the trade off between
the two pruned exhaustive search steps in our algorithm, the first searching for set
higher-order bits, the second searching for lattice points. Increasing one reduces the
other. Furthermore, according to our empirical evidence, the “even” strategy may
provide a small gain in some cases, but it is not clearly more efficient than the “not
even”, i.e. “odd” strategy. All numbers in these tables were obtained using the proof
of concept implementation in Sage [135]. To establish the cost of the enumeration,
we use the number of nodes in the pruned enumeration tree as reported by the Pruner
class from FPLLL/FPYLLL [55, 56]. Processing each node is generally assumed to
take about 100 CPU cycles [55].
3.5.5 Putting It All Together
3.5.5.1 Kyber KEM
We now draw together Sections 3.5.1-3.5.4.1 to give a concise account of our attack
and its performance on the Kyber KEM. Recall that we have 3 instances of the form
s̃ = Wn ·∆+ s for a single private key in Kyber, with n = 256. We first establish
some notation. Below, “label (n,m)” indicates an instance from Figure 3.1 having n
coefficients/entries in s(... ) where the error term ∆(... ) is the sum of m original error
terms ∆j . Note that in Figure 3.1, the label of a node is given by the subscript in
∆.
root (256,1) This instance is in the secrets si for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, , . . . , n − 1} and has
error ∆j for the j-th equation. It corresponds to the root node in Figure 3.1.
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Table 3.5: Experimental results for Kyber parameters and number of bit-flips κ = 5
(ρ0 = 0.2%, ρ1 = 0.1%); θ is the scaling factor of our lattice, α the number of bits we
guess in a band of size β. In the “even” case we target the least significant bits of the
components of∆ first. The column “guess” holds the number of guesses before lattice
enumeration which includes the cost of guessing ∆0, the column “enum” holds the
number of nodes in the pruned lattice-point enumeration tree. The column “total”
is the product of the two. All costs are give as log2(·). The column “rate” is the
success rate over 200 experiments. Only parameters with success rate ≥ 60% are
shown. The minimal total cost is highlighted in bold and used in Table 3.10.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 5, odd
2 1 1 9.7 16.2 25.9 77.5%
2 1 2 11.3 14.8 26.1 85.0%
2 2 1 14.7 16.2 30.9 83.5%
2 2 2 17.9 13.7 31.5 96.5%
2 3 1 19.0 16.2 35.3 84.0%
2 3 2 23.8 13.5 37.3 99.5%
3 1 1 9.7 14.0 23.8 81.0%
3 1 2 11.3 13.6 24.9 87.0%
3 2 1 14.7 14.0 28.7 87.5%
3 2 2 17.9 12.8 30.7 98.5%
3 3 1 19.0 14.0 33.1 88.0%
3 3 2 23.8 12.7 36.5 100.0%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 5, even
2 1 1 10.7 11.1 21.8 74.5%
2 1 2 11.7 9.4 21.1 78.5%
2 2 1 16.7 10.7 27.4 87.5%
2 2 2 18.7 6.0 24.7 94.0%
2 3 1 22.1 10.5 32.6 90.5%
2 3 2 25.1 5.7 30.8 98.5%
3 1 1 10.7 11.6 22.4 79.5%
3 1 2 11.7 10.3 22.0 81.0%
3 2 1 16.7 11.3 28.0 92.0%
3 2 2 18.7 7.8 26.5 96.0%
3 3 1 22.1 11.2 33.3 94.5%
3 3 2 25.1 7.6 32.7 99.5%
+ (128, 2) This instance is the result of folding once on the plus branch. It is
in the secrets si for i ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . . , n − 2}. The j-th equation has error term
∆j +∆j+128.
++ (64, 4) This instance is the result of folding twice on the plus branch. It is
in the secrets si for i ∈ {0, 4, 8 . . . , n − 4}. The j-th equation has error term
∆j +∆j+64 +∆j+128 +∆j+192.
+++ (32, 8) This instance is the result of folding three times on the plus branch.
It is in the secrets si for i ∈ {0, 8, 16, . . . , n− 8}. The j-th equation has error
term ∆j +∆j+32 +∆j+64 +∆j+96 +∆j+128 +∆j+160 +∆j+192 +∆j+224.
++- (32, 8) This instance the result of folding twice on the plus branch and once
on the negative. It is in the secrets si for i ∈ {4, 12, 20, . . . , n − 4}. The j-th
equation has error term ∆j − ∆j+32 + ∆j+64 − ∆j+96 + ∆j+128 − ∆j+160 +
∆j+192 −∆j+224.
For each of our three independent instances comprising a full Kyber key, we perform
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Table 3.6: Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 10 (ρ0 = 0.5%,
ρ1 = 0.1%). For details see Table 3.5.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 10, odd
2 3 2 23.8 16.2 40.0 93.0%
2 4 2 29.4 16.2 45.6 97.5%
2 5 2 34.6 15.9 50.5 99.5%
3 3 1 19.0 14.0 33.1 63.5%
3 3 2 23.8 14.0 37.9 95.5%
3 4 1 22.9 14.0 37.0 64.0%
3 4 2 29.4 14.0 43.4 98.0%
3 5 1 26.5 14.0 40.5 64.0%
3 5 2 34.6 14.0 48.6 98.5%
4 3 1 19.0 20.9 40.0 64.0%
4 3 2 23.8 19.5 43.4 87.5%
4 4 1 22.9 20.9 43.9 64.5%
4 4 2 29.4 19.1 48.5 91.5%
4 5 1 26.5 20.9 47.4 64.5%
4 5 2 34.6 18.8 53.4 92.0%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 10, even
2 3 1 22.1 11.1 33.2 66.5%
2 3 2 25.1 9.8 34.9 89.5%
2 4 1 27.0 11.1 38.1 69.0%
2 4 2 31.1 8.2 39.3 95.0%
2 5 1 31.6 11.1 42.7 70.0%
2 5 2 36.7 7.7 44.4 99.5%
3 3 1 22.1 14.2 36.3 76.5%
3 3 2 25.1 10.6 35.7 90.5%
3 4 1 27.0 14.2 41.3 79.0%
3 4 2 31.1 9.4 40.5 95.0%
3 5 1 31.6 14.2 45.9 79.0%
3 5 2 36.7 9.0 45.8 99.5%
4 3 1 22.1 12.2 34.3 86.0%
4 3 2 25.1 12.1 37.2 95.5%
4 4 1 27.0 12.2 39.3 87.0%
4 4 2 31.1 11.2 42.2 98.0%
4 5 1 31.6 12.2 43.9 87.5%
4 5 2 36.7 10.9 47.6 99.5%
Table 3.7: Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 19 (ρ0 = 1.0%,
ρ1 = 0.1%). For details see Table 3.5.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 19, odd
2 4 2 29.4 16.2 45.6 62.5%
2 5 2 34.6 16.2 50.8 80.0%
2 6 2 39.5 16.2 55.7 86.5%
2 7 2 44.2 16.2 60.4 91.0%
2 8 2 48.7 16.2 64.9 94.5%
3 4 2 29.4 14.0 43.4 71.0%
3 5 2 34.6 14.0 48.6 82.0%
3 6 2 39.5 14.0 53.6 87.0%
3 7 2 44.2 14.0 58.3 91.5%
3 8 2 48.7 14.0 62.8 92.5%
4 4 2 29.4 20.9 50.3 66.5%
4 5 2 34.6 20.9 55.5 70.5%
4 6 2 39.5 20.9 60.5 79.0%
4 7 2 44.2 20.9 65.2 83.5%
4 8 2 48.7 20.9 69.7 84.0%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 19, even
2 5 2 36.7 11.1 47.8 70.5%
2 6 2 42.1 11.1 53.1 84.0%
2 7 2 47.2 11.1 58.3 90.5%
2 8 2 52.1 10.6 62.8 96.0%
3 5 2 36.7 14.2 50.9 74.0%
3 6 2 42.1 13.3 55.4 86.0%
3 7 2 47.2 12.2 59.4 93.0%
3 8 2 52.1 11.8 63.9 98.0%
4 4 2 31.1 12.2 43.3 70.5%
4 5 2 36.7 12.2 48.9 83.0%
4 6 2 42.1 12.2 54.3 89.0%
4 7 1 40.0 12.2 52.2 60.0%
4 7 2 47.2 12.2 59.4 96.5%
4 8 1 43.8 12.2 56.1 60.5%
4 8 2 52.1 12.2 64.4 97.5%
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Table 3.8: Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 25 (ρ0 = 1.4%, ρ1 =
0.1%). For details see Table 3.5.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 25, odd
2 6 2 39.5 16.2 55.7 60.5%
2 6 3 44.0 16.2 60.2 68.0%
2 7 2 44.2 16.2 60.4 72.5%
2 7 3 49.5 16.2 65.7 82.5%
2 8 2 48.7 16.2 64.9 79.0%
2 8 3 54.8 16.2 71.0 90.5%
3 5 3 38.3 14.0 52.4 60.0%
3 6 2 39.5 14.0 53.6 70.0%
3 6 3 44.0 14.0 58.1 74.0%
3 7 2 44.2 14.0 58.3 76.0%
3 7 3 49.5 14.0 63.5 81.5%
3 8 2 48.7 14.0 62.8 80.0%
3 8 3 54.8 14.0 68.8 87.0%
4 6 2 39.5 20.9 60.5 60.5%
4 6 3 44.0 20.9 65.0 68.0%
4 7 2 44.2 20.9 65.2 69.0%
4 7 3 49.5 20.9 70.4 80.5%
4 8 2 48.7 20.9 69.7 71.0%
4 8 3 54.8 19.5 74.3 84.0%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 25, even
2 7 2 47.2 11.1 58.3 65.0%
2 7 3 51.4 11.1 62.4 67.0%
2 8 2 52.1 11.1 63.2 77.5%
2 8 3 56.9 11.1 68.0 80.5%
3 7 2 47.2 14.2 61.4 71.0%
3 7 3 51.4 14.2 65.6 71.5%
3 8 2 52.1 14.2 66.4 82.5%
3 8 3 56.9 13.3 70.2 84.5%
4 6 2 42.1 12.2 54.3 66.5%
4 6 3 45.6 12.2 57.9 66.0%
4 7 2 47.2 12.2 59.4 80.0%
4 7 3 51.4 12.2 63.6 79.0%
4 8 2 52.1 12.2 64.4 89.5%
4 8 3 56.9 12.2 69.1 89.0%
Table 3.9: Experimental results for Kyber parameters and κ = 30 (ρ0 = 1.7%, ρ1 =
0.1%). For details see Table 3.5.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 30, odd
2 8 3 54.8 16.2 71.0 66.5%
2 9 2 53.0 16.2 69.2 63.0%
2 9 3 59.8 16.2 76.0 82.5%
3 7 2 44.2 14.0 58.3 60.0%
3 7 3 49.5 14.0 63.5 66.0%
3 8 2 48.7 14.0 62.8 67.5%
3 8 3 54.8 14.0 68.8 73.0%
3 9 2 53.0 14.0 67.1 74.5%
3 9 3 59.8 14.0 73.9 84.0%
4 7 3 49.5 20.9 70.4 62.5%
4 8 2 48.7 20.9 69.7 63.5%
4 8 3 54.8 20.9 75.7 73.0%
4 9 2 53.0 20.9 74.0 66.0%
4 9 3 59.8 20.7 80.5 80.0%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 30, even
2 9 2 56.9 11.1 67.9 65.5%
2 9 3 62.3 11.1 73.3 66.5%
3 8 2 52.1 14.2 66.4 65.0%
3 8 3 56.9 14.2 71.1 65.0%
3 9 2 56.9 14.2 71.1 73.5%
3 9 3 62.3 14.2 76.5 75.0%
4 7 2 47.2 12.2 59.4 64.5%
4 7 3 51.4 12.2 63.6 64.5%
4 8 2 52.1 12.2 64.4 72.0%
4 8 3 56.9 12.2 69.1 72.0%
4 9 2 56.9 12.2 69.1 79.5%
4 9 3 62.3 12.2 74.5 79.0%
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the following steps:
1. Divide and conquer three times to obtain two bottom level instances +++ and
++- as in Section 3.5.1.
2. Solve at least one bottom level instance using combinatorial and lattice-reduction
techniques as in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4.1. The cost and expected success rate
for solving one such instance are given in Section 3.5.4.1. If solving one in-
stance succeeds with probability p0, we assume that this step succeeds with
probability 1 − (1− p0)2, i.e. we assume the two bottom level instances are
sufficiently different.
3. Substitute the solution obtained into the instance ++. This reduces it from
(64, 4) to (32, 4), Solve this instance as in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4.1. Note
that solving this instance is much easier than in the previous step since the
Hamming weight of the noise is reduced to ≈ κ/2. We assume this step always
succeeds.
4. Work the solution of ++ upward to + by solving +- using the information from
++ as in Section 3.5.2. This step succeeds with probability p1 and we assume
that it is cheaper than the previous steps.
5. Work the solution of + upward to “root” by solving - using the information
from + as in Section 3.5.2. We assume this step always succeeds and we assume
that it is cheaper than the previous steps.
Thus, the overall complexity of recovering 256 components of the Kyber secret is to
run the lattice attack from Section 3.5.4.1 three times (steps 2 and 3) and succeeds
with probability ≈ p1 · (1 − (1− p0)2). In particular, for our choice of parameters
we have11 p1 ≈ 1 and p0 > 0.6 and thus expect success with probability > 0.84. For
example, with κ = 19, Table 3.7 shows that we can solve the hardest BDD problem
with a cost of 243.3 and success probability p0 = 0.705. Since this is by far the
most expensive stage of the attack, we report an attack cost of enumerating ≈ 243.3
nodes in an enumeration tree where each node requires about 100 CPU cycles to
process and a p1 · (1 − (1− p0)2) ≈ 0.91 success probability. We can attack each
11Note that it is easy to amplify p1 by performing additional guessing phases in Section 3.5.2.
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Table 3.10: Cold boot attacks on Kyber KEM keys stored in the NTT domain with
ρ0, ρ1 the cold boot bit-flip rates. The column “cost” gives the cost of recovering
256 components of the secret in terms of the number of lattice points visited during
enumeration (≈ 100 CPU cycles each). The attack can be repeated to recover all
768 components. The column “rate” shows the overall success rate 1− (1− p0)2 for
recovering 256 components of the secret, cf. Section 3.5.4.1. We also give the costs
of a cold boot attack when the secret key is stored in the time domain in the column
“non-NTT”, cf. Section 3.4. In that case, the success rate is always expected to be
close to 100%.
bit-flip rates NTT non-NTT
ρ0 ρ1 cost rate cost
0.2% 0.1% 3 · 221.1 95% 238.7
0.5% 0.1% 3 · 233.1 87% 251.6
1.0% 0.1% 3 · 243.3 91% 270.3
1.4% 0.1% 3 · 253.6 91% 289.2
1.7% 0.1% 3 · 262.8 89% 2100.1
of the d = 3 module elements separately and combine the final solution. We note
that the attacker can detect with high probability when a sub-solution is incorrect
and thus invest more computational resources to increase the chance of success. We
summarise our results in Table 3.10.
The attack needs to be run d = 3 times to recover a full Kyber secret. If a solution
cannot be obtained for one of the three secret ring elements, then the solutions of the
other two sub-problems can be substituted back into the original MLWE problem for
Kyber’s public key. This reduces the effective dimension of the public key to n = 256.
An attacker could then target this smaller RLWE instance. Solving such an instance
costs roughly 277 according to the LWE estimator from [9], again assuming that
enumeration is used to realise the SVP oracle inside BKZ. As suggested above, an
attacker could alternatively attempt to re-run our cold boot attack on the remaining
unknown secret element with different parameter choices from Tables 3.5-3.9. This
would boost the probability of success at the expense of a greater computational
cost.
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3.5.5.2 New Hope KEM
We now move away from our MLWE-based example of Kyber KEM and give a concise
account of the performance of our attack on the RLWE-based New Hope KEM [115].
The parameters used are n = 1024, q = 12289 and the secret polynomials have
coefficients lying in the set {0,±1, . . . ,±8}. Similarly to Kyber KEM, New Hope
uses an NTT to store its secret keys, meaning that we can launch the same cold
boot attack. An important distinction between the Kyber and New Hope cases
is that, for Kyber, we obtain multiple independent cold boot instances, each one
corresponding to an individual polynomial in the secret key; this leads to multiple
instances of relatively low dimension for Kyber. However, in the case of New Hope,
we have just one cold boot instance in a large dimension. This distinction between
MLWE- and RLWE-based schemes holds true in general for our cold boot attack in
the NTT domain.
We focus our attention on the lattice aspect of the attack, assuming that we have
folded the New Hope 1024-dimensional cold boot instance repeatedly to reach a 32-
dimensional instance using the methods in Section 3.5.1. We can then experimentally
estimate the success rate of solving this bottom level instance for various choices of
θ, α, β using the methods in Section 3.5.4.1 with b = 2 and ℓ = 7. The results for
κ = 10, 19, 25, 30 are given in Tables 3.11– 3.14. Note that the value κ = 19 roughly
corresponds to the limiting cold boot case of ρ0 = 0.17%, ρ1 = 0.1% where liquid
nitrogen is used to cool the RAM chip.
We now reuse the analysis and notation from Section 3.5.5.1 to estimate the running
time and success probability of the full attack on New Hope. The success probability
of the attack is ≈ p1 · (1− (1− p0)2) where p1 is the success probability of working
a bottom level solution up and p0 is the probability of successfully solving a bottom
level instance. Once again, we assume that this aspect of the attack can be performed
successfully with probability p1 ≈ 1 without dominating the complexity of the overall
attack. To determine p0, we use the results form Tables 3.11-3.14. A summary of
our results for κ = 19, 25, 30 are given in Table 3.15.
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Table 3.11: Experimental results for New Hope parameters and number of bit-
flips κ = 10; θ is the scaling factor of our lattice, α the number of bits we guess
in a band of size β. In the “even” case we target the least significant bits of the
components of∆ first. The column “guess” holds the number of guesses before lattice
enumeration which includes the cost of guessing ∆0, the column “enum” holds the
number of nodes in the pruned lattice-point enumeration tree. The column “total”
is the product of the two. All costs are give as log2(·). The column “rate” is the
success rate over 100 experiments. Only parameters with success rate ≥ 50% are
shown. The minimal total cost is highlighted in bold and used in Table 3.15.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 10, odd
2 3 2 25.1 15.6 40.7 82.0%
2 4 2 31.1 15.6 46.6 96.1%
2 5 2 36.7 15.6 52.3 100.0%
3 3 2 25.1 12.8 37.9 68.0%
3 4 2 31.1 12.8 43.9 76.6%
3 5 2 36.7 12.8 49.5 81.2%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 10, even
2 3 1 23.8 10.3 34.2 60.9%
2 3 2 26.1 10.3 36.4 73.4%
2 4 1 29.4 10.3 39.7 73.4%
2 4 2 32.4 10.3 42.7 93.0%
2 5 1 34.6 10.3 44.9 77.3%
2 5 2 38.3 10.3 48.7 97.7%
3 3 1 23.8 11.1 35.0 63.3%
3 3 2 26.1 11.1 37.2 71.9%
3 4 1 29.4 11.1 40.5 76.6%
3 4 2 32.4 11.1 43.5 91.4%
3 5 1 34.6 11.1 45.7 78.1%
3 5 2 38.3 11.1 49.4 93.0%
Table 3.12: Experimental results for New Hope parameters and number of bit-flips
κ = 19; for details see Table 3.11.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 19, odd
2 5 2 36.7 15.6 52.3 57.8%
2 6 2 42.1 15.6 57.6 76.6%
2 7 2 47.2 15.6 62.8 82.8%
2 8 2 52.1 15.6 67.7 90.6%
3 6 2 42.1 12.8 54.9 51.6%
3 7 2 47.2 12.8 60.0 56.2%
3 8 2 52.1 12.8 64.9 62.5%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 19, even
2 5 2 38.3 10.3 48.7 59.4%
2 6 2 44.0 10.3 54.4 69.5%
2 7 2 49.5 10.3 59.8 84.4%
2 8 2 54.8 10.3 65.1 89.8%
3 5 2 38.3 11.1 49.4 58.6%
3 6 2 44.0 11.1 55.1 75.0%
3 7 2 49.5 11.1 60.6 81.2%
3 8 2 54.8 11.1 65.9 85.9%
4 6 2 44.0 11.7 55.7 60.9%
4 7 2 49.5 11.7 61.2 69.5%
4 8 2 54.8 11.7 66.4 75.0%
5 6 2 44.0 12.7 56.7 50.8%
5 7 2 49.5 12.7 62.2 59.4%
5 8 2 54.8 12.7 67.5 60.2%
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Table 3.13: Experimental results for New Hope parameters and κ = 25. For details
see Table 3.11.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 25, odd
2 7 2 47.2 15.6 62.8 52.3%
2 7 3 51.4 15.6 66.9 59.4%
2 8 2 52.1 15.6 67.7 63.3%
2 8 3 56.9 15.6 72.5 75.0%
3 8 2 52.1 12.8 64.9 50.0%
3 8 3 56.9 12.8 69.7 57.8%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 25, even
2 7 2 49.5 10.3 59.8 53.9%
2 7 3 52.9 10.3 63.3 54.7%
2 8 2 54.8 10.3 65.1 64.1%
2 8 3 58.7 10.3 69.0 64.8%
3 7 2 49.5 11.1 60.6 56.2%
3 7 3 52.9 11.1 64.1 56.2%
3 8 2 54.8 11.1 65.9 66.4%
3 8 3 58.7 11.1 69.8 67.2%
Table 3.14: Experimental results for New Hope parameters and κ = 30. For details
see Table 3.11.
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 30, odd
2 8 3 56.9 15.6 72.5 52.3%
2 9 2 56.9 15.6 72.4 56.2%
2 9 3 62.3 15.6 77.8 66.4%
2 10 2 61.5 15.6 77.0 64.1%
2 10 3 67.5 15.6 83.0 76.6%
3 9 3 62.3 12.8 75.1 50.0%
3 10 3 67.5 12.8 80.3 54.7%
cost
θ α β guess enum total rate
κ = 30, even
2 9 2 59.8 10.3 70.2 56.2%
2 9 3 64.3 10.3 74.6 58.6%
2 10 2 64.8 10.3 75.1 68.0%
2 10 3 69.7 10.3 80.1 70.3%
3 9 2 59.8 11.1 71.0 55.5%
3 9 3 64.3 11.1 75.4 56.2%
3 10 2 64.8 11.1 75.9 67.2%
3 10 3 69.7 11.1 80.8 68.0%
Table 3.15: Cold boot attacks on New Hope KEM. The column “cost” gives the
cost of recovering all 1024 components of the secret in terms of the number of lattice
points visited during enumeration (≈ 100 CPU cycles each). The column “rate”
shows the overall success rate 1 − (1− p0)2 for recovering 1024 components of the
secret, cf. Section 3.5.4.1. For the columns labelled “non-NTT”, see caption of
Table 3.10.
bit-flip rates NTT non-NTT
ρ0 ρ1 cost rate cost
0.17% 0.1% 248.7 84% 253.7
0.25% 0.1% 260.6 81% 260.0
0.32% 0.1% 270.2 81% 266.1
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3.5.5.3 Conclusions of the Main Attack
We have shown that for practical cold boot bit flip rates, both Kyber and New Hope
are vulnerable to relatively efficient cold boot attacks whether the NTT is used or
not. In the case of New Hope, key storage using an NTT does not make much of
a difference from the perspective of a cold boot attacker for the attacks considered
above. However, for the Kyber case, use of the NTT for key storage does seem to
reduce resistance to cold boot attacks. One reason for this is because the cold boot
problem when considering MLWE keys splits into d independent problems in rela-
tively low dimension. When the NTT is not used for key storage, this independency
does not exist. Therefore, a suggested counter-measure to make cold boot attacks
harder for MLWE schemes is to avoid storing secret keys in the NTT domain. Note
that this does not rule out the possibility of using an NTT altogether, as the NTT
may be computed as and when polynomial multiplication is required.
3.6 Low Hamming Weight Secret Block Leakage Attack
In this section, we discuss an extremely efficient attack that allows for the recovery
of a low Hamming weight RLWE secret key s ∈ Rq given knowledge of a block of
consecutive entries in NTT(s). In particular, if the Hamming weight of the secret is
w, 2w consecutive entries are required for this key recovery attack. Note that this
leakage characteristic is difficult to motivate in practice unlike the cold boot leakage
considered in the previous section.
3.6.1 Linear Complexity
Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) for binary sequences are well known as a
concept. We will be considering LFSRs over a field Zq for prime q i.e. shift registers
where the input (or feedback function) is a linear combination (over Zq) of the
current register values. We call the number of registers in an LFSR the length of
the LFSR. Although the definition of an LFSR is well-known, we include it below
for the sake of completeness. For a simple pictoral representation of an LFSR, see
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Figure 3.5. Note that LFSRs have a wide range of applications and have been
used in the design of efficient stream-ciphers in the past that are now known to be
vulnerable to efficient attacks [21, 20].
Definition 29 (Linear Feedback Shift Register). Let q be a prime, n be a positive
natural number and F : Znq → Zq be a linear function. Denote the entries of
an n-entry register as (xn−1, . . . , x0). A linear feedback shift register with respect
to feedback function F over Zq with length n is an n-entry register that evolves
according to the mapping
(xn−1, . . . , x0) 7−→ (F (xn−1, . . . , x0), xn−1, . . . , x1)) .
Definition 30 (Linear Complexity). The linear complexity of a sequence is the
length of the shortest LFSR generating the sequence.
Definition 31 (Connection Polynomial). Suppose an LFSR produces a sequence
(ai)
L′
i=0 via the relation an + c1 · an−1 + . . . cL · an−L = 0 for L′ ≥ n > L and
constants ci. Then the connection polynomial of this LFSR is defined to be C(D) :=
1 + c1D + . . . cLD
L.
Remark 6. The linear complexity need not be equal to the degree of the minimal
connection polynomial for finite sequences (see the example below). However, these
two quantities are equal when considering infinite periodic sequences with a finite
period.
Example 5. Suppose that we are working in the field Z7 and consider the sequence
(3, 2, 3, 1, 3, 2, 4). It can be shown that a LFSR with 4 registers with a connection
polynomial of C(D) = 1+4D+6D2+5D3 can be used to generate this sequence. To
check this, pick the initial loading of the 4 registers to be (3, 2, 3, 1) and then observe
that 3 + 4 + 6 · 3 + 5 · 2 = 0, 2 + 4 · 3 + 6 + 5 · 3 = 0 etc. A pictorial representation
of this LFSR is given in Figure 3.5.
The linear complexity and minimal connection polynomial of any finite (or finite
period infinite) sequence can be calculated in polynomial time using the Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm [99]. This algorithm is generic as it accounts for sequences over
any field. Clearly, the Berlekamp-Massey can be used as a cryptanalytic tool against
any LFSR-based stream-cipher. However, we will be using the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm in a slightly different context here.
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Figure 3.5: A minimal length LFSR generating the finite sequence (3, 2, 3, 1, 3, 2, 4)
over Z7. Note that the coefficients of the connection polynomial are the negation of
the multiplicands in this diagram. This LFSR has length 4, yet the minimal degree




We now briefly overview the structure of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. Sup-
pose we wish to find the linear complexity and connection polynomial of the fi-
nite sequence (a0, . . . , an−1). Then the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm iteratively
calculates the linear complexity and connection polynomial of each subsequence
a0, . . . , ai for i = 0, . . . , n − 1. Suppose we have just completed the (k − 1)th
loop and have arrived at a linear complexity of lk−1 and connection polynomial
C(k−1)(D) := 1 + c
(k−1)
1 D + · · ·+ c
(k−1)
lk−1
Dlk−1 (recall that some of these coefficients
may be 0) for the subsequence (a0, . . . , ak−1). To start the kth iteration, we calcu-




1 ak−i. This tells us how far
Ck−1(D) is from being the connection polynomial of the subsequence (a0, . . . ak).
There are three cases to consider when updating the linear complexity and connec-
tion polynomial:
1. If d = 0, then the linear complexity and connection polynomial remain the
same.
2. If d ̸= 0, there are two sub-cases:
(a) If 2 · lk−1 > k + 1, then the connection polynomial must change but the
linear complexity stays the same.
(b) If 2 · lk−1 ≤ k+ 1 then the connection polynomial changes and the linear
complexity increases.
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The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm gives explicit formulae for updating linear com-
plexities and connection polynomials depending on which of the three cases is
relevant. For a rigorous proof of correctness, see [99]. The pseudocode for the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm is given as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
Input: s = (s0, . . . , sn−1)
Output: Linear complexity of s and connection polynomial (L,C(D))
/* Initialisation */
1 C(D)← 1; B(D)← 1; x← 1;; L← 0; b← 1; N ← 0;
/* Main Loop */
2 while N < n do
3 (c0, c1, . . . , cn−1)← C(D).Coefficients(); d← sN +
∑L
i=1 cisN−i; // the
discrepancy
/* Case 1: no updates required */
4 if d = 0 then
5 x← x+ 1; continue;
/* Case 2: update only the connection polynomial */
6 else if d ̸= 0 and 2L > N then
7 C(D)← C(D)− db−1DxB(D); x← x+ 1; continue;
/* Case 3: update both linear complexity and connection
polynomial */
8 else
9 T (D)← C(D); C(D)← C(D)− db−1DxB(D); L← N + 1− L;
B(D)← T (D); b← d; x← 1;
10 N ← N + 1;
11 return (L,C(D))
An important ingredient of our attack is the following theorem. In the below, HW(s)
denotes the Hamming weight (i.e. number of non-zero entries) of s and LC((s))
denotes the linear complexity of the sequence (s).
Theorem 4 (Blahut [26]). Let q be a prime such that there exists an (2n)th primitive
root of unity in Zq and let NTT(·) denote a traditional NTT12 of dimension n over
Zq. For any s ∈ Znq , define (ŝ) := (NTT(s), NTT(s), . . . ) to be the sequence comprising
of infinitely many copies of NTT(s). Then LC((ŝ)) = HW(s).
Blahut’s Theorem has been proven for the traditional NTT. However, in this work
12Note that the matrix associated to the traditional NTT has (i, j)th component given by ωij for
nth primitive root of unity ω
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we are considering the negacyclic NTT. It turns out that the correctness of Blahut’s
Theorem for the negacyclic NTT follows straight-forwardly from the traditional case:
Lemma 10 (Negacyclic Blahut). Let q be a prime such that there exists an (2n)th
primitive root of unity in Zq and let NTT(·) denote a negacyclic NTT of dimension n
over Zq. For s ∈ Znq , define (ŝ) := (NTT(s), NTT(s), . . . ) to be the sequence comprising
of infinitely many copies of NTT(s). Then, from Blahut’s theorem for the traditional
NTT, LC((ŝ)) = HW(s).
Proof. In this proof, we denote whether an NTT is negacyclic or traditional using
neg or trad in the subscript. Let ω ∈ Zq be a primitive nth root of unity and
γ ∈ Zq be a square root of ω. Also let g = (1, γ, γ2, . . . , γn−1) and ⊙ denote the




ωij(γjsj) = NTTtrad(g ⊙ s)i (3.13)
Defining the infinite sequence (ĝ ⊙ strad) := (NTTtrad(g ⊙ s), NTTtrad(g ⊙ s), . . . ), we
have that
LC((ŝ)) = LC((ĝ ⊙ strad)) = HW(g ⊙ s) = HW(s) (3.14)
where the first equality is due to Equation (3.13), the second is due to Blahut’s
theorem for the traditional NTT, and the last is due to the fact that γjsj = 0 if and
only if sj = 0.
Blahut’s theorem tells us that a secret with Hamming weight w corresponds precisely
to an infinite sequence in the NTT domain with linear complexity w. In order to
exploit this relation, we use the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [99] which provides a
method for finding the linear complexity and connection polynomial of any sequence.
To investigate this further, we can produce a linear complexity profile for a sequence
by plotting the maximal index present in the subsequence in each iteration against
the linear complexity calculated for that subsequence. This is a trivial task when
considering the previously mentioned structure of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm.
For the linear complexity profile of a random sequence, we typically end up observing
that the points on the profile exhibit a step behaviour roughly lying on the line
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Figure 3.6: Linear complexity profiles for a random sequence (left) and for the NTT
of a low Hamming weight vector (right).
y = x/2. However, if our sequence is the result of a NTT transform of a low Hamming
weight vector, Blahut’s theorem tells us that we should get low linear complexity.
In this case, the linear complexity profile shows the same step behaviour, but levels
off when the low linear complexity of the sequence is reached. Examples of linear
complexity profiles in both these cases in given in Figure 3.6.
3.6.2 Full Attack Description
Suppose we are given a noisy version of a secret key with low Hamming weight w
in the NTT domain. We will show that the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm implicitly
yields a strategy for finding such a key given 2w consecutive error-less symbols. The
logic behind the attack is that the connection polynomial is recovered fully by the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm once 2w symbols have been considered. A consequence
of this is that the attack in Algorithm 4 works if there are 2w clean symbols in the
noisy key. Note that if we were to disregard the NTT, leaking 2w symbols of the
secret key does not lead to an immediate key recovery attack.
Lemma 11. For a prime q, integer n and vector s ∈ Znq with Hamming weight w,
the minimal connection polynomial of (ŝ) := (NTT(s), NTT(s), . . . ) can be recovered
given 2w consecutive symbols of ŝ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume throughout this proof that the given 2w
consecutive symbols are at the beginning of the sequence. Suppose that our lin-
90
3.6 Low Hamming Weight Secret Block Leakage Attack
ear complexity has reached w (which is its maximum value for the error-less NTT
sequence) after the consideration of the first 2w symbols. We analyse the loop in
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm that considers 2w + 1 symbols. Since we know
that the linear complexity cannot increase, we must either be in case 1 or 2 from
Algorithm 3. However, to be in case 2, we must have 2L > N which translates to
2w > 2w+1 for the loop in consideration. This is clearly impossible, so we must be
in the case where the connection polynomial does not change. The same argument
holds for the remaining iterations.
To complete the argument, we need to show that the linear complexity after 2w
iterations is in fact w. Suppose not, i.e. that we have a linear complexity of w′ < w.
Then at some point in the remaining iterations, we must increase the linear com-
plexity to w. Using the notation from Algorithm 3, suppose the first increase occurs
when N = 2w+ k for some k ≥ 0. Then we must be in case 3 from Algorithm 3, so
we update the linear complexity to 2w + k + 1 − w′ > w which is a contradiction.
Therefore we must reach the linear complexity of w after 2w symbols have been
considered.
Note that we can change the starting point of the sequence (ŝ) without changing
the proof of the result above. Therefore in the attack, we do not require that the 2w
error-less symbols occur in the first components of NTT(s). If we do not know where
the error-less symbols are, we can simply re-run the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
on all of the cyclic shifts of NTT(s) in an attempt to get the error-less symbols at the
beginning of the sequence.
A general framework for this attack is given as Algorithm 4. Note that this algorithm
outputs a list of candidates given a noisy NTT secret. A simple way to find the
solution within this list would be to substitute each candidate back into the RLWE
instance that is being attacked.
3.6.3 Cold Boot Scenario
We now consider our Blahut-Berlekamp-Massey attack within an NTT cold boot
scenario. We will work with RLWE parameters n, q, w := HW(s). Recall that we need
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Algorithm 4: Generic attack based on Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
Input: ˜̂s = (s̃0, . . . , s̃n−1) % noisy NTT of secret, Hamming weight
w < n/2
Output: List of candidate secrets L
1 L ← ∅; for i = 0, . . . , n− 1 do
2 (t0, . . . , t2w−1)← (si, . . . , s2w+i);
(L,C(D))←Berlekamp-Massey(t0, . . . t2w−1);
(c0, . . . , cw)← C(D).coefficients(); for j = 2w, . . . , n− 1 do
3 tj ← −
∑w
k=1 citj−i; % derive the remaining symbols
4 for j = 0, . . . , n− 1 do
5 rj = tj−i mod n;
6 L.Add((r0, . . . , rn−1));
7 return L
2w consecutive clean symbols/NTT entries for the attack to go through which is
equivalent to requiring 2w⌈log2 q⌉ consecutive bits of the secret key. When consider-
ing these bits in a noisy version of the secret key, about half of the bits will be out of
the ground state. Therefore, assuming a bit-flip rate of ρ0 towards the ground state
and a bit-flip of ρ1 away from the ground state, we expect (ρ0+ρ1)w⌈log2 q⌉ bit-flips
within the entire block of 2w ⌈log2 q⌉ bits. The strategy is to exhaustively search for
the bits that were flipped and run the Berlekamp-Massey attack algorithm to check
each guess. Ignoring the trivial cost of running Berlekamp-Massey, we have a rough










For example parameters w = 64, q = 12289, n = 1024, we have an attack with
complexity roughly 280 for bit-flip rate ρ0 = 1%, ρ1 = 0.1% remembering that ρ1
is the retrograde flip rate (if ρ0 = 0.17%, the attack complexity is roughly 228 for
w = 64 and 250 for w = 128). In certain scenarios, this complexity could be much
lower. For example, suppose there is a block of 2w⌈log2 q⌉ consecutive bits where
the majority flips could have only occurred away from the ground state. Then we
expect only a small number of bit-flips in this block since ρ1 < ρ0, which reduces the
amount of guesses required before the attack is successful. Therefore, in a cold boot
attack, we would be able to identify the optimal consecutive block of 2w symbols to
launch our attack on very easily.
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3.6.4 Future Directions for Linear Complexity Attacks
The k-error linear complexity of a sequence is the minimal linear complexity attain-
able when changing at most k symbols. This notion corresponds closely to the case
where we have a noisy version of the key that contains at most k erroneous sym-
bols. If we had an algorithm that computed k-error linear complexity along with
the symbol changes required to minimise the linear complexity, then we would be
able to recover secret keys in many non-trivial cases.
However, efficient algorithms for calculating k-error linear complexities only exist
for specific classes of sequences [132, 74]. There is currently no efficient algorithm
that handles sequences with power-of-two period n over a field GF (q) satisfying
2n|(q − 1). It is an interesting open problem to discover such an algorithm.
3.7 Periodic Leakage Attack [45]
In this section, we present another NTT-based key recovery attack from the litera-
ture [45] enabled by a certain leakage characteristic. Let n′|n. Using indexing in Z∗2n
(see Section 3.7.1), the leakage considered in this attack is periodic on all entries of
NTT(s) with index j satisfying j mod 2n′ ∈ S for some S ⊂ Z∗2n′ . As we will see, the
attack performance varies according to the size of n and S. The attack consists of
two main parts:
1. (Section 3.7.2) Deriving a large system of noiseless equations.
2. (Section 3.7.3) Using lattice reduction in small dimensions to derive the most
likely solutions for the key.
3.7.1 Indexing in Z∗2n
If we fix n to be a power of 2, a very convenient convention when presenting this
attack is to index the NTT by integers in Z∗2n rather than in Zn. This means that the
index of an entry of NTT(s) corresponds exactly to the power of the (2n)th primitive
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root of unity γ used to derive that entry. For example, consider s ∈ Rq. Then using
this indexing convention, we have
NTT(s) = (ŝ1, ŝ3, . . . , ŝ2n−1) := (s(γ1), s(γ3), . . . , s(γ2n−1)).
Furthermore, suppose n′|n. Then n′ is also a power of 2 and Z∗2n′ = Z2n′ ∩ Z∗2n.
3.7.2 Deriving the Noiseless Systems of Equations
Fix some n′|n and S = {α ∈ Z∗2n′}. Assume that the values of ŝj are known for
all j such that j mod 2n′ = α. In the NTT domain, a RLWE sample is of the form
(â, â⊙ ŝ+ ê) where ⊙ represents component-wise multiplication of vectors. Since q
is prime, leakage of ŝj implies leakage of êj . Noting that γ2n
′ is an (n/n′)th primitive














by the chinese remainder theorem. This means that given the coordinates êj for all




for k = 0, . . . , nn′ −1, we can

















considering one coefficient of eα(x) at a time, we end up with the under-determined








In the above system, the eαi are known whereas the ei are unknowns. Note that each
value of i ∈ {0, . . . , nn′ − 1} gives rise to an independent system in the n′ unknowns
ei, . . . , ei+ n
n′ ·(n
′−1). At a high level, the attack will proceed by finding candidates
to these under-determined systems conditioned on the fact that the ei are small
integers as they are drawn from an error distribution.
For now, assume that the shortest possible solution to the systems in (3.16) is
used as the candidate solution. Although this is a reasonable criteria for picking
candidate solutions, there is a high chance that we will not be able to recover e
(and therefore s) using this simple strategy. In particular, each of the candidate
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solutions to the independent systems that we pick must be the correct one if we
want to recover the correct value for s. Unfortunately, this is not very likely due
to how under-determined the systems are. To get over this issue, multiple RLWE
samples are required to amplify the success probability.
Making use of multiple RLWE samples Obtaining a correct solution to a single
system of the form (3.16) yields the correct values of ei+kn/n′ i.e. n′ coefficients of
an error vector. Viewing a RLWE sample as (A, b = A · s+ e) where A is a matrix
with negacyclic structure, suppose we look at the entries of b with indices of the
form i + kn/n′. Since we know the value of the error term at these positions, we
derive a system of n′ equations in the n unknown coefficients of s. Bearing this in
mind, once we have solved n/n′ distinct systems of the form (3.16) we end up with
a total of n′ · n/n′ = n equations in the coefficients of s. At this point, recovering
s is trivial linear algebra. Recall that we cannot always effectively find the correct
solution to under-determined systems of the form (3.16). To remedy this problem,
the success probability of the attack can be amplified by allowing the attacker access
to extra RLWE samples (i.e. extra systems of the form (3.16)) so that the attacker
has the freedom to use only the systems that can be solved correctly with high
confidence. How the attacker chooses the appropriate system is addressed in the
following section.
3.7.3 Solving for the Most Likely Solution
When presented with the under-determined noiseless systems of the form (3.16),
the attacker must make an educated guess on what the correct solution is. This
process is aided by the fact that the error polynomial has small coefficients from a
known error distribution χ. Therefore, once the attacker finds a candidate solution,
the probability of seeing that solution when sampling from distribution χ can be
used as a way of measuring the confidence of the candidate solution. For the usual
(spherical) Gaussian error distribution, it is always the case that the shortest solution
will be the one the attacker has the most confidence in. The same can be said for
binomial error distributions.
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Therefore, the attacker strategy will be to solve the individual systems of the form
(3.16) for the shortest solution. In addition to finding the shortest solution, the
attacker records the confidence of the candidate solution by calculating the prob-
ability of the shortest solution under χ divided by the sum of the probabilities of
all valid solutions to that system under χ. If the confidence level recorded is higher
than a threshold, the candidate solution is kept. Otherwise the candidate solution
is removed. Once n/n′ candidate solutions with an acceptable confidence level have
been recorded, the attacker stops and solves a linear system to recover the secret s.
Since the individual systems will be in dimension n′ where n′ is a power of two
dividing n, finding the shortest solution can be done by running BKZ reduction
and lattice enumeration as in Section 3.5.4.1. In particular, the CVP problem to be
solved would be over the lattices





vk = 0 mod q}
using the target point t = (eαi , 0, . . . , 0). The offset of the closest vector and this
target point would yield a candidate solution.
Similar to our cold boot attack, the form of the individual systems is fixed regardless
of the RLWE sample. This means that we can perform BKZ reduction once and for
all, while simply running lattice enumeration when running the attack. However, at
small dimensions e.g. n′ = 8, a meet-in-the-middle exhaustive search is reasonably
efficient and this method used by [45].
Remark 7. It is easy to extend the above attack to the case where ŝj are known for
j mod 2n′ = α1 and j mod 2n′ = α2 i.e. S = {α1, α2}. The difference is that the
single equation given as (3.16) becomes two equations in the unknowns ei+kn/n′.
3.7.4 Experimental Evaluation and Findings
In this section, we briefly present the experimental findings of [45]. Exact complex-
ities were omitted in [45] since the attack is quite cheap for the leakage settings
considered. However, the number of RLWE samples required gives an idea of the
feasibility of these attacks when an attacker has a limited number of RLWE samples
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to work with. Mainly, leakage patterns revealing 1/4 of the secret coefficients were
considered. For the rest of this summary, we fix n = 1024 and binomial error dis-
tribution B16 used in New Hope. Consider the case n′ = 4,S = {1} or equivalently,
n′ = 8,S = {1, 9} using the notation from the remark above. Using a confidence
threshold of 0.98 for candidate solutions to individual systems, it was observed that
22 RLWE samples yields an attack that succeeds with probability 0.5%. Alterna-
tively, the leakage pattern n′ = 8,S = {1, 15} with a confidence threshold of 0.95
yields an attack requiring 170 samples with probability of success 0.1408%. The
final experimental result we mention is for n′ = 8,S = {1, 7}, which yields an attack
with success probability 7.5% using 1929 RLWE samples and a confidence threshold
of 98%. As we can see, the attack requires many RLWE samples, even for low success
probabilities.
We now overview what was found for the case n′ = 8, α = 1 i.e. a leakage of 1/8
NTT coordinates. The first thing to note is that the confidence levels observed
when solving the systems of the form (3.16) for cases n′ = 8 and higher appear to
be at most 0.12 ≈ 0.125 = 2−3 for the binomial distribution B16. Therefore, for
n′ = 8, 12% is the maximal reasonable threshold. Using 12.5% as a threshold for
acceptable guesses, one would then get a 2−3n/n′ success probability. Therefore, even
for n = 256, the highest probability of success expected is 2−96 and for the New Hope
dimension n = 1024, the highest probability of success is around 2−384. Furthermore,
these success probabilities assume a very large number of RLWE samples so that the
12.5% threshold can be met for n/n′ of the noiseless systems.
The experimental findings presented above along with the required number of RLWE
samples suggest that this attack is mainly of theoretical interest. It nonetheless uses
the structure of the NTT to launch a novel and interesting attack.
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4.1 Chapter Synopsis
In this chapter, we present reductions between different algebraic LWE variants.
The main results from this section are heavily inspired by a well-known reduction
from plain LWE with modulus q, dimension n to modulus qn/n′ , dimension n′ for
any n′|n [32]. The error rate in this well-known reduction increases by roughly a
factor of
√
n. We stress that all reductions mentioned in this section ensure that
standard Gaussian error distributions are preserved (but do incur an increase in
the Gaussian error width). In addition, the reductions require small secrets to
work. In this chapter, we generalise the techniques from [32] to the ring/module
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setting. In particular, we show that for module ranks d, d′ where d′|d and ring R,
there is a reduction from the MLWE problem with modulus q, rank d to the MLWE
problem with modulus qd/d′ , rank d′. Importantly, the error distribution remains
statistically indistinguishable from an ellipsoidal Gaussian, but the bound on the
error width grows by an amount dependent on properties of the underlying ring
R. For power of two cyclotomic R of ring dimension n, the error distribution is
shown to grow by a multiplicative factor of roughly n1/2+c
√
d for any constant c > 0
when the normal form secret distribution is used (see Corollary 3 and the following
discussion). Note that this is an improvement on the n2
√
d factor reported in our
original publication [6]. Also, taking d′ = 1, we get a reduction from MLWE to
RLWE.
Still inspired by the work of [32] we derive a reduction from RLWE for power-of-two
cyclotomic R with ring dimension n and modulus q to RLWE with power-of-two
cyclotomic R with ring dimension n/2 and modulus q2. The error rate in this case
increases by a factor of n3/4+c when using the normal form secret distribution (see
Corollary 6 and the following discussion). Once again, this improves on our original
publication which reported a growth factor of n9/4. Unfortunately, the analysis of
this reduction uses the Renyi divergence and therefore only works between search
variants of RLWE. We end this chapter by briefly overviewing related works in the
area of reductions between algebraic variants of LWE. In addition, we highlight an
improvement to our RLWE in (n, q) to RLWE in (n/2, q2) reduction using a recent
theorem of Peikert and Pepin [109]. This improvement allows us to both obtain a
reduction between decision variants, and also reduce the growth rate in error to just
a factor of about n1/2+c for any constant c > 0. In addition, this improvement allows
us to reduce RLWE in (n, q) to RLWE in (n′, qn/n′) for any power-of-two n′ < n at
the cost of a factor n3/2
(n′)1−c growth in the error rate.
Road map The main technical effort of this chapter is contained in Section 4.3
where a reduction from MLWE to MLWE for general rings is described. The general
result is given in Corollary 3. We then describe the consequences of this general
reduction in the case that the underlying ring is a power-of-two cyclotomic in Sec-
tion 4.3.4. Following this, in Section 4.4 we use a similar reduction between different
parameter settings of the power-of-two cyclotomic RLWE. Finally, in Section 4.5 we
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briefly overview related work and present an improvement/generalisation of the re-
sults in Section 4.4.
4.2 Chapter Preliminaries
We will require a result stating that a discrete Gaussian premultiplied by a matrix S
representing multiplication by a field element in the space H, can be drowned by a
wide enough continuous Gaussian (Lemma 12). To simplify presentation, we include
the proof of this result here. Before proving this lemma, we need the following claim.
Claim 2. For any τ ∈ Rn, r ∈ R, define ti =
√
τ2i + r
2 for i = 1, . . . , n and let Λ
be an n-dimensional lattice. Let X ∼ DΛ+u,r and Y ∼ Dτ and define the random
variable Z := X + Y . Provided that τir/ti ≥ ηϵ(Λ) for all i, the distribution of Z is
within statistical distance 2ϵ of Dt.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we denote the density function of Z at any point
z ∈ Rn as p(z). Let c1 =
∫
Rn ρτ (x)dx, let T be the diagonal matrix with Ti,i = rτi/ti
and let uz be the vector whose ith entry is r
2
τ2i +r




























The term labelled (♣1) is a constant with respect to z. Informally speaking, we
will show that (♣2) is almost constant with respect to z. This will imply that the
mass function of Z is almost proportional to ρt as required. Let vz := u+ uz and
define f(x) := ρ(T−1(x + vz)). Note that the Fourier transform of f is given by





x∈Λ f(x) = det(Λ∗) ·
∑


























































≤ ϵ · det(Λ
∗)
det(T−1)
Therefore, we can conclude that (♣2) ∈ [1− ϵ, 1 + ϵ] · det(Λ
∗)
det(T−1) and
p(z) ∈ [1− ϵ, 1 + ϵ] · C · ρt(z) (4.1)


















Using Claim 1 and the fact that (1− ϵ)/(1 + ϵ) ≥ 1− 2ϵ completes the proof.
Lemma 12. Let R be the ring of integers of a field K with degree n and take
arbitrary positive r,B ∈ R. For any non-zero s ∈ K, let S ∈ Qn×n be the matrix
corresponding to field multiplication by s in the space H and let σi = σi(s) for
i = 1, . . . , n. Let S′ be the diagonal matrix with (i, i)th entry
√
B2 + |σi|2. For any
n-dimensional lattice Λ and u ∈ Rn, the random variable Z = S · X + Y where
X ∼ DΛ+u,r and Y ∼ DrBIn is within statistical distance 2ϵ of DrS′ where provided
that rB√
B2+|σi|2
≥ ηϵ(Λ) for all i.
Proof. Let W = S−1Z = X + S−1Y . The distribution of S−1Y is a continu-
ous Gaussian with covariance matrix (rB)2(ST · S)−1 which is diagonal with ith
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entry (rB)2/|σi|2. Therefore, we express the distribution of S−1Y as Dτ where







≥ ηϵ(Λ). This allows us to conclude that the distri-




words, the distribution ofW is continuous Gaussian with diagonal covariance matrix
T where Ti,i = t2i .
To complete the proof, we consider the distribution of Z = SW . By using the data
processing inequality for statistical distance, Z is at most a statistical distance 2ϵ
away from a continuous Gaussian with covariance matrix STST . Recall from the
discussion in Section 2.5.2 that S = U†HDUH for some diagonal matrix D and
unitary UH given in Equation (2.5). Let r1 be the number of real field embeddings
and r2 the number of pairs of complex embeddings. This means that for i = r1 +
1, . . . , r1 + r2, |σi| = |σi+r2 | and therefore that ti = ti+r2 . From these observations,











 ∈ Cn×n. (4.3)
Therefore, we can write STST = T · SST . Since T and SST are both diagonal
with ith entry |σi|2 and t2i respectively, the covariance matrix associated with Z is
diagonal with ith entry |σi|2t2i = r2(B2 + |σi|2).
4.3 Reductions Between MLWE Problems
In this section, we show how to reduce an MLWE instance in module rank d and
modulus q to an MLWE instance in rank d′ and modulus q′. The particular case
where d′ = 1 yields a reduction from MLWE to RLWE .
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4.3.1 Intuition
We start by describing the high-level intuition behind the reduction for the case
d′ = 1 and where the modulus goes from q to qd. For the intuition, we ignore the
dual ring R∨, replacing it with R. In this case, our strategy is to map (a, s) ∈
(Rq)
d × (Rq)d to (ã, s̃) ∈ Rq′ ×Rq′ aiming to satisfy the approximate equation
1
q
⟨a, s⟩ ≈ 1
qd
(ã · s̃) mod R. (4.4)
We then map from b to b̃ ≈ b mod R. For q = Ω(poly(n)), if we take s̃ =
(qd−1, . . . , 1)
T · s and ã = (1, . . . , qd−1)T · a, we obtain
1
qd












(. . . ) + . . . mod R
≈ 1
q
⟨a, s⟩ mod R.
(4.5)
This mapping satisfies the requirement b̃ ≈ (ã · s̃)/qd but leads to a narrow, yet
non-standard error distribution. The reduction in Theorem 5 is a generalisation of
the above idea. Specifically, take some G ∈ (R)d
′×d and s̃ = G · s mod (q′R)d
′
.












ajsj mod R. (4.6)








aj mod R (4.7)
for j = 1, . . . , d. To carry out this strategy, we will sample ã over an appropriate
lattice defined by G in the canonical embedding. The main challenge in applying
this strategy is that we want the error in the new MLWE sample to follow a standard
error distribution, i.e. a continuous Gaussian. In order to carry out the analysis, we
will make use of Lemma 12.
4.3.2 The Main Theorem
Theorem 5. Let R be the ring of integers of some algebraic number field K of degree
n, let d, d′, q, q′ be integers, ϵ ∈ (0, 1/2), and G ∈ Rd′×d. Also, fix s = (s1, . . . , sd) ∈
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(R∨)d. Further, let BΛ be some known basis of the lattice Λ = 1q′ G
T
HR
d′ + Rd (in










2 ln(2nd(1 + 1/ϵ))/π.




1. The output distribution given uniform input F(U((Rq)d × TR∨)) is within
statistical distance 4ϵ of the uniform distribution over (Rq′)d
′
× TR∨.
2. Let M = Rd, M ′ = Rd′ and define B := maxi,j |σi(sj)|. The distribution of




α2 + r2(β2 +
∑d
j=1 |σi(sj)|2) for any β satisfying β2 ≥ B2d.
Proof. We use the canonical embedding on each component of Rd individually, e.g.
aH = (σH(a1), . . . , σH(ad)) ∈ Hd ≃ Rnd and similarly for other module elements.
We will also refer to the canonical embedding of R as simply R to ease notation.
Suppose we are given (a, b) ∈ (Rq)d×TR∨ . The mapping F is performed as follows:
1. Sample f ← DΛ− 1
q
aH ,r
. Note that the parameter r is large enough so that we
can sample the discrete Gaussian efficiently by Lemma 7.
2. Let v = 1qaH +f mod Rd ∈ Λ/Rd and set x ∈ (Rq′)
d′ to be a random solution
of 1q′ G
T
Hx = v mod Rd. Then set ã ∈M ′ to be the unique element of M ′ such
that ãH = x.
3. For some β > B
√
d sample ẽ from the distribution Drβ over KR ≃ H and set
b̃ = b+ ẽ.
4. Finally, output (ã, b̃) ∈ (Rq′)d
′
× TR∨ .
Distribution of ã. Suppose that a ∈ (Rq)d was drawn uniformly at random.
Step 2 of the reduction can be performed by adding a random element of the basis
of solutions to 1q′ G
T
Hy = 0 mod Rd to a particular solution of 1q′ G
T
Hx = v mod Rd.
In order to show that ã is nearly uniform random, we will show that the vector
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x is nearly uniform random over the set (Rq′)d
′
. Note that every x ∈ (Rq′)d
′
is
a solution to 1q′ G
T
Hx = v mod Rd for some v and the number of solutions to this
equation in (Rq′)d
′
for each v is the same. Thus, proving that v is almost uniform
suffices. Observe that r ≥ ηϵ(Λ). Therefore, Lemma 6 tells us that for any particular
ā ∈ (Rq)d and f̄ ∈ Λ− 1q āH , we have





















where C := q−nd/ρr(Λ) is a constant. By summing this equation over appropriate
values of ā and f̄ , Lemma 6 tells us that for any coset v̄ ∈ Λ/Rd,






· ρr(q−1Rd + v̄)

















where C ′ := Cρr(q−1Rd). Note that we may apply Lemma 6 here since we know
that r ≥ ηϵ(q−1Rd) by Lemma 4. This allows us to conclude that the distribution of
v is within statistical distance 1− [(1− ϵ)/(1 + ϵ)]2 ≤ 4ϵ of the uniform distribution.
This means that x is uniformly random over (Rq′)d
′
to within statistical distance 4ϵ
implying that ã is uniform random over (Rq′)d
′
to within statistical distance 4ϵ by
the data processing inequality. It is also clear that if b is uniform random, then so
is b̃. This proves the first claim (uniform-to-uniform).
Distribution of −f . In our analysis of the resulting error, it will be useful to
understand the distribution of the vector −f for fixed ã (and thus fixed v = v̄).
Note that fixing a value f = f̄ fixes 1qa = v̄ − f̄ mod Rd. By summing over all
appropriate values of f̄ in Equation (4.8), one can show that the distribution of −f
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Distribution of the error. Suppose we are given the MLWE sample (a, b =
1
q ⟨a, s⟩ + e) ∈ (Rq)
d × TR∨ as input where e ∈ KR is drawn from Dα. We have
already shown that our map outputs ã ∈ (Rq′)d
′
that is almost uniformly random.
Now we condition on a fixed ã = ¯̃a and analyse the distribution of
(b̃− 1
q′
⟨¯̃a · s̃⟩) mod R∨ (4.10)
where s̃ = Gs. Let f i ∈ Rn be the vector consisting of the ith block of n entries of
f ∈ Rnd for i = 1, . . . , d. Using the fact that s̃ = Gs and that R∨ is closed under
multiplication by elements of R, we can rewrite this as
(b̃− 1
q′
⟨¯̃a · s̃⟩) =
d∑
i=1
si · σ−1H (−f i) + ẽ+ e mod R
∨. (4.11)
We want to show that the RHS of this equation is almost distributed as a Gaussian
in canonically embedded space H. To do so, define the invertible matrix Si,H :=
UHSiU†H ∈ Rn×n where UH is given in Equation (2.5) and Si is the diagonal matrix
with the field embeddings of si along the diagonal i.e. [Si]jk = σj(si)δjk. Note that
Si,H is the matrix representing field multiplication by si in the basis (hi)ni=1 of H.
Therefore, in canonical space, the error is given by
d∑
i=1
Si,H · (−f i) + σH(ẽ) + σH(e) mod R∨ (4.12)
where σH(ẽ) and σH(e) are distributed as Drβ and Dα respectively. Note that we
can conceptualise σH(ẽ) as
∑d
i=1 ẽ
(i) where each ẽ(i) is distributed as a continuous






Also, letting v̄i denote the ith block of n coordinates of v̄, we know that −f i is





Si,H · (−f i) + σH(ẽ) =
d∑
i=1
Si,H · (−f i) + ẽ(i), (4.13)
and applying Lemma 12 to the summand on the RHS, we find (using the trian-
gle and data processing inequalities for statistical distance) that the error term in
Equation (4.12) is a statistical distance of at most 2ϵ+ 2dϵ away from Dα′ .
The following corollary specialises to a map from MLWE in module rank d to d/k and
from modulus q to qk for general rings. Taking k = d constitutes a reduction from
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MLWE to RLWE. Note that the new secret distribution is non-standard in general,
but we can always use the usual re-randomizing process to obtain a uniform secret
i.e. sample s′ ← U(R∨q ) and transform (a, b) to (a, b+ 1q (a · s′)).















2 ln(2nd(1 + 1/ϵ))/π,







where G = Id/k ⊗ (1, q, . . . , qk−1) ∈ Rd/k×d and
(α′)
2 ≥ α2 + 2r2B2d.
Moreover, this reduction reduces the advantage by at most [1−(1− δ)d]+(2d+10)ϵm.
Proof. We run the reduction from Theorem 5, taking q′ = qk, β2 ≥ B2d and G ∈
Rd/k×d as in the corollary statement. The main task is to show that the conditions
on r in the theorem are satisfied by the choice of r in this corollary. In particular, for
Λ = 1q′ G
T
HR
d′ +Rd, we will attempt to express ∥B̃Λ∥ in terms of ∥B̃R∥. Define g :=
(1, q, . . . , qk−1) so that G = Id/k⊗g. In the canonical embedding, we may write the
lattice from Theorem 5 as Λ = 1
qk
(Id/k⊗gT ⊗In) ·(Id/k⊗BR) ·Znd/k+(Id⊗BR) ·Znd.





















Id/k ⊗ gT ⊗ In
)
· Znd/k + Znd
The lattice Λ̄ can be shown to have basis B′ = Id/k ⊗Q⊗ In where
Q =

q−1 q−2 · · · q−k
q−1 · · · q1−k
. . . ...
q−1
 .
Pre-multiplying B′ by Id⊗BR gives us a basis BΛ = Id/k ⊗Q⊗BR for Λ. Orthog-
onalising from left to right, we can see that ∥B̃Λ∥ is precisely 1q∥B̃R∥.
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Finally, the loss in advantage can be derived from the statistical distances in The-
orem 5 and the fact that the reduction is only guaranteed to work when each of
the d secret polynomials has embeddings of modulus at most B (which occurs with
probability at least (1− δ)d).
4.3.3 Normal Form Secret Distribution
There are well-known results stating that an LWE problem where the secret is
drawn from the error distribution is at least as hard as an LWE problem where
the secret is uniform [12]. The connection is straight-forward for plain LWE, but
for R/MLWE, we need to remember that the secrets lie in (R∨)d whereas the er-
rors are sampled from K ⊗ R. However, this complication can be solved using
discretisation techniques that transform continuous errors to discrete ones [98]. Us-






















challenges in an attempt to reintroduce continuous
noise distributions. By Claim 3.9 from [118], adding the noise D√2qα results in chal-







that αq ≥ ∥B̃R∨∥ · Õ(1). An informal summary of this is that we may use a dis-
crete Gaussian secret with a continuous Gaussian error distribution roughly q times
narrower without compromising hardness.
Now that we have established the significance of secret distributions of the form
D(R∨)d,
√
2qα, we next discuss valid choices of (B, δ) with respect to this secret distri-
bution. The below lemma shows that we can choose B =
√
2qαnc for any positive




which is negligible assuming that n is
polynomial in the security parameter.
Lemma 13. For any algebraic number field K of degree n with ring of integers R,












Proof. We first recall that s ← D(R∨),√2qα means that σH(s) ← DσH((R∨)),
√
2qα.
Assuming r1 real embeddings and r2 pairs of complex embeddings so that n =
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It is clear that |σi(s)| ≤ |σH(s)|∞ for i = 1, . . . , r1. For i = r1 + 1, . . . , r1 + r2, we
have that 2|σi(s)|2 = σH(s)2i + σH(s)2i+r2 ≤ 2|σH(s)|
2
∞. Therefore, we have that
maxi |σi(s)| ≤ |σH(s)|∞. Applying Lemma 1 to σH(s) completes the proof.
Corollary 3. Let R be a ring with basis BR in the canonical embedding, c > 0 be
an arbitrary constant and χ denote the distribution D(R∨)d,αq. Also take any α > 0
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Moreover, this reduction reduces the advantage by at most [1−(1− δ)d]+(2d+10)ϵm
where δ = 2n exp(−πn2c).
4.3.4 Instantiation: Power-of-Two Cyclotomic Rings
We now consider the case of cyclotomic rings with power-of-two dimension n. It can
be shown that the map taking the coefficient embedding to the canonical embedding
is a scaled isometry with scaling factor
√
n. In this case, we have R = Z(ξ) for (2n)th
primitive root of unity ξ. Taking the “power basis” of R given by 1, ξ, . . . , ξn−1,
gives us an orthonormal lattice basis of R in the coefficient embedding. Applying
the aforementioned scaled isometry, we find an orthogonal basis in the canonical
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embedding where each vector has length
√
n. Therefore, in the canonical embedding
∥B̃R∥ =
√
n when using this basis.
In the following, we will informally take normal form MLWE to mean the case
where the error distribution is Dα for some α and where the secret distribution is
DR∨,qα (i.e. we will ignore any small constant factor differences between the Gaussian
parameters of the secret and error distributions). We assume that m,n and d are




, ϵ = n− logn as negligible functions
while ignoring constant/logarithmic factors. In this setting, the losses in advantage
are negligible. Taking the above into account, Corollary 3 shows we can reduce
normal form MLWE in modulus q, module rank d to MLWE in modulus qk, module
rank d/k with a uniform secret distribution (after re-randomising the secret). In
particular, the bound on the width of the error distribution grows from α to roughly
nc+1/2
√
dα for any positive constant c. Since normal form MLWE is at least as hard
as uniform secret MLWE, we also have that uniform secret MLWE in modulus q, rank
d reduces to uniform secret MLWE in modulus qk, rank d/k at the cost of roughly a
factor nc+1/2
√
d blow-up in the bound on the error rate. Finally, taking k = d gives
us the result that RLWE in modulus qd is at least as hard as MLWE with modulus q,
rank d with error rate roughly nc+1/2
√
d smaller than the RLWE error rate bound.
4.3.5 Strictly Spherical Error Distributions
Note that the reduction presented in Theorem 5 results in a skewed, but bounded
error distribution. We will now present a lemma that allows us to reduce from
MLWE to MLWE with a spherical error distribution following the strategy laid out
in [97]. The price paid when targeting a strictly spherical error distribution is a
larger (but still polynomial) blow-up in the error rate. Corollary 4 shows that the
extra blow-up factor incurred when targeting a strictly spherical distribution can be
as low as (mn)1/4 wherem is the number of MLWE samples provided. It is important
to note that we will be using the Renyi divergence to carry out this analysis. As a
result, the analysis only applies to the search variants of the MLWE problem. Note
that the reduction and analysis of Theorem 5 implicitly contains a reduction and
analysis between search variants of MLWE. This is because the reduction takes the
distribution A(M)q,s,Dα to a distribution statistically close to A
(M)
q,s,Dα
. It must be noted
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that the reduction maps a secret s ∈ (R∨)d to s̃ = G · s, so we only have a search




)d/k as is the case for G = Id/k ⊗ (1, q, . . . , qk−1).
Lemma 14. For integers m, n, let M ∈ Rm×n be a matrix with non-zero singular























Proof. To prove this lemma, simply work in the orthogonal basis where the matrix







































































































4.3 Reductions Between MLWE Problems
We now use the above lemma to show that there is a search MLWE to search MLWE
reduction where the resulting error distribution is essentially spherical.














2 ln(2nd(1 + 1/ϵ))/π
and define t :=
√




(G · χd) where G = Id/k ⊗ (1, q, . . . , qk−1) ∈ Rd/k×d with proba-








1− (1− δ)d + (2d+ 6)ϵm
)
. Alternatively, if we define
t :=
√








1− (1− δ)d + (2d+ 6)ϵm
)
.
Proof. We run the reduction from Theorem 5 choosing β = B(mn)1/4
√
d. The
resulting error distribution has a diagonal covariance with ith entry (α′)i = α2 +
r2(β2+
∑d
j=1 |σi(sj)|2) where the sj are the components of the original MLWE secret.
In addition, the loss in success probability is at most 1− (1− δ)d + (4d+ 6)ϵ.








can apply Lemma 14 after setting M to be the diagonal matrix with
√∑d
j=1 |σi(sj)|2
in the ith position. Conditioned on B being larger than maxi |σi(sj)| for j = 1, . . . , d





















This quantity is upper bounded by exp(1/2) ≤ 2. By the data processing inequal-
ity, 2 is also an upper bound for the Renyi divergence between the MLWE distri-








probability at least (1− δ)d · p2/2. Repeating the analysis for Renyi divergences of
order infinity completes the proof.
112
4.3 Reductions Between MLWE Problems
Remark 8. We can write Theorem 5 in terms of the Renyi divergence of order
infinity instead of statistical distances to obtain slightly better parameters. Phrasing
Theorem 5 in terms of Renyi divergence allows us to take ϵ = O(1) allowing for
smaller choices of r (by logarithmic factors). We do not spell this out to avoid
repetition, but note that all statistical distances in the proof of Theorem 5 are derived
by bounding the ratio between mass functions i.e. by essentially calculating order
infinity Renyi divergences.
4.3.6 Modulus Reduction
Although we have focused on reductions between MLWE problems of different mod-
ule rank, we can also use Theorem 5 to derive a modulus reduction result by taking
d′ = d, G = I and large enough q′ < q. This is formalised in the following corollary.














2 ln(2nd(1 + 1/ϵ))/π,








2 ≥ α2 + 2r2B2d.
Moreover, this reduction reduces the advantage by at most [1−(1− δ)d]+(2d+10)ϵm.
As an example instantiation, we can take the case of normal form MLWE over
power-of-two cyclotomic rings. As discussed previously, ∥B̃R∥ =
√
n and the choice
B = αqnc for any constant c allows for a negligible δ. Therefore, applying the
corollary above to power of two cyclotomic rings, the reduction increases the bound
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4.4 Reducing RLWE in (n, q) to (n/2, q2)
Throughout this entire section, we assume that n is a power of two. We will be
using similar techniques to the above to show that there is an efficient reduction
between RLWE in cyclotomic ring of dimension n and modulus q to RLWE in ring
dimension n/2 and q2. We also note that there is a less direct route leading to a
stronger result than that given in this section. This alternative strategy uses recent
results from [109] along with the reduction in the previous section. Details of the
stronger result are given in Section 4.5.1.
4.4.1 Intuition
The reduction strategy is to represent polynomial multiplications in the coefficient
embedding using n×n matrices. The reduction follows the same blueprint as in Sec-
tion 4.3 apart from the fact that we are no longer working exclusively in the canoni-
cal embedding. Since we are considering power-of-two cyclotomic rings, polynomial
multiplication is always represented by a matrix of the form given in Equation (2.4).
Going from ring dimension n to n/2 just halves the dimension of these matrices. For
clarity, we adopt the notation Rn,q = Zq[X]/ ⟨Xn + 1⟩ and Rn = Z[X]/ ⟨Xn + 1⟩.
Our aim is to reduce RLWE in dimension and modulus (n, q) to RLWE in (n/2, q2)
via some mapping a ∈ Rn,q 7−→ ã ∈ Rn/2,q2 , b ∈ TR∨n 7−→ b̃ ∈ TR∨n/2 , s ∈ R
∨
n,q 7−→
s̃ ∈ R∨n/2,q2 . We can start by defining a relationship between rot(s) and rot(s̃)
where rot(·) is a negacyclic matrix as in Equation (2.4). In order to make clear
the distinction between the two rings, we denote n × n matrices associated with
multiplications in Rn,q by writing the subscript n, q. Given a particular choice of
G,H ∈ Zn/2×n (see below), the linear relationship will be defined via the equation
rot(s̃)n/2,q2 = 2 ·H · rot(s)n,q ·GT . (4.14)
Note that the factor of 2 is present to account for the fact that the new secret should
be in the dual ring R∨n/2,q2 =
2
nRn/2 and the matrix H ensures that we end up with
a square matrix rot(s̃)n/2,q2 . We also need to be careful that G and H are chosen
so the matrix rot(s̃)n/2,q2 has the correct form. We will write b ∈ Rn and b̃ ∈ Rn/2
as the coefficient vectors of b ∈ TR∨n and b̃ ∈ TR∨n/2 respectively. Define the map
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between b and b̃ (up to some Gaussian error) as
b̃ ≈ 2H · b.
In order for the reduction to work, we require that b̃ ≈ ã · s̃/q2 mod R∨n/2. Writing
this in terms of coefficient vectors,
2H · rot(s)n,q ·
1
q










GT · ã mod 1.
Explicit forms for our choice of G and H are
G = In/2 ⊗ (1, q) ∈ Zn/2×n, (4.15)
H = In/2 ⊗ (1, 0) ∈ Zn/2×n. (4.16)
Claim 3. Take G and H as above. Then rot(s̃)n/2,q2 is of the correct form (i.e. rep-
resents multiplication by some polynomial in (Rn/2,q2)).
Proof. We can write simple explicit forms (GT )kl = δk,2l−1 + qδk,2l and (H)ij =
δ2i−1,j . Then the matrix multiplication H · rot(s)n,q · GT yields (rot(s̃)n/2,q2)il =
2(rot(s)n,q)2i−1,2l−1 + 2(qrot(s)n,q)2i−1,2l which is of the correct form.




si ·Xi 7−→ s̃ = 2(s0 − qsn−1) + 2
n/2−1∑
i=1
(s2i + qs2i−1) ·Xi. (4.17)
4.4.2 Proof of Correctness
Now the proof of correctness for this reduction is essentially the same as Theorem 5
with a few minor differences. The first is that it is convenient to perform part of
the analysis in the coefficient embedding. The second is that we can only show a
reduction resulting in an elliptical Gaussian error distribution that is not diagonal in
canonical space. Such error distributions are non-standard. Therefore, we follow this
theorem with a corollary that uses Renyi divergence analysis to obtain a spherical
error distribution for search variants of RLWE.
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2 ln(2n(1 + 1/ϵ))/π.
Define G, H and s̃ as in Equations (4.15), (4.16) and (4.17) respectively. Further,
define σi := |σi(s)|.
For any α > 0 and a particular H′ ∈ Rn/2×n, there exists an efficient probabilistic
mapping F : Rn,q × TR∨n,q → Rn/2,q × TR∨n/2,q2 such that:
1. The statistical distance between F(U(Rn,q×TR∨n,q)) is within statistical distance
4ϵ of U(Rn/2,q × TR∨
n/2,q2
).
2. The statistical distance between F(ARnq,s,Dα) and A
Rn/2
q2,s̃,2H′·Dα′
is at most 8ϵ
where (α′)i2 = α2 + r2(β2 + |σi(s)|2) for any β ≥ maxi |σi(s)|.
Proof. Let all vectors denote coefficient vectors of the corresponding ring/field ele-
ments e.g. s is the coefficient vector of s. Suppose we are given (a, b) ∈ Rn,q ×TR∨n,q
and take G,H ∈ Zn/2×n as in Equations (4.15) and (4.16) respectively. The map-
ping F is performed as follows:




over the lattice Λ = 1
q2
GTZn/2 + Zn. Note that
the parameter r/
√
n is large enough so we can sample the discrete Gaussian
efficiently by Lemma 7 since ∥B̃Λ∥ = q−1 (c.f. the lattice in Corollary 2).




v mod 1. Then set ã ∈ Rn/2,q2 to be the unique polynomial such that ã = x.
3. Sample ẽ ← Drβ/√n over KR ≃ H ≃ Rn/2 and set b̃ to be the element of
TRn/2,q2∨ corresponding to 2H · (b+ ẽ).
4. Finally, output (ã, b̃) ∈ (Rn/2,q2)× TR∨
n/2,q2
.
Distribution of ã: We follow the steps in the proof of Theorem 5 so keep details
to a minimum. Since r/
√
n ≥ ηϵ(Λ) (which is implicitly shown in the proof of
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Corollary 2), we can show using Lemma 6 that







for some constant C. Next, by applying Lemma 6 after noting that r/
√
n ≥ ηϵ(Λ)
we can show that






· ρr/√n(q−1Zn + v̄)








where C ′ := Cρr/√n(q−1Zn). This implies that the distribution of v and therefore
ã is within statistical distance 4ϵ of uniform (since each value of v has the same
number of possible values for ā). If b is also uniform, then b̃ is also uniform. This
shows that the reduction maps the uniform distribution over Rn,q × TR∨n,q to the
uniform distribution over Rn/2,q2 ×TR∨
n/2,q2
to within statistical distance 4ϵ. For the
rest of the proof, we condition on a fixed value ã = ¯̃a i.e. fixed a = ā and thus a fixed
v = v̄ = 1
q2
GT ā mod Zn. We also assume that b is from the RLWE distribution.
Distribution of the error: Similarly to Theorem 5, we can show that the distri-




n. Using the definition










rot(s̃) · ¯̃a = 2H · (rot(s) · (−f) + e+ ẽ) mod 2
n
· Zn/2 (4.20)
where ẽ (resp. e) is drawn from the spherical distribution Drβ/√n (resp. Dα/√n).
All that is left is to analyse the distribution of this error. We begin by analysing
the bracketed term i.e. ignoring the 2H factor. We will map the bracketed term
into n-dimensional canonical space and analyse the distribution there. Note that
for the power-of-two cyclotomic ring we are using, the mapping is a scaled isometry
with scaling factor
√
n. Therefore, in canonical space, rot(s) · (−f)+ e+ ẽ becomes
S · (−f ′) + e∗ + ẽ∗ where
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• e∗ and ẽ∗ are distributed as Dα and Drβ respectively,
• S corresponds to field multiplication by s ∈ R∨ in the canonical embedding.








ing Lemma 12, we find that the distribution of S · (−f ′) + ẽ∗ is within statistical
distance 4ϵ of Dt where ti = r
√
β2 + |σi(s)|2. This implies that the distribution
of (rot(s) · (−f) + e∗ + ẽ∗) is within statistical distance 4ϵ of Dα′ in the canonical
embedding. Setting H′ to be the matrix corresponding to H in canonical space
completes the proof.
Corollary 6. Let Rn denote the power of two cyclotomic ring of dimension n ≥ 2
and χ be a distribution over R∨n satisfying
Prs←χ [∥σH(s)∥∞ > B ] ≤ δ







2 ln(2n(1 + 1/ϵ))/π,
let (α′t)
2 = 2α2 + 2r2B2(mn)2t. Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm solving S-
RLWE(Rn/2)
m,q2,Dα′t
(U(R∨n/2,q2)) for t = 1/4 (resp. t = 1/2) with success probability p1/4
(resp. p1/2). Then there exists a PPT algorithm solving S-RLWE(Rn)m,q,Dα(χ) with
success probabilities at least (1− δ)
p2
1/4
2 − (δ + 8ϵ) and (1− δ)
p1/2
2 − (δ + 8ϵ).
Proof. We will only go through the proof for t = 1/4 since the t = 1/2 case follows in
an identical fashion. We first run the reduction in Theorem 6 with β = B ·(mn)1/4 to
transform our S-RLWE(Rn)m,q,Dα(χ) instance with secret s to within statistical distance
δ+10ϵm of a S-RLWE(Rn/2)
m,q2,2H′·Dα′
(χ′) problem where (α′i)2 = α2+ r2(β2+ |σi(s)|2).
Note that the mapping between secrets is reversible and that the δ term arises from
the fact that the reduction analysis only holds when β ≥ maxi |σi(s)|. Therefore
performing this reduction results in at most an additive loss of δ + 10ϵm in suc-
cess probability. Note that we can further re-randomise to obtain a uniform secret
distribution i.e. obtain instances of the S-RLWE(Rn/2)
m,q2,2H′·Dα′
(U(R∨n/2,q2)) problem.
Next, conditioned on the event that maxi |σi(s)| ≤ B we can use Lemma 14 (and
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The above is upper bounded by 2. By the data-processing inequality and the prob-









with probability at least p2/2. To complete the proof for t = 1/4, we note that







where H is defined in Equation (4.16). It should be clear





n as H effectively deletes entries. Mapping back to the
canonical embedding in dimension n/2 via the appropriate scaled isometry, we find
that the error distribution 2H′ · D√
α2+r2β2
is spherical with Gaussian parameter√
2(α2 + r2β2).
We now discuss the consequences of this corollary. Taking normal form RLWE i.e.
setting χ = DR∨n ,αq allows us to set B = αqn
c for any constant c > 0 whilst keeping
δ negligible by Lemma 13. Further, we can set ϵ = n− log(n) (which is a negligible
function), m = O(1), n = poly(λ) and ignore logarithmic factors in this discussion.
In doing so, the above corollary for t = 1/4 says that if we can solve RLWE in
dimension n/2, modulus q2 and error rate α · n3/4+c with non-negligible probability
in polynomial time, then we can also solve RLWE with dimension n, modulus q
and error rate α is polynomial time with non-negligible probability. This result is
improved upon in the next section.
4.5 Related/Subsequent Work
The work of [139] revisited the problem over reducing MLWE to RLWE. In partic-
ular, the search to search variant of Theorem 5 (with slightly different parameters)
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is extended to obtain decision to decision reductions.
There is also literature relating other algebraic variants of LWE via reductions. The
algebraic variants considered include, Order-LWE (OLWE) [17], Middle-Product-
LWE (MPLWE) [121] and Polynomial-LWE (PLWE) [122]. Very informally, PLWE
is the analogue of RLWE over polynomial rings Z[X]/f(X) that are not rings of
integers of algebraic fields, OLWE is the analogue of RLWE over rings that are
“orders” of algebraic number fields, and MPLWE is concerned with LWE over rings
where the multiplication is replaced with a so-called “middle-product”. It is shown
in [121] that MPLWE is at least as hard as PLWE for any polynomial f coming from
a large class of polynomials. The blow-up in error-rate in this reduction is related
to properties of the polynomial f . In turn, it was shown in [122] that the PLWE
problem with a large class of polynomials is at least as hard as the RLWE problem.
The growth in error rate for the class of polynomials considered is at least n5/2
for this reduction. Another method of proving hardness of PLWE was presented
in [17] via a reduction from OLWE (which was also shown to have a reduction from
worst-case lattice problems).
Very recent work [109] unifies the above works by using an abstract framework
and a collection of concise reductions encompassing many of the discussed hardness
results. An advantage of this unification is that the growth in error rates are simpler,
more concrete and smaller than previous work. It turns out that we can directly
strengthen our search to search RLWE reduction by applying a result in the abstract
framework laid out in [109]. In doing so, we can actually obtain a decision to decision
RLWE reduction with a smaller polynomial blow-up in error rate than the search to
search reduction in Section 4.4. We give details of this below.
4.5.1 An Improved RLWE to RLWE Reduction Result
The definition of OLWE is entirely analogous to the definition of RLWE. In particu-
lar, the decision variant with respect to an order O is parametrised by a modulus q, a
secret distribution χ over O∨ and an error distribution ψ over KR. Let Oq := O/qO.
The decisional OLWE problem OLWEOq,ψ(χ) asks to distinguish between uniform
samples over Oq×KR/O∨ and samples of the form
(





a ← U(Oq), s ← χ and e ← ψ. The below is a result from [109] phrased using the
convention that b = 1qa · s + e rather than b = a · s + e as was the case in [109].
We can also define the module variant of OLWE in rank d denoted OLWEOdq,ψ(χd) by
considering the order variant of the normal MLWE problem with secret distribution
χd over (O∨)d. Consider any two rings R,R′ such that R′ is a finite-rank free R-
module and any x ∈ R′. In the below, we define TrR′/R(x) to be the trace of the
R-linear transformation acting on R′ (viewed as a module over R) corresponding to
multiplication by x. It is also useful to note that if a number field K ∼= Q[X]/f(X),
then we can view KR as the ring R[X]/f(X).
Theorem 7 (Theorem 6.1 [109]). Let K ′/K be a number field extension; O be an
order of K; O′ be an order of K ′ that is a rank-d free O-module with known basis
#»
b = (b1, . . . , bd) ∈ (K ′)d; ψ′ be a distribution over KR; and q be a positive integer.
Then there is an efficient deterministic reduction preserving the number of samples
from OLWEO′q,ψ′(χ′) to OLWEO
d
q,ψ(χ) where ψ = TrK′R/KR(ψ
′) and χ = TrK′/K(χ′ ·
#»
b ).
Using the notation from Section 4.4, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 7. For any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , log2 n} for power-of-two n, there exists an








Proof. We instantiate Theorem 7 by setting ξ to be a primitive (2n)th root of unity
for power-of-two n. Then we set K ′ = Q(ξ) and K = Q(ξ2i) to be cyclotomic fields.
The rings of integers R′ := Z(ξ) = Rn and R := Z(ξ2
i
) = Rn/2i are cyclotomic rings
of dimension n and n/2i respectively. Since rings of integers are orders, we may set
O′ = R′ and O = R. It is easy to see that R′ is a rank 2i R-module with basis
#»
b = (1, ξ, . . . , ξ2
i−1). Finally, we show that TrK′/K(DR∨n ,αq ·
#»
b ) = DR∨
n/2i
,2iαq and
TrK′R/KR(Dα) = D2iα. As the simplest example, take i = 1. It is not hard to see
that for any e =
∑n−1
j=0 ejξ
j ∈ K ′, the linear map representing multiplication by e in
the K-module basis (1, ξ) is given by the 2× 2 matrix[
e0 + e2ξ
2 + · · ·+ en−2ξn−2 e1ξ2 + e3ξ4 + · · ·+ en−1ξn
e1 + e3ξ
2 + · · ·+ en−1ξn−1 e0 + e2ξ2 + · · ·+ en−2ξn−2
]
.
Therefore TrK′/K(e) = 2 · (e0+ e2ξ2+ · · ·+ en−2ξn−2). In a similar fashion, one may
see that TrK′/K(eξ) = 2 · (−en−1 + e1ξ2 + · · · + en−3ξn−2). It is straight-forward
to show that TrK′R/KR takes exactly the same form. It can now be seen that if
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ψ′ = Dα, then ψ = D2α and if χ′ = D(R′)∨,αq, then χ = (DR∨,2αq)2. This analysis
can straight-forwardly be generalised to consider the remaining values of i.
We can now compose Corollary 7 with Corollary 3 in the context of power-of-two














Importantly, composing the corollaries yields a decision to decision reduction, so the
result here is stronger than that given in Section 4.4. In addition, reducing from
dimension n to n/2 (i.e. taking i = 1) the error rate grows from α to nc+1/2 · α
for any constant c > 0 in this two step reduction (ignoring constant/logarithmic
factors and choosing parameters such that losses in advantage are negligible). This
growth factor is roughly n1/4 smaller than the one given in Section 4.4. Another
advantage of the two-step reduction is that we can reduce to any power of two





)3/2 · (n′)c+1/2 = n3/2
(n′)1−c . Informally, this shows the hardness of small
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5.1 Chapter Synopsis
This chapter is concerned with constructing a fully post-quantum secure round-
optimal verifiable pseudorandom function (VOPRF) in the quantum random oracle
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model. To our knowledge, this is the first construction of a post-quantum VOPRF.
The pseudorandom function that will be obliviously evaluated is the RLWE based
PRF from Banerjee and Peikert [18] (referred to as the BP14 PRF from now on).
As a reminder, a VOPRF for a pseudorandom function F is a protocol between a
server S and a client C. The server holds a key k and the client has an input x. The
client C wants the guarantee of obtaining the correct value of Fk(x) without leaking
the value of x to S. On the other hand, the server wants to be able to provide the
value of Fk(x) without C learning anything about k. For applications of VOPRFs,
see the introduction of this thesis. The rest of this synopsis aims to give the intuition
behind our VOPRF design and security argument.
Intuition/Technical Overview We first informally overview the BP14 PRF in
the ring setting. Specifically, for a particular function aF : {0, 1}L → R1×ℓq where






· aF (x) · k
⌉
where the key k ∈ Rq has small coefficients when represented in {−q/2, . . . , q/2}.
To provide intuition for our VOPRF design, we describe a basic protocol below that
serves as a starting point. We assume that zero knowledge proofs of each message
are implicitly provided to ensure that the protocol is followed. Our first attempt at
building a VOPRF is to execute the following steps:
1. The server publishes some commitment to a small key k ∈ Rq.
2. On input x, the client picks invertible s ∈ Rq, small e ∈ R1×ℓq and sends
cx = a
F (x) · s+ e.
3. On input small k ∈ Rq, the server sends dx = cx · k + e′ for small e′ ∈ R1×ℓq .
4. The client outputs y =
⌊
p




For server security, note that dx = aF (x) · s · k + e · k + e′. In a security proof,
one strategy could be to artificially introduce an additional error term es that is
distributed identically to e. Suppose that we choose e′ from a distribution that
statistically hides addition of terms e · k and es · s. Then, from the perspective
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of the client, the server might as well have sent dx = (aF (x) · k + es) · s + e′.
Picking es (and e) from an appropriate distribution [18] makes the term in brackets
i.e. aF (x) · k + es computationally indistinguishable from uniform random under
a RLWE assumption. This implies that the message dx leaks nothing about the
server’s key k.
For client security in the first message, we pick s from a valid RLWE secret distri-
bution and e from the same distribution as that of es. Similarly to the above, this
implies that cx = aF (x) · s + e is indistinguishable from uniform and doesn’t leak
information on s. Finally, we must show that the client does indeed recover Fk(x)
as its output y. For correctness, we would like to say that⌊
p
q






· aF (x) · k + p
q






· aF (x) · k
⌉
.
Thus, we guarantee correctness if all coefficients of pq · aF (x) · k are at least∥∥∥∥pq (e · k + e′) · s−1
∥∥∥∥
∞
away from Z + 12 . It turns out that if all coefficients of s−1 are small, then this
condition is satisfied with extremely high probability due to the 1-dimensional short
integer solution (1D-SIS) assumption (see Definition 23). The form of aF (x) is
crucial to the connection with the 1D-SIS problem. In particular, we rely on the fact
that we can decompose aF (x) as a′1 · a′2 where a′1 ∈ R1×ℓq is uniform random and
a′2 ∈ Rℓ×ℓq has entries that are polynomials with binary coefficients.
Unfortunately, this simplified protocol cannot quite be realised using standard RLWE
secret distributions. The problem is that (to our knowledge) there is no standard
RLWE secret distribution where samples from the distribution are guaranteed to have
small inverses in Rq. To overcome this issue, we apply a technique for sampling “full”
NTRU keys [69, 116]. Firstly, we sample small ring elements s and t from a Gaussian
distribution. Secondly, we use the extended GCD algorithm – in conjunction with
Babai’s rounding algorithm – to recover small u and v, such that u · s + v · t =
1 mod Rq. To adapt the basic protocol to our actual protocol, the client sends
c1x = a
F (x) · s+ e1, c2x = aF (x) · t+ e2 and receives back
d1x = c
1
x · k + e′1, d2x = c2x · k + e′2.





u · d1x + v · d2x
)⌉
. In addition,
the real protocol incorporates zero knowledge proofs of knowledge (that we show are
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instantiable based on adaptations of Stern’s protocol) to prevent malicious parties
deviating from the protocol description. Although we focus on Stern’s protocol for
simplicity, we may also instantiate the proofs using the recent work of Beullens [24]
to improve efficiency.
Ultimately, the security of our VOPRF construction using the Stern-style zero knowl-
edge proofs holds in the QROM and relies on the hardness of RLWE and 1D-SIS which
are both at least as hard as certain lattice problems using appropriate parameters.
We discuss asymptotic parameter settings for which our protocol relies directly on
assumed hard lattice problems in Section 5.4. In summary, we obtain a round-
optimal lattice-based VOPRF in the QROM secure against malicious adversaries
with polynomially sized messages.
Road Map We begin with chapter preliminaries in Section 5.2 that include the
formal definition of a VOPRF that we use. This is followed by the actual VOPRF
construction in Section 5.3 and security proof in Section 5.4. Details on how to
instantiate the zero knowledge components of our construction in the QROM are
given in Section 5.6.
5.2 Chapter Preliminaries
We begin by setting some RLWE/error distribution notation. This is followed by
some results implying that with all but negligible probability, two RLWE samples is
enough to ensure a unique secret. We then introduce the BP14 PRF formally along
with a formal security definition of a VOPRF.
Important Notation: We use power of two cyclotomic rings R = Z[X]/⟨Xn+1⟩
throughout this section. We will be using the practical decisional version of the
RLWE problem given in Definition 20. To ease notation, we use χσ to denote the
Gaussian distribution DZ,σ. Furthermore, R(χσ) will denote the distribution over
elements of R where each coefficient is distributed as χσ. In addition, we denote
RLWERm,q,R(χσ)(R(χσ)) as RLWEm,n,q,σ and omit m when we do not wish to specify
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a particular number of samples. We also use coefficient embeddings in this section
to define the norms of polynomials. For any positive real number B ≥ 0, R≤B is
the set of degree n − 1 polynomials whose coefficients are integers with absolute
value at most B. We denote matrices whose entries are integers using non-bold
capital letters and vectors whose entries are integers using an over-arrow. This is
to differentiate them from matrices/vectors whose entries are ring elements. This
convention is particularly useful in Section 5.6.
5.2.1 RLWE with Two (Invertible) Samples is Well-Defined
Note that we can apply the following claim to the Gaussian error distribution R(χσ)
by setting σ̄ = σ
√
n and applying Corollary 1.
Claim 4. Let |R×q | denote the number of invertible elements in Rq and χ be a
distribution that outputs polynomials with infinity norm ≤ σ̄. The S-RLWE2,q,n,χ
problem restricting to invertible ring elements a1, a2 has a unique solution with




Proof. Suppose we are given a RLWE challenge b1 = a1 ·s+e1, b2 = a2 ·s+e2. Then
we can write any s′ ∈ Rq as s′ = s+u for some u ∈ Rq. Then it should be clear that
bi − ai · s′ = ai · u+ ei.
Since the error distribution χ outputs polynomials with infinity norm at most σ̄, s′
can only possibly be a valid solution when |ai · u mod q|∞ ≤ 2σ̄. This means that
our RLWE instance has a unique solution if there is no non-zero u ∈ Rq such that
|ai · u|∞ ≤ 2σ̄.
We now upper bound the probability over uniformly chosen invertible elements a1, a2
that there exists a non-zero u ∈ Rq resulting in the event that |ai · u mod q|∞ ≤ σ̄
for i = 1 and 2. We refer to this event as E. For any fixed u = ū ̸= 0, we have that
Pr
a1,a2←R×q















which is an upper bound for the corresponding RLWE instance having a non-unique
solution.
In order to qualitatively interpret this lemma, we next analyse how many elements of
Rq are invertible for a particular choice of q that we will be using in our construction.










and |R×q | ≥
∏m
i=1(pi − 1)n.
Proof. We use the chinese remainder theorem (CRT) isomorphism
Rq ∼= Rp1 × · · · ×Rpm .
Now consider Rpi for some fixed i and suppose that xn + 1 =
∏ni
j=1 rj(x) mod pi
where rj(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree dj . Then by applying the CRT











j=1 (pi − 1)
dj ≥ (pi − 1)n.
It follows that there are at least
∏m
i=1(pi − 1)n invertible elements in Rp1 × · · · ×
Rpm which means that the probability of a uniformly sampled element of Rq being







To summarise, we will take σ̄ = σ
√
n for σ = poly(λ) and q =
∏m
i=1 pi where p1
is superpolynomial in λ. Note that Claims 4 and 5 imply that two RLWE samples


















which is negligibly close to 1 when mn is polynomial in λ. In addition, the quantity
|R×q |/|Rq| is also negligibly close to 1 implying that sampling two standard RLWE
samples results in invertible a1 and a2 with all but negligible probability. Therefore,
we can say that standard S-RLWE with two samples has a unique solution with all
but negligible probability for the parameter setting discussed here.
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5.2.2 The BP14 PRF
We will use an instantiation of the lattice PRF from [18]. Below, we present relevant
definitions/results, all of which are particular cases of definitions/results from [18].
We set ℓ = ⌈log2 q⌉ throughout. The construction from [18] makes use of gadget
matrices used in many previous works [108, 18, 33, 59].
Gadgets G, G−1 Define G : Rℓ×ℓq → R1×ℓq to be the linear operation corresponding
to left multiplication by (1, 2, . . . , 2ℓ−1). Further, define G−1 : R1×ℓq → Rℓ×ℓq to be
the (non-linear) bit decomposition operation that essentially inverts G i.e. the ith
column of G−1(a) is the bit decomposition of ai ∈ Rq into binary polynomials.
To emphasise the non-linearity, we do not use bold font for G−1 as it cannot be
expressed by a matrix.





and extend this definition coefficient-wise for
polynomials/vectors of polynomials. The PRF from [18] that we focus on is defined
as Fk(x) = ⌊ax · k⌉p for ax ∈ R1×ℓq as defined below. Throughout, we reserve L to
denote the bit-length of the PRF input.
Definition 32. Fix some a0,a1 ← R1×ℓq . For any x = (x1, . . . , xL) ∈ {0, 1}L. We
define ax ∈ R1×ℓq as












The pseudorandomness of this construction follows from the RLWE assumption.
Theorem 8 ( [18]). Let R = Z[X]/⟨Xn + 1⟩ for power-of-two n and sample k ←
R(χσ). If q ≫ p ·σ ·
√
L · (n · ℓ), then the function Fk(x) = ⌊ax · k⌉p is a PRF under
the RLWEn,q,σ assumption.
When we eventually prove security of our VOPRF, it will be useful to define a special
error distribution such that ax ·k+e remains indistinguishable from uniform (under
a RLWE assumption) when e is sampled from this special error distribution. To this
end, we introduce the distributions Ea0,a1,x,σ followed by a lemma that is implicit in
the pseudorandomness of the PRF from [18].
129
5.2 Chapter Preliminaries
Definition 33. For a0,a1 ∈ R1×ℓq , define
ax\i := G
−1 (axi+1 ·G−1 (axi+2 ·G−1 (. . . (axL−1 ·G−1 (axL)) . . . ))) ∈ Rℓ×ℓq .
Furthermore, let Ea0,a1,x,σ be the distribution that is sampled by choosing ei ←
R(χσ)




ei · ax\i + eL.
Lemma 15 (Implicit in [18]). If a0,a1 ← R1×ℓq , e← Ea0,a1,x,σ and s← R(χσ), then
for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1}L,
(a0, a1, ax · s+ e)
is indistinguishable from uniform random by the RLWEq,n,σ assumption.
In addition to introducing Ea0,a1,x,σ, it will be useful to write down an upper bound
on the infinity norm on errors drawn from this distribution. The following lemma
follows from the fact that for y ← χσ, ∥y∥∞ ≤ σ
√
n with all but negligible probability
by Corollary 1. In fact, we could use the result that ∥y∥∞ ≤ σnc
′ with probability
at least 1 − c · exp(−πn2c′) for any constant c′ > 0 and some universal constant c
(Corollary 1) to reduce the upper bound, but we choose not to for simplicity.
Lemma 16 (Bound on errors). Let x ∈ {0, 1}L, ℓ = ⌈log2 q⌉ and n = poly(λ).
Samples from Ea0,a1,x,σ have infinity norm at most L ·ℓ ·σ ·n3/2 with all but negligible
probability.
5.2.3 Verifiable Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions
Recall that the main goal of our work is to build a verifiable oblivious pseudorandom
function (VOPRF). A VOPRF is a protocol between two parties: a server S and
a client C, that in some sense realises the ideal functionality in Figure 5.1. The
functionality consists of two phases, the initialisation phase and the query phase. In
the event that the functionality FVOPRF receives an input k from party S (i.e. the
server) during the initialisation phase, it stores the key for use during the query
phase. This models a server in a real protocol committing to a PRF key k. Next
comes the query phase, where the client C sends some value x to FVOPRF. Once this
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value x has been received, the server S either sends the functionality an instruction
to abort or to deliver the value y = Fk(x) to C. Finally, the functionality carries out
this instruction. Importantly, (assuming that no abort is triggered) the client has
the guarantee that its output is indeed Fk(x) i.e. the output of the client is verifiably
correct when interacting with FVOPRF. Importantly, when interacting via the ideal
functionality, a client learns only the final evaluation and the server learns nothing
about the client’s input.
The Ideal Functionality FVOPRF
This is a two party functionality between a server S and a client C. We assume there is
a fixed PRF function defined by Fk(x).
Init: On input of init from both parties the functionality waits for an input k from party
S. If S returns abort then the functionality aborts. Otherwise the functionality
stores the value k.
Query: On input of (query, x) from the client C, if x ̸=⊥ then functionality waits for
an input from party S. If S returns deliver then the functionality sends y = Fk(x)
to party C. If S returns abort then the functionality aborts.
Figure 5.1: The Ideal Functionality FVOPRF
We now describe the distributions that arise in the security requirement. We con-
sider malicious adversaries throughout that behave arbitrarily. We begin with the
distributions of interest when a server has been corrupted. First, we consider a
“real” world protocol Π between C(x) and S(k) along with an adversary A. We de-
note realΠ,A,S(x, k, 1λ) to be the joint output distribution of A(k) when corrupting
S(k) and C(x) where C(x) behaves as specified by Π. In this setting, A interacts
directly with C. Now we introduce a simulator denoted Sim that lives in the “ideal”
world. Specifically, still assuming A corrupts a server, Sim interacts with A on one
hand and with C(x) via FVOPRF on the other hand. Considering this setting, for any
client/server input pair (x, k), we define idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,S(x, k, 1λ) to be the joint
output distribution of A(k) and the honest client C(x) when A(k) interacts via Sim.
Informally, one may interpret Sim as an attacker-in-the-middle between A and the
outside world that interacts with FVOPRF external to the view of A. Security will
argue that whatever A can learn/affect in the real protocol can be emulated via Sim
in the ideal world setting.
Next, we describe the distributions of interest when a client has been corrupted by
an adversary A. We let K denote the key distribution under which PRF security
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of F holds. First, consider a “real” world case where A corrupts C(x) and directly
interacts with honest S(k) which follows the specification of protocol Π. In this case,
we use realΠ,A,C(x,K, 1λ) to denote the joint output distribution of A(x) and S(k)
where k ← K. Now consider an alternative “ideal” world case where we introduce
a simulator Sim interacting with A on one hand and with S(x) via FVOPRF on the
other hand. Once again, one may wish to interpret the simulator as an attacker-in-
the-middle interacting with FVOPRF external to the view of A. In this alternative
case, we denote the joint output distribution of A(x) and S(k) where A interacts
via Sim and k ← K as idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,C(x,K, 1λ).
Finally, for protocol Π, let output(Π, x, k) denote the output distribution of a client
with input x running protocol Π with a server whose input key is k. Using the
notation established above, we are ready to present our definition of a VOPRF.
Definition 34. A protocol Π is a verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function for a
PRF F if all of the following hold:
1. Correctness: For every pair of inputs (x, k),
Pr[output(Π, x, k) ̸= Fk(x)] ≤ negl(λ) .
2. Malicious server security: For any PPT adversary A corrupting a server,
there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for every pair of inputs (x, k):
idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,S(x, k, 1
λ) ≈c realΠ,A,S(x, k, 1λ).
3. Average-case malicious client security: For any PPT adversary A cor-
rupting a client, there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for all client inputs
x:
• idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,C(x,K, 1λ) ≈c realΠ,A,C(x,K, 1λ).
• If A correctly outputs Fk(x) with all but negligible probability over the
choice k ← K when interacting directly with S(k) using protocol Π, then
A also outputs Fk(x) with all but negligible probability when interacting
via Sim.
We now discuss this definition. Note that the correctness and malicious server
security requirements are the standard ones used in MPC (for the standard security
132
5.3 A VOPRF Construction From Lattices
notions, see [87]). Therefore, we restrict this discussion to the condition that we
call average case malicious client security. The motivation for this non-standard
property is that an honest server will always sample a key from distribution K as it
wishes to provide pseudorandom function evaluations. In particular, PRF security
holds with respect to this key distribution K. Therefore, it makes sense to ask what
a malicious client may learn/affect only in the case where k ← K which leads to
the first point of our average case malicious client security requirement. The second
point of the requirement captures the fact that adversaries may have access to an
oracle that checks whether the PRF was evaluated correctly or not. Suppose that
we give the adversary A access to an oracle which can check an input/output pair
to the PRF is valid or not. Then A should not be able to distinguish whether it is
interacting with a real server S or a simulation Sim. Note that our proof structure
relies heavily on our alternative malicious client security definition. In particular,
the definition above allows us to argue over the entropy of secret keys when making
indistinguishability claims.
5.3 A VOPRF Construction From Lattices
In this section, we provide a construction emulating a Diffie-Hellman style blinding
construction ga = ((gr)a)1/r. In what follows, we will initially ignore the zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge establishing that all computations are performed
honestly. A detailed description of the protocol is in Figure 5.2 but the main high-
level idea follows.
Recall that we are working with power-of-two cyclotomic rings. We begin by con-
sidering a slightly different scenario. In particular, suppose that a client wants to
obtain a · k + e ∈ Rq (where e is relatively small) from a server holding a short
k without revealing a ∈ Rq. One way to achieve this is for the client to sam-
ple s, t, e0, e1 ← R(χσ). The client could then also sample short u, v such that
u · s+ v · t = 1 ∈ Rq (we discuss how in Section 5.3.1). The client submits a · s+ e0
and a · t+ e1 and obtains (a ·s+ e0)k+ e′0 and (a · t+ e1)k+ e′1 from the server where
133





1 are small. Finally the client can compute:
r = u · ((a · s+ e0) · k + e′0) + v · ((a · t+ e1)k + e′1)
= a · (u · s+ v · t) · k + u · e0 · k + u · e′0 + v · e1 · k + v · e′1
= a · k + u · e0 · k + u · e′0 + v · e1 · k + v · e′1
≈ a · k.
As mentioned above, a more detailed and precise formulation of our construction is
given in Figure 5.2. In addition to the query phase informally outlined above, there
is a set-up phase where system-wide parameters are sampled, and an initialisation
phase where the server commits to its secret key. In the protocol description, Pi and
Vi are prover and verifier algorithms for three different ZKPoK systems indexed by
i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Information on the languages underlying these zero knowledge proof
systems is given in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Sampling s, t, u, v
To compute tuples s, t, u, v such that u · s+ v · t = 1 and all elements are short, we
may use known techniques for sampling “full” NTRU private keys [69, 116] on input
of (s, t) ∈ R2. From now on we use: Res(·, ·) to refer to the computation of the
resultant of two polynomials; xgcd(·, ·) to refer to the computation of the extended
GCD of two integers; and s⋆ to refer to the conjugate of s in R. In particular,
fullNTRU(s, t) runs the following steps.
1. Compute rs = Res(s,Xn + 1) ∈ Z and u′ ∈ R s.t. u′ · s = rs
2. Compute rt = Res(t,Xn + 1) ∈ Z and v′ ∈ R s.t. v′ · t = rt
3. Compute r, u′′, v′′ = xgcd(rs, rt). If r ̸= 1: abort
4. Set u = u′′ · u′ ∈ R and v = v′′ · v′ ∈ R.




v · s⋆ − u · t⋆
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VOPRF construction
SetUp: To set up the various parameters execute the following steps:
• Pick a0,a1 ← R1×ℓq
• crs0 contains (a, b) ∈ R2q
• crs1 and crs2 are for proof systems P1 and P2 respectively
Init: The initialization procedure is executed by the server S and the client C both with
initial input crs0.
1. The server S executes the following steps
• k, e, e′ ← R(χσ).
• c1 ← a · k + e mod q.
• c2 ← b · k + e′ mod q.
• π0 ← P0(k, e, e′ : crs0).
and sends (c1, c2, π0) to the client C.
2. On receipt of (c1, c2, π0), the client C executes
• b← V0(crs0, c1, c2, π0).
• Output abort if b = 0; otherwise store (c1, c2).
Query: This is a two message protocol between the client and the server, with the client
going first.
1. On input of (x ∈ {0, 1}L, crs1, crs2) the client C executes the following steps
• s, t← R(χσ).
• If fullNTRU(s, t) aborts: go back to previous step
else: (u, v)← fullNTRU(s, t).









• e1,e2 ← Ea0,a1,x,σ.
• c1x ← ax · s+ e1 mod q.
• c2x ← ax · t+ e2 mod q.
• π1 ← P1(x, s, t, e1,e2 : crs1, c1x, c2x,a0,a1).
and sends (c1x, c2x, π1) to the server S.
2. On receipt of (c1x, c2x, π1) the server S executes the following steps
• b← V1(crs1, c1x, c2x,a0,a1, π1).
• Output abort if b = 0
• e′1,e′2 ← R(χσ′)1×ℓ.
• d1x = c1x · k + e′1 mod q.
• d2x = c2x · k + e′2 mod q.
• π2 ← P2(k, e′1, e′2, e, e′ : crs0, crs2, c1, c2,d1x,d2x, c1x, c2x).
and sends (d1x,d2x, π2) to the client C.
3. On receipt of (d1x,d2x, π2) the client C executes
• b← V2(crs0, crs2, c1, c2,d1x,d2x, c1x, c2x, π2).
• Output abort if b = 0.
• yx =
⌊





Figure 5.2: VOPRF construction
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(b) Update (u, v) = (u+ r · t, v − r · s) ∈ R2.
6. Return u, v.
Note that it might be significantly more efficient to implement rational arithmetic
using floating point arithmetic as in [116]. Finally, using the same heuristic argu-
ments as in [69, Appendix A], we may expect the norm of u, v to satisfy ∥(u, v)∥ ≈√
n/12 · ∥(s, t)∥. However, for the purposes of our security proofs, we use the upper
bound ∥(u, v)∥∞ ≤ nσ (see below for details).
Suppose we sample (s, t) ← R(χσ)2. Then there is a chance that s and t are not
co-prime, causing the above algorithm to abort. However, it is shown in Lemma
4.4 in the full version1 of [133] that discrete Gaussian s and t will be co-prime with
non-negligible probability as long as σ ≥ 7 · n3/2 · ln3/2(n). Therefore, an algorithm
solving RLWE with two discrete Gaussian coprime secrets (s, t) with non-negligible
advantage would also solve RLWE where the two secrets are sampled independently
from Gaussian distributions, with non-negligible probability. This implies that the
sampling algorithm above results in a secret distribution for which RLWE is believed
to be hard if (s, t)← R(χσ)2.
5.3.1.1 Upper Bound on ∥u, v∥∞
Babai’s rounding technique is a very efficient way of obtaining a candidate solution
to CVP. Given a target point t ∈ Rn and a lattice Λ with basis B (which need
not be a square matrix), Babai’s rounding technique outputs the lattice vector w =
B⌊(BTB)−1BT t⌉. The offset vector obtained can therefore be written as
t−w = B ·
(
























We now use this analysis to give an upper bound on ∥(u, v)∥∞ that is computed in
the algorithm from Section 5.3. At a high level, the first four steps find a (poten-
1available at http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/damien.stehle/NTRU.html
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tially very long) pair (u, v) ∈ R such that us + vt = 1 mod Rq and the final two
steps update this (u, v) using Babai’s rounding technique. In particular, suppose we
define S,T ∈ Zn×nq to be the negacyclic matrices denoting multiplication by s and t
respectively. Then the final two steps run Babai’s rounding technique on the lattice
Λ = {z ∈ Z2n : [S|T] · z = 0} and target point t = (u, v) (using the coefficient
embedding), and update (u, v) to be the resulting offset. The basis for Λ used is
B = [T| − S]T ∈ Z2n×n (which has linearly independent columns by invertibility of
s, t in the field Q(X)/⟨Xn+1⟩). Therefore, bounding the infinity norm of the offset
(via Equation (5.3)) gives us a bound for the final value of ∥(u, v)∥∞. Noting that











n = nσ (5.4)
that holds with all but negligible probability over the choice of s and t.
5.3.2 Zero Knowledge Argument of Knowledge Statements
We now discuss the statements associated with the ZKAoKs in our construction
given in Figure 5.2. The arguments of prover Pi fall into two groups separated by a
colon. Arguments before a colon are intended as “secret” information pertaining to
a witness for a statement. Arguments after a colon should be interpreted as “public”
information describing the statement that is being proved.
A note on common reference strings (CRS) Our construction contains com-
mon reference strings (CRSs). A CRS shared by prover and verifier is commonly
used in non-interactive ZKAoK/ZKPoKs as follows. An honestly sampled CRS en-
sures the soundness and completeness of the proof system. Additionally, there is
an algorithm producing simulated CRSs from a distribution that is computationally
indistinguishable from that of an honestly sampled CRS. It is a simulated CRS that
is used to prove the zero-knowledge property. More specifically, there is an efficient
algorithm producing simulated proofs with the property that the following two dis-
tributions are computationally indistinguishable for any instance in the underlying
language:
1. The joint distribution of a simulated CRS and simulated proof,
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2. The joint distribution of an honest CRS and honestly produced proof.
In order to accommodate a wider class of non-interactive ZKPoKs, we include CRSs
explicitly in our construction.
5.3.2.1 Client Proof.
The client proof denoted P1(x, s, t, e1, e2 : crs1, c1x, c2x,a0,a1) should prove knowl-
edge of
• x ∈ {0, 1}L
• s, t ∈ R where |s|∞, |t|∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n
• e1, e2 ∈ R1×ℓ where |e1|∞, |e2|∞ ≤ L · ℓ · σ · n3/2
such that
c1x = ax · s+ e1 mod q,
c2x = ax · t+ e2 mod q.
5.3.2.2 Server Proofs.
The server proof in the initialisation phase denoted P0(k, e, e′ : crs0) has the purpose
of proving knowledge of k, e, e′ ∈ R where |k|∞, |e|∞, |e′|∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n such that
c1 = a · k + e mod q,
c2 = b · k + e′ mod q,
where crs0 contains (a, b).
The server proof in the query phase denoted by
P2(k, e′1, e′2, e, e′ : crs0, crs2, c1, c2,d1x,d2x, c1x, c2x)
has the purpose of proving that there is some
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• k, e, e′ ∈ R where |e|∞, |e′|∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n




c1 = a · k + e mod q,
c2 = b · k + e′ mod q,
d1x = c
1
x · k + e′1 mod q, (5.5)
d2x = c
2
x · k + e′2 mod q.
It is important to note that both d1x and d2x each consist of ℓ ring elements. Therefore,
the above system consists of a total of 2+ 2ℓ noisy products of public ring elements
and k. We draw attention to the fact that the server need not prove a bound on k in
the query phase, as this was dealt with in the initialisation phase. The fact that two
RLWE samples are used during the initialisation phase forces the server to commit
to a single k since RLWE with two samples has a unique secret with extremely high
probability in the parameter setting that we will use (see Section 5.2.1). If only one
RLWE sample was used, then a malicious server could use a different key k′ in the
query phase consistent with the single RLWE sample and produce a passing proof
in the query phase using k′ instead of k (since P2 is not asked to give bound on the
key). Adding a length bound requirement to k would allow for the use of a single
RLWE sample. Nonetheless, we use the given formulation to reduce the burden of
designing the proof system π2. We do this in the hope of future work that designs
more efficient alternatives to the realisation of π2 given in this thesis. Moreover, π2
in the query phase need not prove knowledge of k as this was also dealt with in the
initialisation phase.
5.3.3 Correctness
Before proving correctness, we present a lemma that will prove useful.
Lemma 17. Fix any x ∈ {0, 1}L. Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm D(x,a0,a1)
that outputs r ∈ R such that ∥r∥ ≤ B and at least one coefficient of ax · r is in
the set (q/p) · Z + [−T, T ] with non-negligible probability (over a uniform choice of
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a0,a1 ← Rℓq and its random coins). Then there exists an efficient algorithm solving
1D-SISq/p,nℓ,max{nℓB,T} as defined in Definition 23.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm A using D as a sub-routine that attempts
to solve 1D-SIS-Rq,p,nℓ,T on uniform input v ∈ Znℓq :
1. Let j ∈ {0, 1} denote the first bit of x and set wj := v ∈ Znℓq .
2. Sample wj̄ ← Znℓq













4. Run r ← D(x,a0,a1).
5. If there is no coefficient of ax · r in the set (q/p) · Z+ [−T, T ], then abort.
6. Otherwise let x′ be the input x with the first bit removed. There is a coefficient
of ax · r = aj · G−1(ax′) · r in (q/p) · Z + [−T, T ] meaning that for some k∗,
there is a column of G−1(ax′) · r, say y ∈ Rℓq such that the Xk
∗ coefficient of
⟨aj ,y⟩ is in (q/p) · Z+ [−T, T ].
7. Let 1(·) be an indicator function. Noting that the coefficient of Xk






vin+k · (−1)1k>k∗ (yi)k∗−k mod n,
output z ∈ Znℓq where zin+k = (−1)1k>k∗ (yi)k∗−k mod n for i = 0, . . . , ℓ − 1,
k = 0, . . . , n− 1.
It is clear that if A does not abort, it outputs a vector z ∈ Znℓq such that ⟨v, z⟩ ∈
(q/p) · Z + [−T, T ]. Furthermore, if no abort occurs, then the entries of z (up to a
sign) correspond to the coefficients of a column of r ·G−1(ax′) where ∥r∥∞ ≤ B with
non-negligible probability. Recalling thatG−1(ax′) ∈ Rℓ×ℓq is a binary decomposition
of polynomials, we can see that,
∥z∥∞ ≤ ℓ · n ·B
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with non-negligible probability. In other words, A solves the 1D-SIS-Rq,p,nℓ,nℓB prob-
lem in polynomial time with non-negligible probability. To complete the proof, we
use Lemma 9.
Lemma 18 (Correctness). Adopt the notation of Figure 5.2, assuming an honest
client and server. Define T := σn2 · (Lℓσ2n5/2 + σ′). For any x ∈ {0, 1}L, k ∈ Rq
such that ∥k∥∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n, we have that
Pr[yx ̸= Fk(x)] ≤ negl(λ)
over the choice of PRF parameters a0,a1 ← R1×ℓq assuming the hardness of 1D-SISq/p,nℓ,T .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary x. Assume that there exists a k such that ∥k∥ ≤ σ ·
√
n and
Pr[yx ̸= Fk(x)] is non-negligible over the choice of a0,a1 ← R1×ℓq . Expanding d1x
and d2x, we have that
yx =
⌊




Note that e := u · (e1 · k + e′1) + v · (e2 · k + e′2) has infinity norm less than T (as
defined in the lemma statement) with all but negligible probability. Therefore, if
yx ̸= Fk(x) with non-negligible probability, it must be that at least one coefficient of
ax ·k in the set (q/p) ·Z+[T, T ] with non-negligible probability. Applying Lemma 17
to the algorithm D(x) that ignores a0,a1 and simply outputs k implies an efficient
algorithm solving 1D-SISq/p,nℓ,max{n3/2ℓσ,T}.
5.4 VOPRF Security Proof
In this section, we show that the protocol in Figure 5.2 is a VOPRF achieving
security against malicious adversaries. In particular, corrupted clients and servers
that attempt to subvert the protocol learn/affect only as much as in an ideal world,
where they interact via the functionality FVOPRF.
Theorem 9. (Security) Assume p|q. The protocol in Figure 5.2 is a secure VOPRF
in the sense of Definition 34 provided that the following conditions hold:
• RLWEq,n,σ is hard,
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• q2p ≫ σ
′ ≫ L · ℓ · σ2 · n3,
• 1D-SISq/(2p),n·ℓ,4·σ′·σ·n5/2 is hard.
5.4.0.1 Correctness against non-aborting malicious client transcripts
During the malicious client proof, it will be useful to call upon the fact that any
non-aborting protocol transcript allows for the computation of Fk(x).
Lemma 19. Assume that RLWEq,n,σ is hard, σ and n are poly(λ), and q2p ≫ σ′ ≫
L · ℓ · σ2 · n3. For any x ∈ {0, 1}L, consider a non-aborting run of the protocol in
Figure 5.2 between a (potentially malicious) efficient client C∗ and honest server S.
Consider any u, v ∈ Rq, such that ∥u∥∞, ∥v∥∞ ≤ σn and u·s+v ·t = 1, where s, t are
extracted from C∗’s proof in its message to S. Then, the value of
⌊
u · d1x + v · d2x
⌉
p
is equal to ⌊ax · k⌉p with all but negligible probability over the choice of a0,a1 and
k.
Proof. We use the notation from Figure 5.2. First note that for a non-aborting
protocol run, any efficient client C∗ must have produced c1x and c2x correctly using
some x ∈ {0, 1}L, s, t, e1, e2 where ∥s∥∞, ∥t∥∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n and ∥e1∥∞, ∥e2∥∞ ≤ L ·ℓ ·σ ·
n3/2. To complete the proof, we will use the fact that pq (ax ·k+e) is computationally
indistinguishable from uniform random over pq · R1×ℓq when e ← Ea0,a1,x,σ assuming
the hardness of RLWEq,n,σ (Lemma 15). This implies that every coefficient in pq (ax ·
k + e) is at least T ′ away from Z + 1/2 with all but negligible probability for any
T ′ ≪ 1. We will use this fact twice to complete the proof. With this in mind, a
client computing the output as prescribed in Figure 5.2 obtains⌊
p
q






ax · k +
p
q










q (ax · k + e)
⌉
can be shown to be equal to Equation (5.6) (with all




σn2(L · ℓ · σ2 · n5/2 + σ′) ≥
















with all but negligible probability,










5.4.1 Malicious Client Proof
Lemma 20 (Average case malicious client security). Assume that σ and n are
poly(λ), let p|q, and let conditions (i) and (ii) be as follows:
(i) RLWEq,n,σ is hard,
(ii) q2p ≫ σ
′ ≫ L · ℓ · σ2 · n3.
If the above conditions hold, then the protocol in Figure 5.2 has average case security
against malicious clients.
Proof. We describe a simulation S that communicates with the functionality FVOPRF
(environment) on one hand, and the malicious client C∗ on the other. S carries out
the following steps:
1. During CRS.SetUp, publish honest a0,a1, crs1 and (dishonest) simulated ver-
sions of crs0 and crs2. Denote the simulated CRS elements by crs′0 and crs′2.
2. During the Init phase, send C∗ a uniform c1, c2 ← Rq with a simulated proof
π0,Sim and pass the init message onto FVOPRF. Initialise an empty list received.
3. During the Query stage, for each message (c1x, c2x, π1) from C∗, do the follow-
ing:
(a) b ← V1(crs1, c1x, c2x,a0,a1, π1). If b = 0 send abort to the functionality
and abort the protocol with the malicious client. If b = 1 continue to the
next step.
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(b) Extract the values x, s, t from π1 using the ZKAoK extractor and send
(query, x) to the functionality.
(c) • If FVOPRF aborts:
S aborts.
• If FVOPRF returns y ∈ R1×ℓp and ∀y∗, (x,y∗) /∈ received:
(i.e. if this is the first time x is queried) uniformly sample








• If FVOPRF returns y ∈ Rℓp and ∃y∗s.t.(x,y∗) ∈ received:
(i.e. x was previously queried) Then set yq = y∗.
(d) Next pick ē′1, ē′2 ← χσ′ and set
d̄
1
x = yq · s+ ē′1 mod q,
d̄
2
x = yq · t+ ē′2 mod q.






We now argue that C∗ cannot decide whether it is interacting with S or with a
genuine server. Firstly, recognise that crs′0, crs′2 is indistinguishable from honestly
created crs0, crs2. Secondly, the malicious client cannot distinguish the simulator’s
uniform c1, c2 that it sends during the Init phase from the real protocol by the
RLWEq,n,σ assumption (condition (i)). This implies that both the SetUp and Init
phases that S performs are indistinguishable from the real protocol.
The most challenging step is arguing that the simulator’s behaviour in the Query
phase is indistinguishable from the real protocol from the malicious client’s point
of view. We will analyse the behaviour of the simulator assuming that no abort is
triggered. We begin by arguing that the server message in the real protocol with
respect to any triple (x, s, t) can be replaced by a related message (ax ·k+ex) ·s+ ê′1
where ex ← Ea0,a1,x,σ and ê′1 ← R(χσ′)1×ℓ (and similarly for the message depending
on t) without detection by the following statistical argument. For brevity, consider
the quantities that depend on s, i.e. c1x and d1x (a similar argument holds for the
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quantities depending on t). We have that the server response in the real protocol
has d1x of the form
(ax · s+ e1) · k + e′1 (5.7)
where e1 ← Ea0,a1,x,σ and e′1 ← R(χσ′)1×ℓ. By Lemma 3, the message distribution
in Equation (5.7) is statistically indistinguishable (condition (ii)) from
ax · k · s+ e′′1 (5.8)
where e′′1 ← R(χσ′)1×ℓ due to the fact that σ′ ≫ L ·ℓ ·σ2 ·n3. By a similar argument,
the quantity given in Equation (5.8) is statistically close in distribution to
(ax · k + ex) · s+ e′′′1 . (5.9)
where ex ← Ea0,a1,x,σ and e′′′1 ← R(χσ′)1×ℓ.
Using Lemma 15 and condition (i), we have that the term in front of s in Equa-
tion (5.9) is indistinguishable from uniform by the hardness of RLWEq,n,σ (Lemma 15).
In particular, from an efficient C∗’s point of view, d1x cannot be distinguished from
ux · s+ e1
where ux ← R1×ℓq and e1 ← R(χσ′)1×ℓ. Similarly, d2x cannot be distinguished from
ux · t + e2 for the same ux as above and e2 ← R(χσ′)1×ℓ. Note that on repeated
queries, the errors sampled from R(χσ′)1×ℓ are fresh. The fact that S samples yq
from a uniform element of a uniform interval implies the indistinguishability part of
the average-case malicious client security definition.
Next, we show that if the malicious client can indeed compute the correct value from
the messages it receives from the honest server (in the real protocol), then it can do
the same with the messages that it receives from the simulator. In Lemma 19, we
show that a malicious client which does not cause an abort can compute ⌊ax · k⌉p
from the messages it receives from the honest server with all but negligible proba-
bility. We now show that this is also the case with the messages it receives from
S. Consider yq sampled by S and the corresponding values d̄1x and d̄
2
x. In addition,
define e := yq − (q/p) · y ∈ R1×ℓ≤ q
2p
so that e follows the uniform distribution over
R1×ℓ≤ q
2p
. We have that⌊
p
q
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We also know that with all but negligible probability, ∥u · ē′1+ v · ē′2∥∞ ≤ σ ·σ′ ·n5/2
(since no abort occurred) and that ∥e∥∞ is less than q/(2p)−T with all but negligible
probability as long as T ≪ (q/2p). Taking T = σ · σ′ · n5/2, we get that with all but












implying that the quantity in Equation (5.10) rounds correctly to y with all but
negligible probability. Therefore, both the real protocol and simulator enable correct
evaluation of the PRF.
5.4.2 Malicious Server Proof
Lemma 21. Let conditions (i),(ii) and (iii) be as follows:
(i) RLWEq,n,σ is hard,
(ii) σ′ ≫ L · ℓ · σ2 · n5/2,
(iii) 1D-SISq/(2p),n·ℓ,4σ′σn5/2 is hard.
If the above conditions hold, then the protocol in Figure 5.2 is secure in the presence
of malicious servers.
Proof. We construct a simulator Sim interacting with the malicious server S∗ on one
hand and with the functionality FVOPRF on the other. The simulator Sim behaves
as follows:
1. During the SetUp phase, publish honest a0, a1, crs0, crs2 and (dishonest) sim-
ulated crs′1 to use with the proof systems.
2. During the Init phase, if S∗ sends c1, c2 ∈ Rq and an accepting proof π0, then
use the zero knowledge extractor to obtain a key k′ from π0 and forward this
on to the functionality. If the message is not of the correct format, or the proof
does not verify, then abort.
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3. During the Query phase, select two uniform random values u1,u2 ← R1×ℓq ,
and using the ZK simulator, produce a simulated proof π1,Sim using crs′1. Send





S∗. If the proof π̃2 verifies2, forward on deliver to FVOPRF. Otherwise, forward
abort to FVOPRF.
We will show that the joint output of an honest client C and S∗ in the real world
(where they interact directly) and the ideal world (where they interact via FVOPRF
and S) are computationally indistinguishable. We begin by arguing that the mali-
cious server S∗ cannot distinguish whether it is interacting with a real client or S, as
described above. Firstly, replacing crs1 by crs′1 is indistinguishable from the point
of view of S∗ by definition of a simulated CRS. Importantly, if S∗ can produce valid
proofs in the Init phase, the key k′ with ∥k∥∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n obtained by the simulator
is the unique ring element consistent with c1, c2. This is due to the fact that RLWE
is well-defined given two samples (see chapter preliminaries).
All that is left to consider is the Query phase. Note that in the real protocol,
the client produces two values c1x, c2x that are pseudorandom under the hardness of
RLWEq,n,σ by Lemma 15. Therefore, the malicious server S∗ cannot distinguish a real
(c1x, c
2
x) from the pair (u1,u2) that Sim uses. By the properties of a ZK simulator,
it follows that a real client message (c1x, c2x, π1) and crs1 is indistinguishable from
(u1,u2, π1,Sim) and crs′1. Next, if the response from S∗ has a valid proof, then Sim
forwards on deliver. This means that the ideal functionality passes a PRF evaluation
to the client using the server key k′. We now argue that this emulates the output
on the client side when running the real protocol with malicious server S∗.
The case where the proof verification fails is trivial since the client aborts in the
real and ideal worlds. As a result, we focus on the case where the zero knowledge
proof produced by S∗ in the query phase verifies correctly. Let e1, e2 ← Ea0,a1,x,σ
be sampled by the honest client. For this honest client interacting with malicious


















′ + e′2)v (5.11)
for k′,e′1,e′2 chosen by S∗ where ∥k′∥∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n and ∥e′1∥∞, ∥e′2∥∞ ≤ σ′ ·
√
n.
2Alternatively, if d̃1x, d̃
2
x is consistent with k′
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Therefore, rounding the quantity in Equation (5.11) is guaranteed to result in the
correct value if every coefficient of pq · axk′ is further than∥∥∥∥pq (e1k′ + e′1)u+ pq (e2k′ + e′2)v
∥∥∥∥
∞
away from Z+1/2. In other words, if S∗ can force incorrect evaluation, it must have
found k′ ≤ σ ·
√
n such that a coefficient of axk′ is within a distance∥∥∥(e1 · k′ + e′1) · u+ (e2 · k′ + e′2) · v∥∥∥∞
≤ 2
(






· σ · n2
condition(ii)





2pZ. At this point we apply Lemma 17 using 2 ·p and T = 4 ·σ′ ·σ ·n5/2
to show that S∗ forcing incorrect evaluation with non-negligible probability violates
the assumption that
1D-SISq/2p,n·ℓ,max{n3/2·ℓ·σ,4·σ′·σ·n5/2}
is hard. Therefore, condition (iii) enforces correct evaluation with all but negligible
probability when the parameters satisfy condition (ii).
5.4.3 Setting the parameters
Let λ be the security parameter. Theorem 9 requires the following conditions:
• q2p ≫ σ′ ≫ L · ℓ · σ2 · n3
• RLWEq,n,σ is hard
• 1D-SISq/(2p),nℓ,4·σ′·σ·n5/2 is hard.
We will be using the presumed hardness of SIVPγ for approximation factors γ =
2o(
√
n). The SIVPγ lattice dimension associated to RLWE will be n = λc (for some
constant c); the dimension associated to 1D-SIS hardness will be n′ := λ. We first
choose σ = poly(n) and σ′ = σ ·λω(1), and then set q = p ·
∏n′
i=1 pi by picking coprime
p, p1, . . . , pn′ = 4σ
′σn5/2 · ω(
√
nn′ log q logn′). Having made these choices, it should
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Parameter Description Requirement Asymptotic
n ring dimension n = poly(λ) poly(λ)
q original modulus q = p · σ′ · λω(1) λω(1)
p rounding modulus — poly(λ)
ℓ log2(q) — log2(λω(1))
σ secret/error distribution q/σ = 2o(
√
n) poly(λ)
σ′ drowning distribution σ′ = Lℓσ2n · λω(1) λω(1)
L bit-length of PRF input — —
Table 5.1: Parameters of our VOPRF
be clear that the first of the three conditions is satisfied. We can apply Theorem 2 to
argue RLWE hardness via SIVP for sub-exponential approximation factors 2Õ(n1/c)
(for c > 2), noting that σ = poly(n) and
q = (4 · σ′ · σ · n5/2)n′ω((n · n′ · log q · logn′)n′/2)
= 2(2+2 logσ+ω(1) logλ+(5/2) logn)·n




c · log q · logn)n1/c/2)
= 2Õ(n
1/c).
Finally for the 1D-SIS condition, we note that q/p =
∏n′
i=1 pi and
p1 = 4 · σ′ · σ · n · ω(
√
n · n′ log q · logn′)
= 4 · σ2 · λω(1)n · ω(
√
n · n′ · log q · logn′)
= (n′)ω(1) · ω(
√
n′1+c · log q · logn′).
So applying Lemma 8, we get hardness of our 1D-SIS instance via the presumed hard-
ness of SIVP on n′-dimensional lattices for (n′)ω(1) · poly(n′) approximation factors.
We summarise the parameters of our construction in Table 5.1.
5.5 Post-Quantum Zero Knowledge Instantiations (High level)
We now describe high-level instantiations of our zero knowledge proofs of knowledge.
At a high level, we may use (parallel repetitions of) Stern-based proofs along with
the Fiat-Shamir transform for all proof systems as in [86] (although there may be
other alternatives e.g. using the optimised protocol of Beullens [24]). Recall that
the Fiat-Shamir transform has recently been proven secure in the QROM [50, 91].
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We place most of our attention on discussing how to instantiate Proof System 1,
as the other proof systems may be derived straight-forwardly using a subset of the
techniques arising in Proof System 1. For more precise details on how to instantiate
Proof System 1 using Stern’s protocol, see Section 5.6. From now on, we use non-
bold capital letters to denote matrices with entries in Zq, and over-arrows to denote
vectors with entries in Zq. Bold fonts are still used to represent matrices/vectors
with entries in Rq.
Proof System 0: Two RLWE samples with a common small secret
Let A,B ∈ Zn×nq be the negacyclic matrices associated to multiplication by a, b ∈ Rq
respectively. Further, let #»c 1, #»c 2 ∈ Znq be the coefficient vectors of c1, c2 ∈ Rq
respectively. The first proof aims to prove in zero knowledge, knowledge of a short
solution #»x := ( #»x 1, #»x 2, #»x 3), where ∥ #»x∥∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n to the system
#»c 1 = A · #»x 1 + #»x 2,
#»c 2 = B · #»x 1 + #»x 3.
The security of our VOPRF uses a very special form of q for security due to the
use of the 1D-SIS assumption. In particular, q is neither an integer permitting
an NTT, nor a prime power. This is unfortunate because the state-of-the-art for
proving zero knowledge of short solutions to linear equations use the fact that x(x−
1) = 0 mod q if and only if x ∈ {0, 1} to prove that witness vectors have binary
entries [141] (or utilise NTTs and similar algebraic relations for ternary entries [30]).
As a result, we can either use Stern’s protocol as described in [89], or rejection
sampling techniques [94, 95] to perform this zero knowledge proof. However, due
to the soundness gap suffered when using rejection sampling (i.e. the fact that the
infinity norm of the extractable witness may be a small constant factor times larger
than intended), one can imagine the use of the less efficient Stern’s protocol for the
sake of keeping our VOPRF security proofs conceptually simpler. In actual fact, as
with all of the proof systems, the analysis and linear systems derived when applying
Stern’s protocol can be reused to show compatibility with the more efficient protocol
of Beullens [24]. However, for simplicity, we focus on the abstract version of Stern’s
protocol since our main aim is to show feasibility rather than efficiency.
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Proof System 1: Non-interactive proofs of PRF evaluations
At a high level, we can run Stern’s protocol [136] O(λ) times in parallel and apply the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the QROM. We present the abstract Stern’s protocol itself
in Figure 5.3 and highlight the sufficient requirements for the use of the abstract
protocol here. This abstraction is both presented and proven to be a ZKAoK in [84]
with respect to computationally binding commitments. It is also easy to see that if
the commitment scheme is perfectly binding, then the protocol becomes a ZKPoK.
We will assume the availability of a perfectly binding post-quantum commitment
scheme throughout. Note that perfectly binding lattice-based commitment schemes
do exist e.g. [23, 22]. For some set VALID and a matrix M representing a set of
linear equations over the integers modulo a natural number (e.g. q), the abstraction
of Stern’s protocol allows a prover to argue knowledge of a solution #»w ∈ VALID to
a system M · #»w = #»y mod q in zero knowledge. In order to apply Stern’s protocol,
there must be a set of permutations Γ = {Γϕ : ϕ ∈ S} acting on the entries of #»w
such that both of the following key properties hold.
Key properties:
1. For every ϕ ∈ S, #»w ∈ VALID ⇐⇒ Γϕ( #»w) ∈ VALID.
2. For every #»w ∈ VALID, the distribution of Γϕ( #»w) (for ϕ ← S) is uniform over
the set VALID.
Therefore, in order to apply the abstract Stern’s protocol, we must rewrite our
problem as a linear system of equations and describe a set VALID alongside a set
of permutations Γ possessing the key properties above. The details of how this is
done are presented in Section 5.6, but we now give a short high-level summary of
the technique.
First note that we can compute ax recursively by setting variables Bi ∈ Rℓ×ℓq for i =
L− 1, . . . , 0 via BL−1 = G−1(axL−1), and Bi = G−1(axi ·Bi+1) for i = L− 2, . . . , 0.
Using this, we have ax = G · B0. We can therefore use the system G · Bi =
axi ·Bi−1 to facilitate computation of ax along with the equation yx = G ·B0 ·k+e
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Abstract Stern Protocol [86]
Objective: P wishes to prove knowledge of #»w ∈ Znq ∩VALID such thatM · #»w = #»y mod q
to V.
Commitment: IfM ∈ Zm×nq , P with witness #»w samples ϕ← S, #»r ← Znq and sets #»z =
#»w+ #»r mod q. Then P samples randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 and sends Cmt = (C1, C2, C3)
where
• C1 = Com (ϕ,M · #»r ; ρ1)
• C2 = Com (Γϕ( #»r ); ρ2)
• C3 = Com (Γϕ( #»z ); ρ3)
Challenge: V sends a challenge Ch← {1, 2, 3}
Response: P sends RSP according to Ch as follows:
• If Ch = 1: RSP = ( #»t , #»s , ρ2, ρ3) where
#»
t = Γϕ(
#»w) and #»s = Γϕ( #»r ).
• If Ch = 2: RSP = (π, #»u , ρ1, ρ3) where π = ϕ and #»u = #»z .
• If Ch = 3:RSP = (ψ, #»v , ρ1, ρ2) where ψ = ϕ and #»v = #»r .
Verify: V outputs the bit b according to the following:
• If Ch = 1:
b = 1 ⇐⇒
( #»
t ∈ VALID ∧ C2 = Com ( #»s ; ρ2) ∧ C3 = Com
( #»
t + #»s ; ρ3
))
• If Ch = 2:
b = 1 ⇐⇒ (C1 = Com (π,M · #»u − #»y ; ρ1) ∧ C3 = Com (Γπ( #»u ); ρ3))
• If Ch = 3:
b = 1 ⇐⇒ (Com (ψ,M · #»v ; ρ1) ∧ C2 = Com (Γπ( #»v ); ρ2))
Figure 5.3: Abstract Stern Protocol [86]
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(where e represents rounding) to fully describe a PRF evaluation. However, the
resulting system is over ring elements and is not linear in unknowns. To solve these
issues, we simply replace ring multiplication by integer matrix-vector products and
then linearise the resulting system using known techniques [85, 86]. At this point,
we carefully describe the set VALID, noting the structure that linearisation/ring
structure introduces. We also make use of special bit-decompositions to bound
the infinity norms of valid solutions. From this, we use known techniques [85, 86]
(extended to the ring setting) to describe Γ satisfying the key properties above. We
once again remind the reader that the resulting linear system obtained can be used
along with the relatively efficient protocol of Beullens [24].
Proof System 2: Non-interactive proofs of secret equivalence
Recall that we wish to prove existence of a solution to Equations (5.5). Note that
d1x,d
2
x from the protocol in Section 5.3 are vectors holding ℓ ring elements. Therefore,
Equations (5.5) can be expressed as a system
ci = aik + ei, i = 1, . . . , 2 + 2ℓ
where ∥e1∥∞, ∥e2∥∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n, ∥e3∥∞, . . . , ∥e2+2ℓ∥∞ ≤ σ′ ·
√
n. In order to instantiate
this proof system, we may use the abstract Stern protocol again. Note that in
Section 5.5, we implicitly show how to prove knowledge of RLWE secrets. Therefore,
using the same techniques, we can straight-forwardly obtain abstract Stern proofs
for Proof System 2.
5.6 Abstract Stern Protocol for Proof System 1
In this section we outline how we rewrite the statement of Proof System 1 as a
linear system of equations and describe a set VALID alongside a set of permutations
Γ possessing the key properties for the abstract Stern protocol stated in the previous
section.
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5.6.1 (Randomised) PRF Evaluation and the ZK Relation.
Recall that G−1 is the non-linear binary decomposition operation, and G is the
powers of two matrix that undoes G−1. Also recall that in the query phase, the
client computes the function F ′k;e : {0, 1}L → R1×ℓq where





−1 (. . . )
))
· k + e mod q. (5.12)
Note that this function is similar to, but not exactly the same as the PRF F from
Section 5.2.2. In particular, the function F ′ is a randomised version of F where the
error e is not obtained in a deterministic fashion. Note, however, that the techniques
of this section can be straight-forwardly adapted to prove the analogous relation that
uses F instead of F ′ (see [86]). In terms of the function F ′, the language we are
interested in providing a ZKAoK/ZKPoK for is






∥s∥∞, ∥t∥∞ ≤ β1,
∥e1∥∞, ∥e2∥∞ ≤ β2}.





BL−2 = G−1(axL−2 ·BL−1)
BL−3 = G−1(axL−3 ·BL−2)
...
B0 = G−1(ax0 ·B1)
Fs;e1(x) = G ·B0 · s+ e1
Ft,e2(x) = G ·B0 · t+ e2
where each equation is considered over the ringRq. Importantly, Bi ∈ Rℓ×ℓ2 represent
binary decompositions and a ∈ R1×ℓq .
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5.6.2 Evaluation of F ′ as a System of Linear Equations.
However, the system of equations above is not linear since G−1 is not a linear
operator. In the hope of deriving a linear system of equations that we can use
Stern’s protocol on, we first multiply by the linear operator G ∈ R1×ℓq or equivalently
gT = (1, 2, . . . , 2ℓ−1) ∈ R1×ℓq . In doing so, we can set b0 = (gT ·B0) ∈ Rℓq to obtain
gT ·BL−1 = axL−1 (5.13)
gT ·BL−2 = axL−2 ·BL−1
gT ·BL−3 = axL−3 ·BL−2
...
bT0 = ax0 ·B1 (5.14)
F ′s;e1(x) = b0 · s+ e1
F ′t;e2(x) = b0 · t+ e2.
We now wish to come up with a ZKPoK allowing to prove knowledge of {(Bi)L−1i=1 ,
b0, s, t, e1, e2} (where s, t, e1, e2 are short, and Bi ∈ Rℓ×ℓ2 ) satisfying the above
system of linear equations.
5.6.3 Three Problems with the Linear System.
In order to use Stern’s protocol, the witness must be a vector with entries Zq that
solves some publicly known linear system. Considering the current formulation, we
have three initial problems to solve:
1. The Bi’s are matrices, rather than vectors,
2. The “witness” {(Bi)L−1i=1 , b0, s, t, e1, e2} consists of vectors/matrices with en-
tries in Rq rather than Zq.
3. The system is quadratic in unknowns, rather than linear.
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Solving the First Problem.
To get the unknowns Bi ∈ Rℓ×ℓ2 in vector-form rather than matrix-form, we can
introduce some tensor products. For i = 1, . . . , L − 1, define bi ∈ Rℓ
2
2 to be the
vector consisting of the columns of Bi stacked on top of each other. Inserting the
appropriate tensor products, Equations (5.13)-(5.14) end up being of the form
(Iℓ ⊗ gT ) · bi = (Iℓ ⊗ axi) · bi+1,
b0 = (Iℓ ⊗ ax0) · b1.
Solving the Second Problem.
We would like to replace all multiplications in Rq by a matrix-vector multiplication
over Zq. To do so we simply use the well known negacyclic matrices over Zq that
represent multiplication in Rq. We define A0 ∈ Zn×nℓq (and A1) to be the horizontal
concatenation of the negacyclic matrices corresponding to the entries of a0 ∈ R1×ℓq
(resp. a1). Furthermore, we define S ∈ Zn×nq (and T ) to be the negacyclic matrices
representing s ∈ Rq (resp. t). Note that this turns part of our witness back into a
matrices, but we will show how to deal with this using the techniques of [85] later.
Also, for i = 0, . . . , L−1, let #»b i be the vertical concatenation of the coefficients in the
ring entries of bi and let #»e 1 (resp. #»e 2) be the vertical concatenation of coefficients
in the entries of e1 (resp. e2). Further, let #»y 1 and #»y 2 be the vertical concatenation
of the coefficients in F ′s,e1(x) and F
′
t,e2(x) respectively. Let
#»g T = (1, 2, . . . , 2ℓ−1) ∈




b L to be the
binary vector with a 1 in each block of nℓ entries (at the (i− 1)n+ 1th position in
the ith block), we end up with the following system of equations mod q:
G⊗ · #»b L−1 = A⊗xL−1
#»
b L (5.15)
G⊗ · #»b L−2 = A⊗xL−2 ·
#»
b L−1
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where #»b 0 ∈ Znℓq ,
#»
b i ∈ {0, 1}nℓ
2 for i ̸= 0 and S, T have small entries.
Solving the Third Problem.
We very briefly overview the techniques of [86] to indicate how one can linearise
Equations (5.15) to (5.17). The idea is to represent A⊗xi ·
#»
b i+1 by writing
A⊗xi ·
#»













In order to make use of this, we treat unknowns xi and
#»













In doing so, Equations (5.15) - (5.16) end up being of the form
[G⊗|G⊗] ·
#»







where for i = 1, . . . , L − 1, valid solutions
#»
b̃ i are of the form given in (5.20) i.e. a
binary vector where the top half or bottom half of entries are 0. Equation (5.17)
becomes
#»







Now we turn our attention to Equations (5.18) and (5.19). The high level idea
for obtaining equations linear in unknowns is the same. We essentially rewrite the
equations in terms of a new single unknown that depends quadratically in the old
unknowns and then take note of the structure that this induces on valid solutions.
We only consider the term (Iℓ ⊗ S) ·
#»
b 0 from Equation (5.18) since the quadratic




i ∈ Rq corresponding to S ∈ Zn×nq , it is clear that if we know
the products si · (
#»
b 0)j for every (i, j) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} × {1, . . . , nℓ}, then we can
calculate (Iℓ⊗S)·
#»
b 0 since every entry will be a linear combination of these products.
Therefore, letting #»s ∈ Znq be the coefficient vector of s, we can write #»z s =
#»
b 0 ⊗ #»s
so that
(Iℓ ⊗ S) ·
#»
b 0 = Q · #»z s mod q
where Q ∈ Znℓ×n2ℓ2 is some known constant matrix. Note that this methodology is
the same as in [85] apart from the fact that Q here is defined using the structure
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of Rq. It is also useful here to express
#»
b 0 in terms of its binary decomposition
vector. In particular, we define
#»
b̃ 0 ∈ {0, 1}nℓ
2 to be the vertical concatenation of the
binary decomposition of entries in #»b 0. We can also rewrite #»s using a special binary
decomposition. In particular, set δj = ⌊(β1 + 2j−1)/2j⌋ for j = 1, . . . , ⌊logβ1⌋ + 1,
and Dβ1 = In ⊗ (δ1, . . . , δ⌊logβ1⌋+1). As in [86], we can efficiently find a vector
#»s ′ ∈
{−1, 0, 1}n(⌊logβ1⌋+1) such that Dβ1 #»s ′ = #»s for any #»s ∈ {−β1, . . . , β1}
n. In addition,∑⌊logβ1⌋+1
i=1 δi = β1, implying that ∥Dβ1 · #»s ∥∞ ≤ β1 for any #»s ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n(⌊logβ1⌋+1).




b 0. Similarly, defining
P := Q · (Hq ⊗Dβ) and #»z ′s :=
#»
b̃ 0 ⊗ #»s ′ we can write
(Iℓ ⊗ S) ·
#»
b 0 = P · #»z ′s mod q.
Note that we can derive a similar equation for t. We can also define Dβ2 similarly
to Dβ2 to decompose #»e 1, #»e 2 into trinary #»e ′1, #»e ′2.
5.6.4 The Final Linear System.
Finally, we arrive at the following system modulo q:
[G⊗|G⊗] ·
#»


























#»y 1 = P · #»z ′s +Dβ2 · #»e ′1
#»y 2 = P · #»z ′t +Dβ2 · #»e ′2 (5.23)
where valid solutions are such that:
•
#»
b̃ L = (1, 0)
T ⊗ #»c or (0, 1)T ⊗ #»c where for ĉi =
i−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, . . . , 0, 1
ℓ−i︷ ︸︸ ︷
, 0, . . . , 0),
#»c = (ĉ1∥ĉ2, ∥ . . . ∥ĉℓ)T ⊗
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1, 0, . . . , 0)T (5.24)
• for i = 1, . . . , L − 1,
#»
b̃ i ∈ {0, 1}2nℓ
2 and either the first or second nℓ2 entries
are 0
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•
#»
b̃ 0 ∈ {0, 1}nℓ
2
• #»z ′s =
#»
b̃ 0 ⊗ #»s ′ for some #»s ′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n(⌊logβ1⌋+1)




t ′ for some #»t ′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n(⌊logβ1⌋+1)
• #»e ′1, #»e ′2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}nℓ·(⌊logβ2⌋+1)
5.6.5 The Building Block Extensions and Permutations.




















to the system M · #»ψ = #»y implicit in Equations (5.22)-(5.23). We do this in the
standard way by extending the witness vector (while updating the system of equa-
tions), and then defining a set VALID along with a set of permutations Γ such that
the two key properties from Section 5.5 hold. We begin by describing an extension




It turns out that we do not need to extend the part of the witness comprising
#»
b̃ L. All we need to do is define the permutations indexed by bit b ∈ {0, 1}, πb :
{0, 1}2nℓ2 → {0, 1}2nℓ2 . Writing #»v = ( #»v 0, #»v 1) where #»v 0, #»v 1 ∈ {0, 1}nℓ
2 , we define πb
via the equation πb( #»v ) = ( #»v b, #»v b̄). In words, this permutation either does nothing
or switches a valid
#»
b̃ L to the other valid option according to the value of b ∈ {0, 1}.
Extension for
#»
b̃ 1, . . . ,
#»
b̃ L−1
Recalling that either the second or first half of entries in each of
#»
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0, we define the extension Ext0 to act as follows on a vector #»v ∈ {0, 1}2n
′ . Writing
#»v = ( #»v 1,
#»v 2) where #»v 1, #»v 2 ∈ {0, 1}n
′ and letting h be the hamming weight of #»v ,
we define




1, . . . , 1,
h︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, #»v 2,





#»v 2, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n′−h
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
h
) if #»v 1 =
#»
0 .
Define the permutation on vector entries τσ indexed by any σ ∈ Sn′ where Sn′
is the symmetric group on n′ elements as follows. Writing #»v 1 = (v1,1, . . . , v1,n′)
and #»v 2 = (v2,1, . . . , v2,n′), we let τσ( #»v ) := (v1,σ(1), . . . , v1,σ(n′), v2,σ(1), . . . , v2,σ(n′)).
The corresponding permutations accompanying Ext1 are given by πb ◦ τσ for any




For a vector #»v = (v1, . . . , vn′) ∈ {0, 1}n
′ , we define
Ext2( #»v ) = (v1, v̄1, v2, v̄2, . . . , vn′ , v̄n′) ∈ {0, 1}2n
′
.
The corresponding permutations ρ #»d : {0, 1}
2n′ → {0, 1}2n′ are indexed by #»d ∈
{0, 1}n′ . For #»w = (w1,0, w1,1, w2,0, w2,1, . . . , wn′,0, wn′,1), we define
ρ #»d (
#»w) := (w1,d1 , w1,d̄1 , . . . , wn′,dn′ , wn′,d̄n′ )
. The crucial observation is that
#»w = Ext2( #»v ) ⇐⇒ ρ #»d (










In [85], an extension and permutation for products of two bits compatible with
Stern’s protocol is presented. Inspired by this, we first show an extension and
permutation that can handle products between c1 ∈ {0, 1} and c2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. For
c ∈ {1, 2}, we use the notation c+c2 = c2 + c mod 3 and define
Ext3(c1, c2) := (c1c2, c1c+12 , c1c+22 , c̄1c2, c̄1c+12 , c̄1c+22 ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}6. (5.26)
Let cyc denote the clockwise cyclic permutation on entries of a 3 dimensional vector.
The corresponding building-block permutations are indexed by b1 ∈ {0, 1}, b2 ∈
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{−1, 0, 1}, and are defined by
T 3b1,b2 : (
#»v 0,
#»v 1) 7−→ (cycb2( #»v b1), cycb2( #»v b̄1))
where #»v i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}3 for i = 0, 1. This ensures that
#»v = Ext3(c1, c2) ⇐⇒ T 3b1,b2(
#»v ) = Ext3(c1 ⊕ b1, c2 ⊕3 b2) (5.27)
where ⊕3 denotes addition modulo 3 and #»v = ( #»v 0, #»v 1) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}6. This permu-
tation essentially one time pads both c1 and c2. We can generalise Ext3 and T 3(,) to
act on vectors #»a = (a1, . . . , an′) ∈ {0, 1}n
′ and #»b = (b1, . . . , bn′′) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n
′′ as
follows. Informally, the generalised extension Ext⊗3 is the vertical concatenation of
the Ext3((ai, bj)) ranging over i = 1, . . . , n′ and j = 1, . . . , n′′. More precisely,
Ext3,⊗( #»a ,
#»
b ) =Ext3(a1, b1)∥Ext3(a1, b2)∥ . . . ∥Ext3(a1, bn′′)∥ . . . ∥ . . . ∥ . . .
. . . Ext3(an′ , b1)∥Ext3(an′ , b2)∥ . . . ∥Ext3(an′ , bn′′).
Importantly, this generalised extension contains all entries arising in the tensor prod-
uct #»a ⊗ #»b , so can be considered as an extension of #»a ⊗ #»b . The generalised permu-




d = (d1, . . . , dn′′) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n
′′




. Writing #»v = ( #»v 1,1, . . . , #»v 1,n′′ , . . . , #»v n′,1, . . . , #»v n′,n′′) where





( #»v ) :=(T 3c1,d1(
#»v 1,1)∥T 3c1,d2(
#»v 1,2)∥ . . . ∥T 3c1,dn′′ (
#»v 1,n′′)∥ . . . ∥ . . . ∥ . . .
. . . ∥T 3cn′ ,d1(
#»v n′,1)∥T 3cn′ ,d2(
#»v n′,2)∥ . . . ∥T 3cn′ ,dn′′ (
#»v n′,n′′)).
Using these definitions, we have
#»v = Ext3,⊗( #»a ,
#»









Extension for #»e ′1, #»e ′2
Here we use the technique from [89]. For any #»v ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n′ with h−1, h0, h1
entries equal to −1, 0, 1 respectively, we define the extension
Ext′( #»v ) = ( #»v ∥
n′−h−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
−1, . . . ,−1,
n′−h0︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0,
n′−h1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1).
Note that this outputs a vector in {−1, 0, 1}3n′ with exactly n′ entries that take each
of the values −1, 0, 1. The corresponding permutations τ ′σ are indexed by σ ∈ S3n′
where S3n′ is the symmetric group over 3n′ elements. For #»w = (w1, . . . , w3n′), the
permutation τ ′σ is defined via τ ′σ( #»w) = (wσ(1), . . . , wσ(3n′)).
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5.6.6 The Full Extension, Permutation and Valid Set.





























This forces us to update the system of equations to M ′ · #»ψ ′ = #»y where the columns
of M make up a subset of the columns of M ′. We now conclude by defining the set
VALID and set of permutations Γ satisfying the key properties from Section 5.5.
We will say that #»v = ( #»v 1, #»v 2, . . . , #»v L, #»v L+1, #»v L+2, #»v L+3, #»v L+4, #»v L+5) ∈ VALID if
and only if:
• #»v 1 ∈ {0, 1}2nℓ
2 is either (1, 0)T ⊗ #»c or (0, 1)T ⊗ #»c where #»c is defined in
Equation (5.24).
• #»v 2, . . . , #»v L ∈ {0, 1}4nℓ
2 have Hamming weight nℓ2 with either the first half or
second half of entries all 0.
• #»v L+1 ∈ {0, 1}2nℓ
2 and is consistent with the form of vector output by Ext2.
• Letting #»w be the valid preimage of #»v L+1 under Ext2, #»v L+2 and #»v L+3 ∈
{−1, 0, 1}6n2ℓ2(log⌊β1⌋+1) are of the form Ext3,⊗( #»w, #»s ′′) and Ext3,⊗( #»w,
#»
t ′′) re-
spectively for some s′′, t′′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n(⌊logβ1⌋+1)
• #»v L+4, #»v L+5 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}3nℓ(⌊logβ2⌋+1) have an equal number of −1, 0, 1 entries
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The permutation set Γ is
Γϕ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2,1, ϕ2,2, . . . , ϕL,1, ϕL,2, ϕL+1, ϕL+2, . . . , ϕL+5),
ϕ1, ϕ2,1, ϕ3,1, . . . , ϕL,1 ∈ {0, 1}
ϕ2,2, . . . , ϕL,2 ∈ Snℓ2
ϕL+1 ∈ {0, 1}nℓ
2
ϕL+2, ϕL+3 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n(⌊logβ1⌋+1)











































Ext3,⊗( #»ν L+1 ⊗ #»s ′′)














Ext2( #»ν L+1 ⊕ ϕL+1)
Ext3,⊗(( #»ν L+1 ⊕ ϕL+1)⊗ ( #»s ′′ ⊕3 ϕL+2)
Ext3,⊗(( #»ν L+1 ⊕ ϕL+1)⊗ (
#»







The above implies both the first and second key properties required for the abstract
version of Stern’s protocol. In particular, for the second property, note that a
random permutation in Γ essentially one-time pads arguments in the Ext sections of
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